The failure of the SADC organ : regional security arrangements in southern Africa, 1992-2003 by Nathan, Laurence
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
THE FAILURE OF THE SADC ORGAN: 
REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS 
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1992-2003 
LAURENCE NATHAN 
Thesis Presented for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
In the Department of Historical Studies 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
AUGUST 2009 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation explores and analyses the establishment, evolution and effectiveness of 
the regional security arrangements of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) between 1992 and 2003. 
SADC was established in 1992 with a mandate to promote economic integration, poverty 
alleviation, peace, security and the evolution of common political values and institutions. 
With the ending of the Cold War and the imminent demise of apartheid in South Africa, it 
was a time of great hope and promise in Southern Africa. In the decade following 
SADC's formation, however, the region remained wracked by violent conflicts, which 
included the long-running civil war in Angola, a rebellion and full-blown war with state 
belligerents in the Democratic Republic of Congo and state repression and violence in 
Zimbabwe. 
In these circumstances SADC had a woeful record of peacemaking and was distinguished 
chiefly by its fractious internal quarrels. The major disagreements were around the 
orientation and strategies of peacemaking and regional security. The formation of the 
SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, a common security regime, 
was bedevilled by acrimonious disputes among member states over a ten-year period. 
Perversely, a vehicle that was intended to ease tensions and enhance unity and confidence 
had exactly the opposite effect. The process of drafting SADC's Mutual Defence Pact 
was similarly protracted and tortuous. This story is the subject of the dissertation. 
The dissertation seeks to answer the following questions: What are the reasons for 
SADC's failure to establish a viable security regime and engage in effective 
peacemaking? Why did SADC experience so much difficulty in forging its Mutual 
Defence Pact? Does SADC constitute an emerging security community? And what is the 
relationship between domestic stability and the establishment of a security community? 
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I argue that SADC's failure to create effective security arrangements was due to three 
problems. First, there was an absence of common values among member states. There 
were two key lines of division in this regard: between democratic and authoritarian 
domestic dispensations and between pacific and militarist tendencies in the foreign 
policies of states. The development of both the Organ and the Defence Pact floundered on 
the division between the pacific and militarist camps. The absence of a consensus on 
democracy prevented the organisation from addressing the violence and insecurity caused 
by authoritarianism and human rights abuses. 
In order to explore the significance of these divisions, I distinguish between the internal 
and external logic of a regional organisation as necessary but separate requirements for 
cohesion and effectiveness. The external logic, which is strong in Southern Africa, refers 
to the interests, gains and objective conditions that make the organisation a beneficial 
venture in the assessment of member states. The internal logic, which is weak in the case 
of SADC, refers to the normative congruence in the policies of member states that 
enables these states to engage in close political and security co-operation. In the absence 
of sufficient congruence, states are unable to resolve their major disputes, build trust, 
develop common policies and act with common purpose in crisis situations. Whereas the 
external logic is the fuel that drives a regional organisation, the internal logic is the glue 
that holds it together. 
The second major problem was that member states were loath to surrender a measure of 
sovereignty to regional structures and they were especially reluctant to set up a security 
regime with binding rules and decision-making. The concerns about diluting sovereignty 
stemmed from the political weakness of SADC states, which have only a tenuous hold on 
sovereignty, and from the lack of common values and shared vision of the security 
regime. 
The third critical problem was that Southern Africa was (and remains) characterised by 
small economies, underdevelopment and weak administrative capacity, which impaired 
the effectiveness ofaB SADC's forums and programmes. This problem was compounded 
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by the aversion of member states to centralising the co-ordination of regional 
programmes in a strong secretariat. 
The main conclusion regarding the problems that have frustrated SADC's efforts to 
create effective security arrangements - the absence of common values; fear of losing 
sovereignty; and weak states - is that these problems cannot be solved at the regional 
level. The capacity and orientation of a regional organisation derive from, and are 
constrained by, the capacity and orientation of its members. 
A number of writers have argued that the SADC region is a 'nascent' security 
community. I refute this claim on empirical and theoretical grounds. The claim does not 
take proper account of the circumstances of the region, many of hose people and states 
are deeply insecure, and it does not pay close attention to the content of the organisation'S 
security agreements. These agreements anticipate the possibility of inter- and intra-state 
violence and thus do not indicate movement towards the attainment of 'dependable 
expectations of peaceful change', which is the benchmark of a security community. 
I contend that domestic stability, defined as the absence of large-scale violence in a 
country, is a necessary condition of a security community. Large-scale domestic violence 
blocks the emergence of security communities because it makes people and states acutely 
insecure and creates the risk of cross-border destabilisation and violence. It also generates 
uncertainty, tension and mistrust among states, militating against integration and a sense 
of collective identity. I conclude that the security community benchmark of dependable 
expectations of peaceful change should apply as much within states as between them. The 
practical import is that SADC has no prospect of becoming a security community while 
its member states are plagued by domestic instability. 
In course of the dissertation I describe my personal involvement in SADC's efforts to set 
up a common security regime and show that the contribution and originality of the 
research derive in part from participant observation and access to official documents that 
are not in the public domain. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This dissertation explores and analyses the establishment, evolution and effectiveness of 
the regional security arrangements of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) between 1992 and 2003. The founding members of SA DC were Angola, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. The countries that subsequently acceded to the SADC Treaty were South 
Africa in 1994, Mauritius in 1995, Seychelles and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) in 1997 and Madagascar in 2005. The Seychelles withdrew in 2003 and then 
rejoined the organisation in 2008. 
The first Section of this introductory Chapter sets the scene, discussing the international 
expectation that regional organisations will playa prominent role in maintaining peace 
and security within their geographical domains, the mixed empirical record of regional 
organisations in this regard, and the dismal peacemaking history of SADC. The following 
Section considers some of the general factors that might account for the success or failure 
of regional organisations as conflict resolution formations. The Chapter then presents the 
focus and research questions of the dissertation; explains some of the key terms that are 
used in the study; summarises the main findings and conclusions; presents the research 
methodology; and concludes by outlining the organisation of the dissertation. 
1.2 Regional organisations as conflict resolution forums 
From the outset the United Nations (UN) has envisaged the engagement of regional 
bodies in conflict prevention and resolution. Article 52 of the UN Charter promotes 
regional arrangements and agencies for dealing with matters relating to the maintenance 
of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action and in a manner 
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consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN. Article 52 states further that the 
members of these arrangements and agencies must make every effort to achieve pacific 
settlement of local disputes before referring the disputes to the Security Council, and the 
Council will encourage pacific settlement of local disputes through ,such arrangements 
and agencies. Article 53 provides that the Council shall, where appropriate, use regional 
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority but insists that 
regional enforcement action should not take place without the Council's authorisation. 
Since the end of the Cold War, regional organisations have grown in number, prominence 
and assertiveness and the UN, whose own peacekeeping and peacemaking capacity has 
been overstretched, has strongly supported this trend. I In 1992 UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Gali issued a seminal report, An Agenda for Peace, which presented a 
bold and far-reaching perspective on preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding in the post-Cold War era.2 The report endorsed the role of regional 
organisations in all these spheres of activity, in co-operation with the UN, in order to 
lighten the burden of the UN Security Council and contribute to a "deeper sense of 
participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs". 3 The report also 
called for closer co-operation and co-ordination between the UN and regional 
organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security. This topic has 
subsequently been addressed in various ways: in a declaration passed by the UN General 
Assembly in 1994;4 in a resolution and statements issued by the Security Council;5 in 
lB. Boutros-Ghali, 1992, An Agenda/or Peace, New York: United Nations; M. Barnett, 1995, 'The UN, 
Regional Organisations and Peace-Keeping', Review 0/ International Studies, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 411-433; 
and M. Pugh and W. Sidhu (eds), 2003, The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond, 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
2 Boutros-Ghali,An Agenda/or Peace, op cit. 
3 Ibid, para 64. 
4 United Nations General Assembly, 1994, Declaration on the Enhancement of Cooperation between the 
United Nations and Regional Arrangements or Agencies in the Maintenance ofInternational Peace and 
Security, 9 December. 
5 United Nations Department of Public Information, 2005, 'Security Council Highlights Need to Further 
Strengthen Cooperation between UN, Regional Organizations in Maintenance oOnternational Peace, 
Security: Resolution 1631 (2005) Adopted Unanimously', media release, 17 October, retrieved on 6 
January 2009 from www.un.orgINewslPress/docsI2005!sc8526.doc.htm. 
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reports issued by the Secretary-General;6 and at regular high-level meetings between the 
UN Secretary-General and the heads of regional organisations.7 
The African Union (AU), set up in 2002 as the successor to the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU), regards SADC and the other "regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, 
management and resolution" as an integral part of its security architecture.8 The AU's 
Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the AU Commission are enjoined to 
work closely with the regional bodies and ensure that there are effective partnerships 
between these bodies and the Council in the promotion and maintenance of peace, 
security and stability.9 
Against this background and in light of the success of European institutions - chiefly the 
European Union (EU), the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) 
and the CSCE's successor, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE)IO - donor governments have assiduously promoted the replication of European 
models of integration in the South. I I They have pushed for the formation of regional 
organisations in areas where none are present, such as Central Asia,12 and have invested 
6 United Nations, 2001, 'Prevention of Armed Conflict. Report of the Secretary-General', UN document 
Al551985-S/2001l574, 7 June; United Nations, 2006, 'A Regional-Global Security Partnership: Challenges 
and Opportunities. Report ofthe Secretary-General', UN document Al611204-S/2006/590, 28 July; and 
United Nations, 2008, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Relationship between the United Nations 
and Regional Organizations, in particular the African Union, in the Maintenance ofInternational Peace and 
Security', UN document S/20081186, 7 April. 
7 For an overview of efforts to enhance co-operation between the UN and regional organisations, see 
Security Council Report, 2008, 'UN Cooperation with Regional and Subregional Organisations and 
Conflict Prevention', Update Report, no. 2, 14 April. 
8 African Union, 2002, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union, Durban, article 16. The Protocol can be viewed at www.africa-
uni on .org/root! A UI organs! psclProtocol peace%20and%20security. pdf 
9 Ibid, article 16(1). 
10 B. Meller, 2008, 'European Security: The Role of the European Union', Working Papers, series 2, no. 
29, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics; and B. Meller, 2008, 'European Security: 
The Role of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe', Working Papers, series 2, no. 30, 
Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics. 
11 J. Mayall, 1995, 'National Identity and the Revival of Regionalism', in L. Fawcett and A. Hurrell (eds), 
Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order, New York: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 169-198. 
12 A. Matveeva, 2007, 'The Regionalist Project in Central Asia: Unwilling Playmates', Working Papers, 
series 2, no. 13, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics. 
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A number of regional entities fall somewhere between these poles, successful at certain 
times or in certain respects but not others. For example, the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) is credited with the major achievement of preventing a war 
between member states but it has not played a useful role in intra-state crises (Section 
6.4).18 The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa has 
generally failed to address, let alone resolve, violent conflict between and within member 
states but between 2002 and 2005 it facilitated negotiations between the government of 
Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, culminating in a peace agreement 
that ended Africa's longest running civil war.19 The Economic Community of West 
African States (ECQWAS) has been extremely active in regional peacemaking;20 in the 
1990s it undertook peace enforcement operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea 
Bissau, drawing mixed reviews.21 
Where does SADC fit into this picture? The organisation was founded in 1992 with a 
mandate to promote economic integration, poverty alleviation, peace, security and the 
evolution of common political values and institutions. It was a time of great hope and 
promise in Southern Africa. In the late 1980s the Cold War had drawn to a close, easing 
regional tension as the intrusion of Superpower rivalry dissipated, and at the start of the 
new decade the global wave of democracy swept through the region with multi-party 
elections being held in sev ral countries for the first time. Most importantly, the system 
of minority rule in South Africa was about to be replaced with a democratic dispensation. 
18 Sridharan, 'Regional Organisations and Conflict Management', op cit; and A. Acharya, 1998, 'Collective 
Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia', in E. Adler and M. Barnett (eds), Security 
Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 198-227. 
19 L. Cliffe, 1999, 'Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Hom of Africa', Third World Quarterly, vol. 20, 
no. 1, pp. 89-111; and L.A. Schafer, 2007, 'Negotiating the North/South Conflict: Sudan's Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement', ISS Occasional Paper, no. 148, Institute for Security Studies, retrieved on 8 March 
2009 from www.iss.co.zalindex.php?link id=3&slink id=4833&link type=12&slink type=12&tmpl id=3. 
20 A. Adebajo, 2002, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner. 
21 M. Sesay, 1995, 'Collective Security or Collective Disaster? Regional Peace-keeping in West Africa', 
Security Dialogue, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 205-222; W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 1994, 'Regional Organisations and the 
Resolution ofInternal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia, International Peacekeeping, vol. 1. 
no. 3, pp. 261-302; H. Howe, 199617, 'Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping', 
International Security, vol. 21, no. 3, pp.l45-176; and D. Francis, 2000, 'Torturous Path to Peace: The 
Lome Peace Agreement and Post-War Peace Building and Reconstruction in Sierra Leone', Security 
Dialogue, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 357-373. 
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This would not only bring an end to Pretoria's destabiIisation of its neighbours but would 
also bring the region's most powerful country into the community of Southern African 
states. The historical patterns of conflict and war looked set to be replaced by amity and 
co-operation. With the involvement of South Africa, whose economy was treble the size 
of those of the other SADC states combined,22 it would be possible to foster development 
and tackle socio-economic problems in a co-ordinated and synergistic fashion. The region 
was awash with optimism, anticipating an era of stability, peace and development. 
Notwithstanding the spirit of optimism, the founders of SADC had no illusions that the 
region would be free of conflict. They agreed that it was necessary to create a framework 
and mechanisms to provide for stability, peace and security.23 The SADC Treaty of 1992 
thus provides that the organisation's principles include peaceful settlement of disputes, its 
objectives include the promotion and defence of peace and security and its member states 
must conclude a protocol on co-operation and integration in the area of "politics, 
diplomacy, international relations, peace and security".24 In 1996 SADC formed the 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, a common security regime 
charged with promoting peace and security through political, military and security co-
operation and the peaceful settlement of inter- and intra-state conflict.25 In 2001 the 
SADC heads of state and government approved the Protocol on Politics, Defence and 
Security Co-operation, which sets out the objectives, jurisdiction, structures and modus 
operandi of the Organ. Two years later the heads of state and government concluded the 
SADC Mutual Defence Pact, which deals with military collaboration and collective 
action in response to an armed attack against a signatory party. 
22 This figure is based on the economic data contained in SADCC, 1992, 'Theme Document'. Maputo, 29-
31 January, pp. 9-11. 
23 SADC, 1992, Towards the Southern African Development Community: A Declaration by the Heads of 
State or Government of Southern African States. Windhoek, pp. 9-10. 
24 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, 1992, Windhoek, articles 4, 5 and 21. 
25 There are many SADC documents that refer to the security body as the Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security (e.g. SADC, 2001, Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, Blantyre). However, 
the amended SADC Treaty of 200 1 refers to the body as the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-
operation. 
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In the decade following SADC's formation, the region remained wracked by a high level 
of violent conflict. The most prominent conflicts were the long-running civil war in 
Angola that ended in 2002; election disputes, a mutiny and an external military 
intervention in Lesotho in 1998; a rebellion and full-blown war with state belligerents in 
the DRC, which began in 1998 and continues to flare up periodically; and, continuously 
from 2000, state repression and violence in Zimbabwe. 
Despite the existence of the Organ, SADC has a woeful record of peacemaking. In most 
of the crises that beset the region it refrained from diplomatic engagement and critical 
comment. It played no meaningful role in relation to the Angolan civil war and was 
sorely divided over the DRC rebellion. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia responded to the 
rebeIlion by deploying troops in support of Congolese President Kabila while South 
Africa, backed by Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, pursued a diplomatic solution 
and championed a ceasefire. The divergent strategies generated acute animosity within 
SADC and crippled the Organ. The organisation fared no better in relation to the 
Zimbabwe crisis. For several years after the onset of the reign of terror in that country, 
the SADC heads of state expressed solidarity with Harare and ignored the human rights 
abuses. It was only in 2007 that they appointed one of their members, President Mbeki of 
South Africa, to mediate in Zimbabwe. 
In short, the promise of peace and security in Southern Africa has not been realised and 
SADC has been distinguished less by its peacemaking efforts than by its fractious internal 
quarrels. Of great significance and irony is the fact that the major quarrels have been 
around the orientation and strategies of peacemaking and regional security. The 
formation of the Organ was bedevilled by acrimonious disputes among member states 
over a ten-year period. Perversely, a vehicle that was intended to ease tensions and 
enhance unity and confidence had exactly the opposite effect. The process of drafting 
SADC's Mutual Defence Pact was similarly protracted and tortuous. This story is the 
subject of the dissertation. 
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1.3 Accounting for the peacemaking effectiveness of regional organisations 
As noted above, the effectiveness of regional organisations in relation to peace and 
security differs from one organisation to another. There are specific historical and 
political reasons for success and failure in each case but it is also possible that there are 
general explanatory factors that apply across a range of cases. There has been no rigorous 
comparative study in this regard, however, with the result that there are no general 
theories that explain why certain regional organisations are better than others at conflict 
prevention, management and resolution.26 A review ofthe published case studies suggests 
that the following factors are significant:27 
.. Conflict in the region. The prevalence, scope, nature and intensity of intra- and inter-
state conflict in a region shape the regional organisation's peace and security agenda 
and its ability to deal successfully with that agenda. As in the case of SAARC and 
lOAD, a high level of conflict between member states might prevent the organisation 
from functioning in a cohesive manner. Regional organisations might consequently be 
least effective at peacemaking in those regions where they are needed most. 
.. State capacity and cohesion. The political, economic and administrative strength of 
member states is likely to have a major bearing on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the regional body. A regional organisation might or might not reflect its members' 
strengths but it will almost certainly inherit their weaknesses. 
II Organisational mandate. The organisation's mandate in relation to peace and security 
will naturally influence its activities in this regard. For example, the formal or 
informal mandate might exclude efforts to address intra-state conflict on the grounds 
that such efforts would undermine sovereignty and violate the principle of non-
26 One of the studies on regional organisations cited above - Acharya and Johnston, Crafting Cooperation, 
op cit - compares the effectiveness ofregionai organisations but does not focus specifically on peace and 
security. 
27 L. Nathan, 2007, 'Preliminary Ideas on Regional Organisations, Peace and Security', presented at the 
Annual Workshop ofthe Crisis States Research Centre, Cape Town, 20-24 August. 
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interference in domestic affairs?8 The mandate might even go so far as to exclude 
inter-state disputes and 'contentious issues' .29 
.. Common values. The degree of normative congruence among member states has a 
strong influence on their level of trust, their willingness to forge and adhere to 
common policies on security and foreign affairs and their ability to act with common 
purpose in crisis situations. Over time, common values might come to constitute the 
strategic or political culture of the organisation. On the other hand, as discussed at 
length in this dissertation with respect to SADC, the absence of common values might 
render the organisation ineffectual in the domain of high politics. 
.. The regional hegemon. The role and posture of the regional hegemon or dominant 
state has a major bearing on the organisation's effectiveness. This might explain why 
the peacemaking initiatives of ECOWAS, which have been driven by Nigeria, have 
been much more extensive and robust than those of SADC, which has been relatively 
neglected by South Africa (Section 5.6). Yet in certain regions the critical factor is 
not simply the posture of the hegemon but rather the relationship between the two 
most powerful countries. Whereas the co-operative relationship between France and 
Germany since World War II has spurred the process of European integration,30 the 
conflictual relationships between South Africa and Zimbabwe and between India and 
Pakistan have impeded progress in their respective regions. 31 
.. Extra-regional actors. The role played by extra-regional actors in relation to regional 
politics and the regional organisation might be a significant enabling or constraining 
28 This is the case with ASEAN. See Sridharan, 'Regional Organisations and Conflict Management', op cit. 
29 The SAARC Charter of 1985 expresses a desire to promote peace, stability, amity and progress in South 
Asia through methods that include peaceful settlement of disputes but it also states that bilateral disputes 
and contentious issues shall be excluded from the deliberations ofthe organisation. See the Charter of the 
South Asian Associationfor Regional Cooperation at www.saarc-sec.orgldataldocs/charter.pdf. 
30 T. Pedersen, 1998, Germany, France and the Integration of Europe: A Realist Interpretation, London: 
Pinter. 
31 L. Nathan, 2008, 'Power, Security and Regionalism in Southern Africa and South Asia', presented at the 
Seminar on State Failure and Regional Security, International Peace Research Institute of Oslo and 
Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Oslo, 11-12 December. 
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factor. The relevant actors include foreign powers, the UN and other international 
bodies. 
.. Regional political economy. The relevant factors here include the actual and 
comparative economic strength of member states and the extent of regional economic 
integration, trade and infrastructure. In the 1960s and 1970s functionalist theories of 
integration, based on the experience of Europe, suggested that increasing economic 
co-operation and interdependence within a region would have a pacifying effect, 
reducing the risk of inter-state violence in particular.32 In the current period the policy 
emphasis of the AU is different: achieving political stability through peacemaking 
and good governance is viewed as a necessary pre-condition for investment, trade and 
economic growth.33 This logic is also evident in SADe's founding documents 
(Section 2.3). 
.. Domestic politics and policies. Domestic politics and policies shape regional politics 
and the regional organisation in various ways. For example, as explored in this 
dissertation, whether the regional body has a pacific or militarist approach to security 
and peacemaking depends on the foreign policies of member states. Domestic politics 
might favour regional integration endeavours or they might give rise to conflictual 
relations between neighbouring states and thereby impede such endeavours. 
.. Learning organisation. Although difficult to observe and measure, the degree to 
which a regional organisation identifies and acts on lessons from its previous 
peacemaking engagements might be a relevant factor. There are countless 
publications and seminars on 'lessons learnt' from the peace and security initiatives 
of the UN and regional bodies but it is not always clear that these organisations have 
in fact learnt and applied the lessons. 
32 E.B Haas, 1958, The Uniting oJ Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press; and E.B. Haas, 1961, 'International Integration: The European and the Universal 
Process', International Organization, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 366-392. 
33 This is one ofthe main themes of the New Partnership for Africa's Development, which is an integrated 
socio-economic framework for Africa's development. See www.nepad.org. 
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.. Role of leaders. The leaders of member states (e.g. presidents, prime ministers and 
foreign ministers) might have a major impact on the organisation's direction and 
effectiveness. For example, since the end of World War II regional integration in 
Europe has been championed by French, German and Belgian leaders. In Southern 
Africa, by contrast, there have been few national champions of the regional 
integration project. In the 1990s President Mugabe of Zimbabwe was the most active 
head of state regarding the creation of regional security arrangements (Chapter 3), 
while President Mbeki was more interested in the continental mechanisms of the New 
Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) and the AU (Section 5.6). In 1999 the 
Foreign Minister of Swaziland, Albert Shabangu, played a pivotal and courageous 
role in unblocking the SADC Organ impasse (Section 3.5). 
Through a comprehensive historical examination of SADC's security arrangements and 
performance, this dissertation aims to enhance our understanding of the factors outlined 
above and thereby contribute to the generation of knowledge about the effectiveness of 
regional organisations in relation to peace and security. 
1.4 Research focus and questions 
The focus of the dissertation is on the establishment, evolution and effectiveness of 
SADC's regional security arrangements between 1992 and 2003.34 Three types of 
institutional arrangement are considered: a common security regime; a mutual defence 
pact; and a security community. These terms are defined in Section 1.5. 
34 For discussions on SADC's economic development and trade relations, see J.D. Lewis, S. Robinson and 
K. Thierfelder, 2003, 'Free Trade Agreements and the SADC Economies', Journal of African Economies, 
vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 156-206; c.L. McCarthy, 1999, 'Polarised Development in a SADC Free Trade Area', 
South African Journal of Economics, vol. 67, noA, pp. 211-220; D. Hansohm, W. Breytenbach, T. 
Hartzenberg and C. McCarthy, 2004, Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook., 2004, 
vol. 4, Windhoek: Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit; and P. Khandelwal, 2004, 'COMESA and 
SADC: Prospects and Challenges for Regional Trade Integration', IMF Working Papers, no. 041227, 
International Monetary Fund. 
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The dissertation seeks to answer the following questions: 
II What are the reasons for SADC's failure to establish a viable security regime and 
engage in effective peacemaking? 
II Why did SADC experience so much difficulty in forging its Mutual Defence Pact? 
II Does SADC constitute an emerging security community? 
II What is the relationship between domestic stability and the establishment of a 
security community? 
1.5 Definition of terms 
This Section explains briefly some of the key terms that are used in the dissertation. 
In the discourse of SADC the concept of 'security' has different meanings depending on 
the context. It refers variously to stability within and between states, to the security of 
states and people and to the military and non-military dimensions of security. The term is 
generally used in a broad, holistic sense. When applied to cabinet ministers or the 
security services, however, 'public security' refers to policing and 'state security' refers 
to the intelligence sector. 
A 'security regime' can be defined as a set of principles, rules, norms and decision-
making procedures that constitute institutionalised co-operation and permit states to 
exercise restraint in the belief that others will reciprocate.35 In the International Relations 
literature the terms 'regime' and 'institution' are used interchangeably. A security regime 
can take a number of forms, including a common security regime and a mutual defence 
35 See R. Jervis, 1983, 'Security Regimes', in S.D. Krasner (ed), International Regimes, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, pp. 173-194; and S.D. Krasner, 1983, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: 
Regimes as Intervening Variables', in Krasner, International Regimes, op cit, pp. 1-21. 
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treaty. States can belong simultaneously to a range of security regimes that have the same 
or different members and territorial boundaries. 
'Common security' is the conceptual basis and organising principle of the Organ. It flows 
from the Palme Commission's thesis that states are interdependent and more likely to 
obtain security through political co-operation than military competition.36 In the Southern 
African context, the concept of a 'common security regime' reflects SADC's view that 
member states are interdependent, regional security is consequently a collective 
enterprise and "institutional arrangements [are] required to ensure political stability and 
mutual security as critical components of regional co-operation and integration".37 From 
this perspective, 'common security' can be regarded as synonymous with 'co-operative 
security' . 
A 'mutual defence treaty' typically entails a commitment by the signatories to a high 
level of military co-operation and to support each other, if necessary through the use of 
force, in the event that one of them is subject to an armed attack. This arrangement is 
referred to as 'collective defence', the best known example being the NATO Treaty.38 
According to Karl Deutsch and his colleagues, a 'security community' exists where a 
group of people has attained a level of integration and sense of community strong enough 
for its members to enjoy dependable expectations of peaceful change and a real assurance 
that their disputes will be settled by means other than fighting. 39 States that comprise a 
security community regard the threat and use of force against each other as unthinkable 
and eschew preparations for fighting one another. The features of a security community 
are explored in Chapter 6. 
36 Palme Commission, 1984, Common Security: A Programmefor Disarmament, London: Pan. For a 
review of the literature on common security, see A. Butfoy, 1997, Common Security and Strategic Reform: 
A Critical Analysis, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
37 SADC, Towards the Southern African Development Community, op cit, pp. 9-10. 
38 The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 can be viewed at www.nato.int/doculbasictxtltreaty.htm. 
39 K.W. Deutsch, S.A. Burrell, RA. Kann, M. Lee Jr., M. Lichterman, R.E. Lindgren, F.L. Loewenheim 
and R.W. Van Wagenen, 1957, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International 
Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 5-7; and 
Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, op cit. 
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In the course of this dissertation I claim that the SADC debates on security arrangements 
were polarised between militarist and pacific camps. By 'militarist' I mean a foreign 
policy preference for military forms of regional conflict resolution, and the term 'pacific' 
refers to a foreign policy preference for diplomatic and other political forms of 
peacemaking. These orientations reflect preferences rather than absolute dispositions. As 
we will see in chapters 3 and 4, the militarist camp in SADC was not opposed in principle 
to political negotiations and the pacific camp did not reject the use of force in all 
circumstances. 
1.6 Main findings and conclusions 
In this Section I summarise the main findings and conclusions of the dissertation and 
indicate the ways in which it differs from and contributes to both the literature on 
regional security in Southern Africa and the International Relations literature on security 
communities. In the following Section on methodology I describe my personal 
involvement in SADC's efforts to set up a common security regime and show that the 
contribution and originality of the dissertation also derive from participant observation 
and access to official documents that are not in the public domain. 
1.6.1 SADC 's failure to create effective security arrangements 
Many analysts in Southern Africa have attributed SADC's inability to establish a viable 
security regime to disagreements among member states over the regime's status and 
structures, to a struggle for hegemony between South Africa and Zimbabwe and to 
personal animosity between their respective presidents.4o This perspective is not wholly 
40 M. Malan, 1998, 'Regional Power Politics under Cover ofSADC - Running Amok with a Mythical 
Organ',ISS Paper, no. 35, Institute for Security Studies; A.W. Tapfumaneyi, 1999, 'Regional Security 
Cooperation in Southern Africa: A View from Zimbabwe', Global Dialogue, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 23-26; C. de 
Coning, 1999, 'Breaking the SADC Organ Impasse: Report of a Seminar on the Operationalisation of the 
SADC Organ', ACCORD Occasional Paper, no. 6, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of 
Disputes; B. Tsie, 1998, 'Regional Security in Southern Africa: Whither the SADC Organ on Politics, 
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inaccurate but it is incomplete and superficial because it focuses on manifestations of 
deeper problems. By way of example, Mark Malan has suggested that defining the 
concept of the Organ and determining its relationship to SADC was not as daunting as it 
appeared if viewed in isolation from regional jealousies and power plays.41 This claim 
reflects a misreading of the situation. Underlying the regional power plays were major 
policy and strategic differences between member states and it was precisely these 
differences that made SADC's labours to define the concept of the Organ so daunting and 
protracted. 
In an article on the challenges of security integration in Southern Africa, Ann 
Hammerstad distinguishes between a traditional military alliance, which aims to ensure 
collective defence against internal and external enemies, and a common security 
approach, which seeks to overcome animosities and fears between states and to create 
mechanisms for peaceful resolution of inter- and intra-state conflict.42 Hammerstad 
maintains that most SADC governments prefer the collective defence strategy; this 
approach is unsuited to the Southern African context, she argues, and should be 
abandoned in favour of a common security strategy. This, too, constitutes a misreading of 
the situation. As discussed in Chapter 3, for over a decade the SADC states were split 
between into two groupings, the one promoting collective defence and other advocating a 
common security regime; the two groupings were of roughly equal political strength, 
giving rise to the lengthy impasse around the Organ; and the official outcome, in the form 
of the Organ Protocol and the Mutual Defence Pact, is a hybrid model weighted in favour 
of common security. 
Defence and Security?', Global Dialogue, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 8-10; L. M0rup, 2004, 'Strengthening African 
Security Capacities: Research Project on How Demark Can Make a Difference in Strengthening African 
Regional Security Organisations', DIIS Report, no. 2004:3, Danish Institute for International Studies; M. 
Malan and J. eilliers, 1997, 'The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: Future Developments', 
Occasional Paper, no. 19, Institute for Security Studies; M. van Aardt, 1997, 'The Emerging Security 
Framework in Southern Africa: Regime or Community?" Strategic Review for Southern Africa, vol. 19, 
no. 1, pp. 1-30, May; M. Baregu, 2003, 'Economic and Military Security', in M. Baregu and C. Landsberg 
(eds), From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges, Boulder and London: Lynne 
Rienner, pp. 19-30; and T. Nkiwane, 2003, 'The Quest for Good Governance', in Baregu and Landsberg, 
From Cape to Congo, op cit, pp. 53-72. 
41 Malan, 'Regional Power Politics under Cover of SADC', op cit, pg. 3. 
42 A. Hammerstad, 2005, 'Domestic Threats, Regional Solutions? The Challenge of Security Integration in 
Southern Africa', Review of International Studies, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 69-87. 
24 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
In this dissertation I argue that SADC's failure to create effective security arrangements 
between 1992 and 2003 was due to three substantial problems. First, there was an 
absence of common values among member states. There were two key lines of division in 
this regard: between democratic and authoritarian orientations in the domestic policies of 
these states, and between pacific and militarist tendencies in their foreign policies. The 
development of both the Organ and the Mutual Defence Pact floundered on the division 
between the pacific and militarist camps. The two camps held their respective positions 
so strongly, and regarded these positions as so divergent, that they found it extremely 
difficult to bridge the differences and forge a collective stance on regional security and 
peacemaking. The absence of a consensus on democracy did not inhibit the endorsement 
of democratic norms in SADC's official statements but it prevented the organisation in 
practice from addressing the violence and insecurity caused by authoritarianism and 
human rights abuses. 
In order to explore the significance of the normative divisions in SADC, I distinguish 
between the internal and external logic of a regional organisation as necessary but 
separate requirements for cohesion and effectiveness. The external logic, which is strong 
in Southern Africa, refers to the interests, gains and objective conditions that make the 
organisation a beneficial venture in the assessment of member states. The internal logic, 
which is weak in the case of SADC, refers to the normative congruence in the policies of 
member states that enables these states to engage in close political and security co-
operation. In the absence of sufficient congruence, states are unable to resolve their major 
disputes, build trust, develop common policies and act with common purpose in crisis 
situations. Whereas the external logic is the fuel that drives a regional organisation, the 
internal logic is the glue that holds it together. 
The second major problem was that member states were loath to surrender a measure of 
sovereignty to regional structures and they were especially reluctant to set up a collective 
security regime that encompassed binding rules and decision-making and the possibility 
of interference in domestic affairs. The concerns about diluting sovereignty stemmed 
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from the political weakness of states, which have only a tenuous hold on sovereignty, and 
from the lack of common values, mutual trust and shared vision of the security regime. 
There has been very little discussion on sovereignty in SADC's official documents and in 
the academic literature on regional security in Southern Africa. This is surprising because 
the conservative approach of member states to sovereignty has severely undermined the 
operation of the Organ, the SADC Treaty and the integration project as a whole. 
The third critical problem was that Southern Africa was (and remains) characterised by 
small economies, underdevelopment and weak administrative capacity, which have 
impaired the effectiveness of all SADC's forums and programmes. This problem was 
compounded for many years by the aversion of member states to ce tralising the co-
ordination of regional programmes in a strong secretariat. Given their opposition to 
transferring sovereignty to the regional organisation, states favoured a decentralised 
model with a small secretariat that lacked authority. With respect to security 
arrangements, they preferred an informal and flexible approach to one that was 
centralised, bureaucratic and based on formal rules and procedures; this had the effect of 
thwarting the achievement of institutional cohesion, continuity and predictability. Several 
writers have bemoaned the SADC Secretariat's limited capacity to support the 
functioning of the Organ.43 They fail to recognise, however, that this is due not to a 
shortage of funds but rather to the conviction of member states that the Secretariat should 
not be involved in regional security and other aspects of 'high politics'. 
The main conclusion regarding the problems that have frustrated SADC's efforts to 
create effective security arrangements - the absence of common values; fear of losing 
sovereignty; and weak states - is that these problems cannot be solved at the regional 
level. The capacity and orientation of a regional organisation derive from, and are 
constrained by, the capacity and orientation of its members. Analysts who imagine that 
SADC is something other than a forum of states, that it can somehow transcend the 
differences between them and that it can do things without their consent have 
43 See, for example, L.M. Fisher and N. Ngoma, 2005, 'The SADC Organ: Challenges in the New 
Millennium', ISS Paper, no. 114, Institute for Security Studies, pg. 7; and A. Adebajo, 2005, 'ECOWAS 
and SADC: A Tale of Two Invalids?', City Press, 22 May. 
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misunderstood the essence of the organisation. By way of example, Augostinho Zacarias 
and other writers have suggested that SADC should drive the democratic transformation 
of its members;44 adopt a structure that ensures the promotion of democratic 
governance;45 tackle domestic security problems;46 and forge a consensus on human 
security and appropriate peacebuilding strategies.47 None of this is in fact possible 
because SADC has no identity, authority and capabilities other than those conferred on it 
by its member states, many of which have little interest in democratic transformation and 
human security and all of which reject emphatically any external interference in their 
domestic affairs. 
Given these dynamics, it is erroneous to suggest that the Organ will gradually evolve and 
become more successful with the passing of time.48 The security body is only likely to 
become effective if it is driven energetically by a core group of democratic states that are 
willing to devote adequate resources to it, provide incentives for compliance with 
SADC's democratic norms and put pressure on states that deviate from these norms. The 
necessary composition and size of such a group is a matter of debate but it would have to 
include, at the very least, South Africa and a democratic Zimbabwe working with 
common purpose. 
1.6.2 SADC as an emerging security community 
A number of writers have claimed that the SADC region is a 'nascent', 'embryonic' or 
'emerging' security community.49 They justify this claim with reference to the 
44 A. Zacarias, 2003, 'Redefining Security', in Baregu and Landsberg, From Cape to Congo, op cit, pp. 31-
51 at pp. 47-48. 
45 M. Baregu and C. Landsberg, 2003, 'Southern Africa's Security Architecture: Challenges and Prospects', 
in Baregu and Landsberg, From Cape to Congo, op cit, pp. 345-354 at pg. 353. 
46 Hammerstad, 'Domestic Threats, Regional Solutions?', op cit, at pg. 87. 
47 Baregu and Landsberg, 'Southern Africa's Security Architecture', op cit; and R. Williams, 2001, 'From 
Collective Security to Peacebuilding? The Challenges of Managing Regional Security in Southern Africa', 
in Clapham, Mills, Momer and Sidiropoulos, Regional Integration in Southern Africa, op cit, pp. 10 1-113 
at pp. 109-112. 
48 G. Cawthra, 2008, 'Collaborative Regional Security and Mutual Defence: SADC in Comparative 
Perspective', Politikon, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 159-176 at pp. 171-2. 
49 N. Ngoma, 2003, 'SADC: Towards a Security Community?" African Security Review, vol. 12, no. 3, 
Institute for Security Studies, pp. 17-28; N. Ngoma, 2004, 'SADC's Mutual Defence Pact: A Final Move to 
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construction of SADC's security architecture through the formation of the Organ in 1996, 
the approval of the Organ Protocol in 2001 and the conclusion of the Mutual Defence 
Pact in 2003. I argue on empirical and theoretical grounds that this perspective is 
mistaken. It is based on official agreements and structures rather than on the actual 
circumstances of the SADC region, many of whose people and states are deeply insecure, 
and it does not pay proper attention to the content of the agreements. The Protocol and 
the Pact anticipate the possibility of large-scale violence within and between countries 
and thus do not indicate movement towards the attainment of 'dependable expectations of 
peaceful change', the benchmark of a security community. On the contrary, the 
documents reflect a community of insecurity and this indeed is an accurate reflection of 
the Southern African reality. 
At a theoretical level I contend that domestic stability, defined as the absence of large-
scale violence in a country, is a necessary condition of a security community. Large-scale 
domestic violence blocks the emergence of security communities because it makes people 
and states acutely insecure and creates the risk of cross-border destabilisation and 
violence. It also generates uncertainty, tension and mistrust among states, militating 
against integration and a sense of collective identity. I conclude that the security 
community benchmark of dependable expectations of peaceful change should apply as 
much within states as between them. The practical import is that SADC has no prospect 
of becoming a security community while its member states are plagued by domestic 
instability. 
a Security Community?" The Round Table, vol. 93, no. 375, pp. 411-423; N. Ngoma, 2005, Prospects for 
a Security Community in Southern Africa: An Analysis of Regional Security in the Southern African 
Development Community, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies; M. van Aardt, 1997, 'The Emerging 
Security Framework in Southern Africa: Regime or Community?" Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 
vol. 19, no. I, pp. 1-30; M.S. Lund and E. Roig, 1999, 'Southern Africa: An Emerging Security 
Community", in M. Mekenkamp, P. van Tongeren and H. van de Veen (eds), Searchingfor Peace in 
Africa: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities, pp. 391-5; F. SOderbaum, 1998, 
'The New Regionalism in Southern Africa", Politeia, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 75-94 at pp. 79-80; 1. Selebi, 1999, 
'Building Collaborative Security in Southern Africa', African Security Review, vol. 8, no. 5; and 
Hammerstad, 'Domestic Threats, Regional Solutions?', op cit. For a contrary view arguing that SADC is 
not a security community, see T. Neethling, 2003, 'Pursuing a Functional Security Community in Southern 
Africa: Is It Possible after All?', Strategic Review for Southern Africa, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 29-52. 
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The theoretical argument is an original contribution to the International Relations 
literature, which neglects the connection between political stability and security 
communities and misconstrues Deutsch's concept as applying exclusively to an absence 
of war between countries. 50 I show that Deutsch also viewed large-scale violence within 
countries as a fatal impediment to the formation of a security community.51 He put his 
position very briefly, though, without offering any empirical or theoretical elaboration. 
This dissertation seeks to address that gap. It explores the relationship between security 
communities, domestic violence, structural instability and the character of political 
systems, and concludes that democratic systems are a necessary feature of these 
communities. 
1.6.3 The significance of common values 
Of the various obstacles to SADC playing a useful role in relation to peace and security, 
the most important has been the absence of common values. The lack of collective 
support for the democratic principles enshrined in the SADC Treaty prevented the 
organisation from dealing decisively with the crisis that commenced in Zimbabwe in 
2000, from addressing other undemocratic practices in the region and from promoting 
human security through the rule of law and respect for human rights. For over a decade 
the normative differences between the pacific and militarist camps, and the animosity and 
mistrust induced by these differences, obstructed the establishment of a workable security 
50 E. Adler and M. Barnett, 1998, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities', in Adler and 
Barnett, Security Communities, op cit, pp. 29-65 at pg. 34; J. Mearsheimer, 1994/95, 'The False Promise of 
International Institutions', International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 5-49 at pp. 38-39; A. Wendt, 1995, 
'Constructing International Politics', International Security, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 71-81 at pg. 73; O. Waever, 
1998, 'Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community', in Adler and 
Barnett, Security Communities, op cit, pp. 69-118 at pg. 104; R. Jervis, 2002, 'Theories of War in an Era of 
Leading-Power Peace. Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 2001', American 
Political Science Review, vol. 96, no. 1, pp. 1-14 at pg. 1; M. Pugh, 2003, 'The World Order Politics of 
Regionalization', in Pugh and Sidhu, The United Nations and Regional Security, op cit, pp. 31-46 at pp. 
39-40; M. Ayoob, 1999, 'From Regional System to Regional Society: Exploring Key Variables in the 
Construction of Regional Order', Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 53, no. 3, pp. 247-260 at 
pg. 250; and M. Mousseau, H. Hegre and J.R. Oneal, 2003, 'How the Wealth of Nations Conditions the 
Liberal Peace', European Journal of International Relations, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 277-314 at pg. 287. 
51 K.W. Deutsch, 1961, 'Security Communities', in J. Rosenau (ed},International Politics and Foreign 
Policy, New York: Free Press, pp. 98-105 at pp. 99-103. 
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strategies for pursuing their interests, through the lens of values and ideas that are rooted 
in domestic history and politics and sometimes inspired by international developments.52 
At the time of SADC's formation the drafters of the organisation's founding documents 
recognised the importance of common values as the glue that would bind member states 
and lay the platform for regional security. The documents thus placed a premium on the 
evolution of common political values, systems and institutions (Section 2.5). Subsequent 
events showed that this perspective was eminently correct but that the aspiration could 
not be met. The Southern African experience supports Connie Peck's observation that 
common values, their codification into well-developed norms and adherence by member 
states to these values and norms are key determinants in the success or otherwise of 
regional organisations. 53 
1.7 Methodology 
Between 1992 and 2001 I was involved in official efforts to set up a common security 
regime in Southern Africa. I served as an advisor on regional security to the SADC 
Secretariat from 1992 to 1996; to the Foreign Minister of Mozambique, Pascoal 
Mocumbi, in 1994 and 1995; to the South African Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, and 
Deputy Minister of Defence, Ronnie Kasrils, between 1994 and 1999; and to the Foreign 
Minister of Swaziland, Albert Shabangu, when he oversaw the finalisation of the Organ 
Protocol in 1999 and 2000. As a result of these engagements, I was the drafter of the 
section on regional security in SADC's 1993 Framework and Strategy document (Section 
52 On the importance of ideas, values and norms in international relations and foreign policy, see Deutsch, 
Political Community, op cit; Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, op cit; A. Acharya, 2004, 'How 
Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism', 
International Organization, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 239-275; M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, 1998, 'International 
Norm Dynamics and Political Change', International Organization, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 887-917; J. 
Goldstein and R.O. Keohane, 1993, Ideas and Foreign Policy: BeliefS, Institutions, and Political Change, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press; A. Wendt, 1992, 'Anarchy is What States Make ont: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics", International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 391-425; and C. Peck, 
2001, 'The Role of Regional Organizations in Preventing and Resolving Conflict', in Crocker, Hampson 
and Aali, Turbulent Peace, op cit, pp. 561-583. 
53 Peck, 'The Role of Regional Organizations', op cit, pp. 578-579. 
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2.6);54 the South African White Paper on Defence of 1994 (Section 3.6);55 and the Organ 
Protocol of 2001 (Section 3.5). I participated in meetings of government officials from 
the SADC states and had access to documentation that was not in the public domain. In 
this dissertation I quote from documents that are not available publicly and show how 
critical formulations in official texts were amended during the drafting process as a result 
of state concerns and disputes. 
In light of the above, the primary research undertaken for this dissertation was based on 
three sources: documents produced by SADC, such as reports, minutes and 
communiques; observations as a participant in the organisation's endeavours to forge co-
operative security arrangements; and personal communication with officials in the SADC 
Secretariat, the South African departments of foreign affairs and defence, and foreign 
affairs officials from Mozambique and Swaziland. 
The arguments contained in the dissertation have evolved over a number of years. 56 
While on sabbatical at the London School of Economics in 2004 and 2005, I benefited 
greatly from the opportunity to present papers and receive feedback at seminars and 
conferences in the UK and South Africa.57 The feedback identified the need to formulate 
some of the arguments more clearly and led to a refinement of the main ideas. There were 
54 SADC, 1993, Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy for Building the Community, Harare, January. 
55 Republic of South Africa, 1996, White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, 
available at www.info.gov.za/whitepapersIl996/defencwp.htm. 
56 L. Nathan, 2002, 'Organ Failure: A Review of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security', in L. 
Laakso (ed), Regional Integrationfor Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in Africa: Europe, SADC 
and ECOWAS, Helsinki: Department of Political Science, University of Helsinki, pp. 62-102; L. Nathan, 
2006, 'SADC's Uncommon Approach to Common Security, 1992-2003', Journal of Southern African 
Studies, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 605-622; L. Nathan, 2006, 'Domestic Instability and Security Communities', 
European Journal of International Relations, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 275-299; and L. Nathan, 2005, 
'Consistencies and Inconsistencies in South Africa's Foreign Policy in Africa', International Affairs, vol. 
81, no.2,pp. 361-372. 
57 In 2004 and 2005 I presented papers on SADC's security arrangements at seminars hosted by the Centre 
for Southern African Studies at Sussex University; the Department of Peace Studies at Bradford 
University; Kings College, London; the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics; 
the Department of Geography at Royal Holloway, University of London; the Department of Political 
Studies and the Centre for African Studies at the University of Cape Town; and the Centre for Conflict 
Resolution in Cape Town. In 2004 I also presented papers on SADC's approach to security at the 
Conference on Futures for Southern Africa, Catholic Institute for International Relations, Institute for 
Commonwealth Studies and Nordic Africa Institute, London; the Conference on Looking at South Africa 
Ten Years On, Institute of Commonwealth Studies and School of Oriental and African Studies, University 
of London; and the annual conference of the Crisis States Research Centre in Delhi. 
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two recurring challenges, the one relating to the salience of values (Section 1.5) and the 
other relating to the determination of organisational effectiveness. 
There are a number of methodological difficulties in attempting to gauge the 
effectiveness' of a regional organisation in relation to peace and security. First, we cannot 
be certain of the full impact of the organisation because we do not know what the security 
situation would have been like had the organisation not existed; the body might have a 
poor track record but in some instances the level of conflict might have been higher in its 
absence. Second, it is hard to establish causality and the relative weight of the factors that 
shape effectiveness since war, conflict and peace are complex phenomena that flow from 
many interrelated elements and processes. Third, it may be relatively easy to assess the 
impact of peacemaking activities like mediation and peace support operations, since they 
either succeeded in ending violence or failed to do so, but it is difficult to ascertain the 
extent to which political, economic and functional co-operation between countries builds 
trust, affinity and practical linkages that contribute over time to the prevention of inter-
state violence. 
Fourth, judgements about a regional organisation's effectiveness depend not only on an 
analysis of the facts but also on normative and theoretical perspectives concerning the 
security and peacemaking potential of these organisations. Some commentators might 
have modest expectations of a regional body while others set the bar much higher. 
Humanitarian concerns about suffering and insecurity might lead to a damning judgement 
of a regional organisation's failure to prevent and resolve violent conflict, whereas an 
appreciation of the inherent limitations of regional organisations and the inherent 
difficulty of peacemaking might lead to a less critical assessment. 
Flowing from these methodological problems there is the all-important matter of deciding 
what criteria to use for determining effectiveness. In this dissertation I assess SADC in 
terms of its stated objectives, an approach that seems analytically sound since all 
organisations are set up for the purpose of achieving one or more objectives and their 
effectiveness hinges on their ability to do so. The approach is also normatively 'fair' as it 
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avoids jUdging an organisation according to goals that the organisation's members do not 
consider relevant. However, there is no a priori assumption that SADC's objectives 
genuinely reflect the interests of member states. Whether they are genuine or merely 
rhetorical is a matter that requires investigation if the organisation does not pursue its 
objectives. 
Given the focus of this dissertation, the relevant objectives in the SADC Treaty are to 
evolve common political values, systems and institutions, to promote and defend peace 
and security and to establish organisational arrangements for co-operation and integration 
in the arena of politics, international relations, peace and security (Section 2.4). The 
general objective of the Organ is to promote peace and security in the region. Its specific 
goals include protecting the people of Southern Africa from instability and conflict; 
promoting the evolution of common political values and institutions; developing common 
foreign policy approaches; promoting regional co-operation and co-ordination on security 
and defence; preventing, containing and resolving inter-and intra-state conflict by 
peaceful means; and promoting the development of democratic institutions and practices 
(Section 3.7). As discussed in the chapters that follow, SADC has largely failed to 
achieve these goals and objectives. The overarching question at the heart of the 
dissertation is why this is the case. 
Finally, it should be noted that research on the Organ and the Mutual Defence Pact is 
constrained by the uninformative nature of SADC's communiques on regional security. 
The heads of state and government are extremely sensitive about the confidentiality of 
security and defence matters, they are loath to admit publicly that they are disunited and 
they do not feel any obligation to keep their citizens informed of deliberations and 
developments in this area. According to Lt Col Walter Tapfumaneyi, a Zimbabwean 
military officer, even government officials have struggled to discern the decisions taken 
at Summit meetings: 
The communiques issued at the end of [Summit] meetings are blunt working 
instruments. They do not give the average SADC minister, official or the 
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independent analyst any clear insight into what actually transpired. They are 
designed for public consumption, either to portray a certain calculated image 
or for damage control, and they seldom capture the true proceedings of a 
meeting.58 
The research constraints are heightened by the fact that the majority of SADC states have 
not published their policies on regional security arrangements. Only South Africa, and to 
a lesser extent Zimbabwe, have articulated publicly their positions (Chapter 3). These 
research difficulties are alleviated to some extent by my personal involvement in official 
processes to set up a common security regime. 
1.8 Structure of the dissertation 
This Section sets out the organisation and structure of the dissertation. 
Chapter 2 covers the establishment of SADC in 1992 and the initial attempts to develop 
regional security policies and mechanisms. It looks at SADC's predecessor, the Southern 
African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), examines the motivation for 
setting up SADC, outlines the main features of the SADC Treaty and considers the ways 
in which the organisation's founding documents addressed the issues of sovereignty and 
common values. The Chapter concludes by tracing the intellectual and institutional 
origins of the regional security debate that became increasingly antagonistic in the 1990s. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the key debates and developments regarding SADC's security 
arrangements between 1996 and 2003. It begins by exploring the Organ deadlock and the 
process of finalising the Organ Protocol in 2001. The Chapter then summarises the 
content of the Protocol and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO), examines 
the tortured evolution of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact and describes the activities of 
58 A. W. Tapfumaneyi, 1999, 'The SADC Organ ot! Politics, Defence and Security: Interpreting the 
Decision of the Maputo 1997 SADC Summit', ACCORD Occasional Paper, no. 9, African Centre for the 
Constructive Resolution of Disputes, pg. 2. 
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the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). The Chapter highlights the 
acute tension between Zimbabwe and South Africa, which was both a consequence of 
historical circumstances and, more fundamentally, a clash of ideas around the strategic 
character of the Organ. 
Chapter 4 deals with SADC's poor record of peacemaking. It concentrates on the 
organisation's response to three conflicts in particular: the Zimbabwe crisis, which began 
in 2000 and brought to the fore SADC's obsession with maintaining state solidarity at the 
expense of human security; the Lesotho mutiny in 1998, which led to a politically 
damaging military intervention by Botswana and South Africa; and the 1998 rebellion in 
the DRC, which sparked Africa's biggest war and divided SADC so severely that it threw 
the organisation's survival into question. 
Chapter 5 seeks to explain the reasons for SADC's inability to construct a viable security 
regime and undertake effective peacemaking. Three major problems are discussed: the 
absence of common values among member states, which inhibited unified action and the 
development of common policies on regional security; the unwillingness of states to 
surrender a measure of sovereignty to a security regime with binding rules and decision-
making; and the economic and administrative weakness of states. I suggest that the Organ 
travails can be understood theoretically by distinguishing between the internal logic of a 
regional organisation, which is based on common values and trust, and its external logic, 
which is based on state interests. I explore this distinction by comparing SADC with the 
EU. The final Section reviews the role of South Africa as the major power in the region. 
Chapter 6 interrogates the concept of a security community. It challenges the claim that 
the SADC region is an· emerging security community and advances the thesis that 
domestic stability is a necessary condition for the attainment of such communities. The 
Chapter demonstrates that Deutsch's work has been misrepresented in the International 
Relations literature and offers some possible explanations for this. 
The Conclusion consolidates the theoretical framework distinguishing between the 
internal and external logic of a regional organisation as necessary conditions for cohesion 
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and effectiveness; the argument that SADC's failure to create a viable security regime 
was due principally to an absence of common values; and the thesis that domestic 
instability poses an insurmountable barrier to the formation of a security community. The 
Chapter underlines the political and structural limitations of SADC, which derive from 
the organisation's primary feature as a forum of states and prevent it from doing things 
that lie beyond the will and capacity of these states. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE FORMATION OF SADC AND THE ERA OF HOPE 
2.1 Introduction 
This Chapter discusses the formation of SADC in 1992 and the early efforts of the 
organisation to develop regional security mechanisms and policies. The Chapter provides 
background information on SADCC, explores the economic and political motivation for 
establishing SADC and presents the key features of the SADC Treaty of 1992. The 
Chapter then examines the ways in which the organisation's founding documents treated 
the issues of common values and sovereignty. It ends with a discussion on the intellectual 
and institutional origins of the acrimonious debate on regional security. 
One of the historical factors that contributed indirectly to the disputes around security 
arrangements was SADCC's mandate, which focused exclusively on economic and 
development matters. Over a period of ten years prior to SADC's establishment, the 
SADCC states forged a consensus on the key concepts and strategies for regional 
economic integration. As discussed in this Chapter, there was no similar consensus on the 
most appropriate concepts and strategies for regional security. SADC's leadership, staff 
and structures, which were largely the same as those of SADCC, were ill-equipped to 
provide direction in this field. SADC was thus born with a clear vision of economic 
integration but no clarity at all on a security regime. Some member states went so far as 
to argue that SADC should be devoted solely to development and economic integration 
and that a separate organisation should be founded to deal with politics and security. For 
a brief period after SADC's formation the Secretariat attempted to craft a regional 
security policy based on democratic and anti-militarist norms. The initiative failed 
because these norms were not shared by all the member states. 
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2.2 The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference 
In 1980, against the backdrop of minority rule in South Africa and regional 
destabilisation by Pretoria, the leaders of the newly independent countries of Southern 
Africa established SADCC and set up its Secretariat in Gaborone. The founding members 
were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. The organisation's goals were to promote regional co-operation through 
development projects, mobilise development assistance from the international 
community, reduce the economic dependence of member states on apartheid South Africa 
and forge links to create equitable regional integration. I 
A decade after its formation, SADCC concluded that these goals had not been met. In a 
frank assessment of its weaknesses, it acknowledged that little progress had been made 
towards development, economic growth and reducing the region's dependence on South 
Africa? The organisation had not become an effective instrument for economic 
integration and transformation. Although the international community had offered 
generous material support, SADCC lacked the capacity for successful project initiation 
and implementation, leading to low disbursement rates by donors. For their part, member 
states had pursued national development strategies that took no account of the imperative 
of regional co-operation. Consequently, no synergy had been generated and there was 
often conflict between national programmes and SADCC's putative regional 
programmes. The absence of harmonised macro-economic and sectoral policies had led 
to sub-optimal national investments and constrained regional trade and growth.3 
I SADCC, 1980, Southern African: Toward Economic Liberation, Lusaka. For a general overview of 
SADCC, see K. Lambrechts, 2001, 'The SADC's Origins', in Institute for Global Dialogue, The IGD 
Guide to the Southern African Development Community, Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue, pp. 
22-27. 
2 The assessment that follows is drawn from SADCC, 1992, 'Theme Document', Maputo, 29 - 31 January, 
pp. 3-5. For an independent assessment ofSADCC, see B. Weimer, 1991, 'The Southern African 
Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC): Past and Future', Africa Insight, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 78-
89. 
3 SADC, 1993, Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy for Building the Community, Harare, January, 
pg.3. 
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SADCC believed that a further problem was its failure to involve all sections of society in 
regional co-operation endeavours. It was almost exclusively a forum of states and 
government officials. This was not an adequate basis for building a regional community: 
"Regional co-operation will remain a 'paper castle' until it touches the lives of the 
ordinary citizens of the region and until they can be involved in determining its form and 
content".4 In SADCC's assessment, the biggest failure of all had been its inability to 
mobilise the region's own resources for development and thereby lay the foundation for 
sustainable progress.s 
SADCC considered its greatest achievement to have been the building of a regional 
identity and sense of common destiny among member states. These states had remained 
united in the face of relentless aggression and divide-and-rule strategies by Pretoria.6 
Now, in the early 1990s, the Cold War had ended, apartheid was in its death throes and 
SADCC was optimistic about the future: "These developments will contribute in no small 
measure to moving the region from an era of conflict to one of peace, stability and 
security, primarily concerned with improving the quality of the lives of the peoples of the 
region ... ".7 Having weathered the storm of destabilisation, the region faced the prospect 
of a democratic South Africa joining the community and contributing to the processes of 
development and integration. It was time for a major reorientation of the regional body. 
2.3 The Motivation for Establishing SADe 
In 1992 SADCC was dissolved and its members concluded a treaty establishing SADC.8 
SADC differs from its predecessor in three significant respects: its mandate extends 
beyond economic and development issues to encompass the political and security 
4 SADCC, 'Theme Document', op cit, pg. 4. 
5 Ibid. 
6 On Pretoria's aggression in Southern Africa in the 1980s, see G. Cawthra, 1986, Brutal Force: The 
Apartheid War Machine, London: International Defence and Aid Fund; and J. Hanlon, 1986, Beggar Your 
Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa, London: Catholic Institute for International Relations. 
7 SADCC, 'Theme Document', op cit, pg. 5. 
8 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, 1992, Windhoek. The Treaty can be viewed on 
SADC's website at www.sadc.int. 
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domains; it includes the regional power, South Africa; and it is constituted as an 
international body with a legal persona. 
The decision to replace SADCC with SADC and broaden the institution's mandate and 
goals was based on five considerations.9 First, in the early 1990s African leaders were 
deeply concerned about the growing international marginalisation of the continent. The 
marginalisation was due principally to Africa's economic and commensurate political 
weakness in global terms. It was exacerbated by the ending of the Cold War, which had 
led to declining interest in Africa among the major powers. African politicians and 
scholars warned that the continent was "drifting almost to the point of deIinkage from the 
attention of the rest of the world"; 10 it had "moved from being at the periphery to the 
periphery of the periphery of the global economy - the permanent political underdog, the 
world's basket case for which there is little hope".ll 
The marginalisation was bound to intensify if the continent did not join the emerging 
global trend towards regional integration. As noted in SADCC's Theme Document of 
1992, industrialised countries throughout the world were in the throes of forming 
economic blocs. Western Europe was constructing a common market, Canada, Mexico 
and the United States (US) were creating a free trade area and similar moves were 
underway in the Asia-Pacific region. In South America the Mercosur project had been 
launched, with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay committed to a common market 
with free movement of goods, and an agreement to eliminate trade tariffs had been 
reached by Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela. At the micro level the regional blocs 
were expected to provide private sector companies with bigger markets and economies of 
scale, making them more competitive internationally. At the macro level the blocs were 
9 The formal. motivation for establishing SADC is set out in SADC, 1992, Towards the Southern African 
Development Community: A Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of Southern African States, 
1992, Windhoek; and SADCC, 'Theme Document', op cit. 
10 O. Obasanjo, 1990, 'Opening Statement', in 'Report on the Results of a Brainstorming Meeting on a 
Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa', unpublished document, Addis 
Ababa, November, pg. 13. 
11 A. Adedeji, 1990, 'Opening Statement', in 'Report on the Results of a Brainstorming Meeting', op cit, 
pg.24. 
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likely to lead to a realignment of economic and political power that would radically 
change international relations. 12 
Africa had no option but to follow suit. In 1991 the member states of the DAU concluded 
the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. The goal was to promote the 
integration of African economies in the interests of greater se~f-reliance. The principal 
strategy for creating the continental Community was through the formation, co-ordination 
and integration of regional economic communities. Member states were expected to 
strengthen the existing regional communities, establish such communities where they did 
not exist and co-ordinate their policies,13 
SADC was set up the regional economic community for Southern Africa. Its founders 
argued that the region was compelled to "strengthen itself economically and politically if 
it is to become a serious player in international relations". 14 SADCC' s 1992 Theme 
Document identified a number of imperatives in this regard. The region needed deeper 
economic co-operation and integration that facilitated cross-border investment and trade 
and allowed freer movement of factors of production across national borders. It also 
needed common economic, political and social values and systems, such as free 
enterprise, free elections, multi-party systems and respect for human rights and the rule of 
law. In addition, regionalisation entailed the overarching challenge of forging "among all 
the countries and peoples of Southern Africa a vision of a shared future, a future within a 
regional community" ,15 
The second set of factors motivating the establishment of SADC related to the host of 
chronic socio-economic problems afflicting Southern Africa. These problems included 
underdevelopment, poverty and unemployment; a proliferation of small arms in private 
hands; a large number of demobilised soldiers who were destitute; illicit trafficking in 
weapons and stolen goods; countless refugees and displaced people; an acute debt crisis 
12 SADCC, 'Theme Document', op cit, pp. 5-6. 
13 Article 88 of the DAU's Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, which can be viewed at 
www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/ AEC Treaty 1991.pdf. 
14 SADCC, 'Theme Document', op cit, pg. 6. 
15 Ibid. 
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and a net outflow of capital; and rampant disease and environmental degradation, 
compounded by natural disasters like drought. Most of these problems were present in all 
the Southern African states, they transcended national borders and they therefore had to 
be tackled in a co-ordinated fashion. The core logic was that regional co-operation and 
co-ordination would generate synergies that were unattainable if states acted unilaterally. 
The magnitude of the underdevelopment burden was starkly evident in comparative 
statistics on Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In 1989 the SADCC countries had a 
combined GDP of $27.2 million, less than Nigeria's GDP of $28.9 million. 16 By way of 
further comparison, GDP figures at that time were $29 million for Hungary, $100.8 
million for Finland, $150 million for Iran and $319 million for Brazil. GDP per capita in 
the SADCC region was a paltry $363, less than that for Africa as a whole (excluding 
South Africa) and vastly less than the figure of $2,300 in South Africa. This grim 
situation showed no signs of improving. During the previous decade economic growth 
rates had declined across Southern Africa, in the case of most countries to levels below 
the rate of population growth. I? 
South Africa's entry into SADC would make an appreciable difference. In ] 989 its GDP 
was $80.3 million, making a regional total of $107.5 million when added to the ten 
SADCC countries. IS This was not ignificant in global terms, however, and the sharp 
disparity between the size of South Africa's economy and that of its neighbours was not 
conducive to regional growth. In 1988 the value of South Africa's exports to the SADCC 
states was more than five times the value of its imports from these countries.19 The 
prospects for growth were further dimmed by the colonial legacy of a regional economy 
and infrastructure designed to serve South Africa and its minority white community. 
Given the small size of national economies, low incomes and inadequate infrastructure, 
individual countries could not on their own attract the investment needed for long-term 
16 All figures in this paragraph are in US dollars and drawn from the World Bank's World Development 
Report of 1991 as cited in SADCC, 'Theme Document', op cit, pp. 9-11. 
17 SADCC, 'Theme Document', op cit, pg. 10. 
18 Ibid, pg. 9. 
19 Ibid, pg. 12. 
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development and growth. Nor, without the synergies generated by regional co-operation, 
did these countries have the resources to address their socio-economic problems. 
Third, in contrast to the bleak economic situation, the political environment had improved 
dramatically and offered new opportunities to strengthen the regional community. The 
demise of the Cold War had led to the cessation of Superpower contestation on the sub-
continent, an attenuation of ideology as a source of tension between and within states, 
and apparently widespread acceptance of political pluralism. Many of the major historical 
conflicts had consequently been resolved or were in the process of being settled: South 
African and Cuban troops withdrew from Angola in 1988 and 1989 respectively; 
Namibia attained independence in 1990; Frelimo and Renamo concluded a partial cease-
fire in Mozambique in 1990 and a general peace accord in 1992; and democratic elections 
were held for the first time in Angola, Mozambique and Malawi. 
From a regional perspective the most important political development was the imminent 
ending of minority rule in South Africa. This would remove the major source of regional 
instability and at long last create the potential for an inclusive formation in Southern 
Africa. The spirit of the time is captured eloquently by Peter Vale, who records the 
expectation that the emergence of a democratic South Africa into the regional community 
would register a kind of zero-hour, a moment from which all the states and people of the 
region began to interact constructively after years of cross-border wars and chronic 
insecurity associated with minority power.20 Vale and many others believed then that "a 
strong, confident South Africa could halt the region's downward spiral- and around this, 
economies would grow, democracy prosper, education flourish: the region's people, as 
Isaiah so triumphantly proclaims, would beat their swords into ploughshares".21 
Fourth, South Africa's forthcoming entry into SADC might have been welcomed but it 
was also threatening in certain respects. The African National Congress CANC) had not 
achieved an outright victory and the balance of power was such that there were bound to 
20 P. Vale, 2003, Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
pp. 1-2. 
21 Ibid. 
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be compromises with the ruling National Party. Amongst other things, it was possible that 
the military, intelligence services and other elements of the apartheid regime would be 
incorporated into the new state. There were also concerns that South Africa, by virtue of 
its economic strength, would inevitably dominate not only the region but also the regional 
body. It therefore seemed prudent to set up SADC prior to South Africa's democratic 
elections and Pretoria's accession to the organisation. This would enable the 
comparatively weak states of SADCC to prepare unified negotiating positions on trade 
and other economic issues, craft a treaty based on progressive principles and entrench the 
concept of "balance, equity and mutual benefit" as the maxim for regional co-
ordination,z2 
Fifth, despite the generally positive political trends and new sense of optimism, there was 
a sober awareness of the violent history and precarious stability of the region. Southern 
Africa had been wracked by violence for decades, ranging from foreign conquests and 
repression by colonial and settler regimes to liberation struggles, apartheid destabilisation 
and civil wars. The political, social and cultural legacy of this violence would not be 
overcome quickly and the transitions to democracy in the early 1990s were fraught with 
uncertainty and danger. In Angola the cease-fire agreement of 1991 and the subsequent 
election in 1992 were thrown into turmoil when Unita rejected the election results and the 
country returned to civil war. In South Africa and Mozambique the processes of 
democratisation were threatened by political and criminal violence. It seemed clear that 
the ending of apartheid and the Cold War had not obviated the need for a regional forum 
for peace and security. 
At the inception of SADC, member states declared that political stability was a 
prerequisite for development and that institutional arrangements were required to achieve 
and maintain stability: 
War and insecurity are the enemy of economic progress and social welfare. 
Good and strengthened political relations among the countries of the region, 
22 SADC, Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy, op cit, pg. 7. 
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and peace and mutual security are critical components of the total environment 
for regional co-operation and integration. The region needs, therefore, to 
establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity, and 
provide for mutual peace and security.23 
Prior to the formation of SADC, regional security issues were addressed through the 
coalition known as the Frontline States. This was an informal political grouping that 
emerged in 1976 with the aim of securing the liberation of Zimbabwe. It subsequently 
focused on Namibian independence, minority rule in South Africa and regional 
destabilisation by Pretoria?4 In the late 1970s the Frontline States created the Inter-State 
Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), a little publicised body comprising defence 
ministers, defence ministry officials and senior military officers, which held regular 
meetings and built a high level of trust among the participating armed forces and 
governments?5 Following South Africa's democratic election in 1994, the Frontline 
States was dissolved and replaced by the SADC Organ, and the ISDSC was reoriented 
and reconstituted to include all the SADC countries (Chapter 3). 
2.4 The SADe Treaty 
The SADC Treaty of 1992 presents the objectives of the organisation as follows: to 
achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty and enhance the standard 
and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa; to evolve common political values, 
systems and institutions; to promote and defend peace and security; to promote self-
sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance; to achieve 
23 SADC, Towards the Southern African Development Community, op cit, pp. 9-10. 
24 By the early 19905 the Frontline States comprised Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. For a history of the coalition, see G. Khadiagala, 1995, Allies in Adversity: Frontline States 
in Southern African Security, 1975-1993, Athens: Ohio University Press; and A. Omari, 1995, 'Regional 
Security: One View from the Front Line States', The Arusha Papers: A Working Series on Southern 
African Security, no. 5, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape and Centre for 
Foreign Relations, Dar es Salaam, July. 
25 Author's interview with Major-General Pheto, Chief-of-Staff of the Botswana Defence Force, Maputo, 
September 1991. 
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complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes; to promote 
and maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources; to achieve sustainable 
utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment; and to 
strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and 
links among the peoples of the region.26 
The Treaty sets out the strategies for achieving these objectives.27 The principal strategy 
in relation to economic integration is the development of regional and national policies 
that progressively eliminate obstacles to the free movement of people, capital, labour, 
goods and services. The main strategy for peace and security is the harmonisation of the 
political policies and international relations of member states. In this regard the Treaty 
stipulates that the organisation and its members must act in accordance with the following 
principles: sovereign equality of member states; solidarity, peace and security; human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law; equity, balance and mutual benefit; and peaceful 
settlement of disputes. 28 These principles constitute the official values of SADC. 
The highest decision-making body of SADC is the Summit, comprising heads of state or 
government.29 The Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson of the Summit rotate annually 
among member states. The second highest body is the Council of Ministers, which 
advises the Summit on overall policy and oversees the implementation of SADC policies, 
the execution of its programmes and the functioning and development of the organisation. 
The Treaty also provides for a Standing Committee of Officials to render technical advice 
to the Council; a Tribunal to adjudicate disputes; an Executive Secretary appointed by the 
Summit; and a permanent Secretariat located in Gaborone. SADC institutions must make 
decisions by consensus and the quorum for meetings of these institutions is two-thirds of 
the member states. 30 
26 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, op cit, article 5(1). 
27 Ibid, article 5(2). 
28 Ibid, article 4. 
29 Ibid, article 10. 
30 Ibid, articles 18 and 19. 
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The Treaty provides that member states must conclude protocols specifying the 
objectives, scope and institutional means of co-operation and integration in seven sectors: 
food security, land and agriculture; infrastructure and services; industry, trade, investment 
and finance; human resources development, science and technology; natural resources 
and the environment; social welfare, information and culture; and politics, diplomacy, 
international relations, peace and security.31 After approval by the Summit, the protocols 
become an integral part of the Treaty and must be ratified by the parties thereto.32 
SADC decided at the outset to adopt a decentralised approach to sectoral co-ordination, 
with responsibility for co-ordination of the sectors being allocated to individualstates.33 
This approach, which proved to be inefficient and ineffectual (Chapter 5), was motivated 
by a desire to promote a sense of ownership of SADC programmes among member states, 
avoid the bureaucratic procedures and costs associated with a centralised model and avert 
a transfer of sovereignty to the regional body. At the end of 2001 there were twenty-one 
sectoral co-ordinating units and commissions in twelve countries.34 The exception in this 
regard was the sensitive sector of 'politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and 
security', which the Summit was unwilling to allocate permanently to a single country. 
Instead, as described below, it sought to establish a central co-ordinating body that would 
be chaired by member states on a rotating basis. This body eventually took the form of 
the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation. 
2.5 Common values and sovereignty 
Given the emphasis that this dissertation places on common values and sovereignty, it is 
worth noting the importance that SADC attached to these issues at the time of its 
formation. The SADC Declaration regarded common values among member states as a 
31 Ibid, article 21. 
32 Ibid, article 22. 
33 In 2001 the Summit approved a plan to phase out the decentralised approach and restructure the 
organisation (Section 3.6). 
34 J. Isaksen and E. TjonneJand, 2001, AsseSSing the Restructuring ojSADC - Positions, Policies and 
Progress, Report of the Chr. Michelsen Institute, R 2001:6, December, pg. 2. 
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vital condition for unity, co-operation and regional security.35 Southern Africa had 
historically been united in the struggle for liberation and the fight against apartheid but 
this was not an adequate basis for co-operation in the post-apartheid era. Instead, "a new 
Southern Africa concerned with peace and development must find a more abiding basis 
for continuing political solidarity and co-operation in order to guarantee mutual peace 
and security in the region".36 The foundation for enduring political solidarity and co-
operation would be provided by greater economic co-operation and integration and by 
common economic, political and social values and systems.37 The recent political 
breakthroughs in Namibia, South Africa and other Southern African countries had 
already brought about a greater convergence of values across the region and this would 
help to create the appropriate environment for deeper co-operation.38 
Accordingly, as noted in the previous Section, the SADC Treaty included as one of the 
organisation's objectives the evolution of common political values, systems and 
institutions; it presented the harmonisation of political policies and international relations 
as a key strategy for peace and security; and it enshrined as the core values of the regional 
body the principles of sovereign equality of states, solidarity, peace and security, human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law, equity, balance and mutual benefit, and peaceful 
settlement of disputes. 
In the decade following SADC's establishment, the principles of democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law were breached in significant ways, generating conflict and 
insecurity within and between countries. Moreover, the lack of harmonisation of domestic 
politics and foreign policies prevented SADC from playing an effective peacemaking 
role. The weight that the organisation's founding documents had placed on common 
values proved correct. During the 1990s SADC enjoyed sufficient normative convergence 
to undertake multilateral co-operation in a range of functional areas but lacked the 
35 SADC, Towards the Southern African Development Community, op cit, pg. 5. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid, pg. 2. 
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normative consensus that was needed to act in a unified manner in the sensitive realm of 
regional security (Chapter 5). 
On the basis of SADCC's lacklustre performance and the experience of regional bodies 
elsewhere in the world, it was also evident to the drafters of SADC's founding documents 
that the achievement of regional integration would depend on the willingness of member 
states to surrender a measure of sovereign decision-making to the regional forum. The 
extent to which states were willing to do this would mark the region's progression from 
co-operation to co-ordination to integration. SADCC's Theme Document of 1992 
asserted categorically that integration would not occur if left to market forces alone. A 
high level of political co-operation and intervention by states was needed to shape the 
scope, scale and nature of integration, arid this in tum required strengthening the powers 
of regional decision-making, co-ordinating, executive and enforcement structures.39 
There were several ways in which the regional structures could be strengthened, all of 
them at the expense of sovereignty. For example, the Executive Secretary could be 
authorised to make certain decisions on behalf of member states. Even without such 
formal authority, a properly empowered Secretariat could wield influence through the 
preparation of agendas, briefings and policy papers. At a higher level, states could agree 
to be bound by SADC's protocols and the decisions of Summit and thereby accept the 
resultant constraints on their national decision-making and freedom of action. States 
could also agree to submit their disputes to the SADC Tribunal and abide by its decisions. 
The most intrusive challenges to sovereignty would arise if the Summit took punitive 
action against a member state that violated SADC's principles or ifthe Summit sought to 
interfere in the internal affairs of a member that posed a threat to regional security. 
The prospect of diluting sovereignty was a vexed issue in Southern Africa, however. 
Having acquired sovereignty relatively recently and at great cost through liberation 
struggles, few if any SADC states were disposed towards giving it up. Furthermore, while 
all the states enjoyed dejeure sovereignty, many of them were struggling to gain defacto 
39 SADCC, 'Theme Document', op cit, pg. 33. 
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sovereignty: they were still in the process of state formation, they did not have full 
administrative control of their territories and they did not have a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force. The absence of common values was a further disincentive to 
transferring sovereignty. States that had substantially different political dispositions were 
not only bound to experience difficulty in making collective decisions but were also 
likely to ignore the decisions that were contrary to their national policies. 
The drafters of the SADC Declaration attempted to address state apprehensions about 
diminished sovereignty by arguing that the transfer of sovereignty to the regional 
organisation was not in fact a loss of sovereignty: 
Integration does imply that some decisions which were previously taken by 
individual states are taken regionally, and those decisions taken nationally give 
due consideration to regional positions and circumstances. Regional decision-
making also implies elements of change in the locus and context of exercising 
sovereignty, rather than a loss of sovereignty.40 
The Declaration observed further that the transfer of sovereignty to SADC was itself an 
exercise of sovereignty: 
Member States recognise that the attainment of the objective of regional 
economic integration in Southern Africa will require us to exercise our 
sovereign right in empowering the organisation to act on our behalf and for our 
common good. This is the challenging mission of SADC.41 
These arguments regarding the transfer of sovereignty might have been ingenious but 
they were also disingenuous. Regardless of how the 'challenging mission' was packaged 
so as to make it more palatable, the bottom line could not be finessed: member states 
either would or would not confer decision-making authority on the Executive Secretary 
40 SADC, Towards the Southern African Development Community. op cit, pg. 10. 
41 Ibid, pg. 11. 
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and they either would or would not consider themselves bound by the organisation's 
principles and decisions. We will see in the course of this dissertation that they were 
averse to both of these undertakings and that their resistance was intimately linked to the 
absence of common values on politics and security. 
2.6 Embryonic policy on regional security 
When SADC was launched in 1992 its founders did not know what kind of regional 
security model they wanted to adopt. The conceptual planning for the new organisation 
was done by SADCC Secretariat officials and the academics they used as advisers. 
Because SADCC's focus had been confined to economic co-operation and development, 
these people were unfamiliar with the literature and debates on regional security. The 
SADCC Theme document of 1992 thus presented a well-researched, comprehensive and 
sophisticated perspective on economic integration, comparing various models and 
selecting the one deemed most appropriate for Southern Africa, but it provided no details 
on the institutionalisation of security co-operation. It merely contained the following 
tentative statement: 
This Document will not address the security issue in any detail, but simply 
draws attention to the need for new mechanisms and possibly institutions to 
address regional political and security issues. Such institutions will need to 
operate [sic] a concept which relates issues of peace and security to those of 
co-operation and development.42 
The absence of security expertise in the Secretariat was compounded by the composition 
of the SADC Council of Ministers, the body responsible for the direction and operations 
of the organisation. The Treaty provided that the Council must "consist of one Minister 
from each Member State, preferably a Minister responsible for economic planning or 
42 SADCC, 'Theme Document', op cit, pg. 18. 
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finance".43 The decision to put these ministers in the driving seat reflects both the history 
of SADCC as a development organisation and the core conception of SADC as a regional 
economic community. One consequence of the decision was a leadership vacuum with 
respect to peace and security. The Treaty expected the Summit to address major conflicts 
in the region but did not provide for a regional committee of foreign ministers or defence 
ministers and there was no ministerial forum charged with constructing SADC's peace 
and security architecture. For domestic political reasons the economic affairs and finance 
ministers who served on the Council dared not trespass into the security terrain. The 
Council's advisory staff who served on SADC's Standing Committee of Officials were 
likewise drawn from the economic affairs and finance departments of member states and 
were similarly loath to tackle security issues. 
In contrast to the lack of security expertise within SADC's embryonic structures, 
numerous researchers and think tanks in Southern Africa were active in this field.44 They 
published theoretical and policy papers on regional security, organised seminars and 
conferences, invited foreign experts to visit the region and facilitated discussions among 
government officials, military officers and academics from member states.45 As discussed 
below, the SADC Secretariat was supportive of these activities but most of the 
governments were not receptive to civil society inputs and engagement. 
Between 1992 and 1994 the Secretariat attempted to drive the formulation of regional 
security policy and imbue it with a democratic and anti-militarist character. The key 
individual in this process was the Secretariat's chief economist, Dr Charles Hove. Since 
the Secretariat had no staff member dedicated to regional security and the Council of 
Ministers and Standing Committee of Officials had no inclination to provide leadership 
43 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, op cit, article 11(1). 
44 The think tanks included the Centre for Southern African Studies at the University of the Western Cape; 
the Institute for Defence Policy (later Institute for Security Studies) in Pretoria; the Military Research 
Group in Johannesburg; the Instituto Superior de Relac;:oes Internationais in Maputo; the Southern African 
Regional Institute for Policy Studies in Harare; the Centre for Foreign Relations in Dar es Salaam; and the 
Centre for Intergroup Studies (later Centre for Conflict Resolution) at the University of Cape Town. 
45 For an overview of the civil society debates on regional security in the early 1990s, see W. Breytenbach, 
1994, 'Conflict in Southern Africa: From the Frontline States to Collective Security', paper presented at the 
Eighth International Conference on Peace and Security in Eastern and Southern Africa, Centre for Foreign 
Relations (Dar es Salaam), Arusha, August. 
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on the subject, Hove took it upon himself to co-ordinate the regional security discussion 
and promote a progressive agenda. His academic training lay in the field of economics, 
however, and he therefore commissioned two researchers at the Centre for Conflict 
Resolution in Cape Town to prepare draft policy on regional security: in 1992 he asked 
me to draft the section on 'politics, diplomacy, peace and security' in SADC's 1993 
Framework and Strategy document;46 and in 1994 he asked me and my Mozambican 
colleague, Joao Honwana, to draft the terms of reference and protocols for SADC's 
security organ.47 
In preparing the draft policies, our main point of reference was Europe because of its 
democratic values, its achievement in forging a security community after World War II 
and its success in managing peacefully and eventually overcoming the Cold War, a 
situation seen as similar in some respects to the dynamics of Southern Africa after the 
ending of apartheid.48 We were fascinated in particular by the experiences of the CSCE, 
which for twenty years had provided a forum for the US, the Soviet Union and West and 
East European countries to engage in dialogue and conclude agreements on security, 
economic co-operation and human rights. During the Cold War the CSCE had 
contributed to a more stable security environment in Europe, promoted co-operation 
across the ideological divide and raised human rights standards in the communist bloc.49 
The conceptual attraction of the CSCE was the linkages it drew between security, human 
rights, development and economic growth as mutually reinforcing imperatives. Elsewhere 
in Africa at this time, the CSCE inspired the formation of the Conference on Security, 
46 L. Nathan, 1992, 'A Framework and Strategy for Building Peace and Security in Southern Africa', paper 
commissioned by the SADC Secretariat for the 1993 SADC Programme of Action, October; and SADC, 
Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy, op cit, pp. 24-26. 
47 L. Nathan and J. Honwana, 1994, 'Terms of Reference and Protocols for the SADC Sector on Politics, 
Diplomacy, International Relations, Defence and Security', paper commissioned by the SADC Secretariat, 
December. This paper was later expanded and published as L. Nathan and J. Honwana, 1995, 'After the 
Storm: Common Security and Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa', The Arusha Papers: A Working 
Series on Southern African Security, no. 3, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western 
Cape and Centre for Foreign Relations, Dar es Salaam, February. 
48 See L. Nathan, 1993, 'With Open Arms: Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Southern 
Africa', Disarmament: Topical Papers, United Nations, pp. 118-134. 
49 B. M0ller, 2008, 'European Security: The Role ofthe European Union', Working Papers, series 2, no. 
29, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics. 
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Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA), an initiative launched in 
1991 by the Africa Leadership Forum headed by Olusegan Obasanjo who was later to 
become the President of Nigeria.50 Coincidently, in 1991 the President of South Africa, 
FW de Klerk, proposed the establishment of a Conference on Security and Co-operation 
in Southern Africa, modelled on the CSCE.51 
Our approach to regional security policy was also grounded in the anti-militarist concepts 
of disarmament, non-offensive defence, common security and 'new thinking on 
security' .52 So-called 'new thinking on security' was a reaction to the state-centric and 
militarist strategies adopted by many countries during the Cold War. It emphasised 
human security rather than state security and conceived of security as a holistic 
phenomenon that was not confined to military matters but broadened to include the 
political, social, economic and environmental spheres.53 Underpinning this approach was 
the conviction that the state was often the greatest threat to the security of citizens and 
that human security would be promoted by redirecting public spending away from the 
armed forces to support development programmes and social services. 
We invoked the notion of 'common security' as the principal organising concept for 
regional security in Southern Africa. This concept had achieved international prominence 
50 Africa Leadership Forum, 1991, The Kampala Document: Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, 
Development and Co-operation in Africa, Ogun State (Nigeria): Africa Leadership Forum; and 1. Nathan, 
1992, 'Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Co-operation and Development in Africa', Southern 
African Perspectives, no. 13, Centre for Southern African Studies, University ofthe Western Cape. In 2002 
the CSSDCA was incorporated into the African Union (www.au2002.gov.zaldocslbackground/cssdca.htm). 
51 Southscan, vol. 6, no. 44, November 1991, pg. 365. 
52 The main intellectual sources included K. Booth, 1994, 'A Security Regime in Southern Africa: 
Theoretical Considerations', Southern African Perspectives, no. 30, Centre for Southern African Studies, 
University of the Western Cape; A. Boserup and R. Nield (eds), 1990, The Foundations of Defensive 
Defence, London: MacMillan; B. Buzan, 1991, People, States and Fear: An Agendafor International 
Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf; K. Booth, (ed), 1991, New 
Thinking about Strategy and International Security, London: Harper Collins; E. Boulding (ed), 1992, New 
Agendasfor Peace Research: Conflict and Security Re-Examined, Boulder: Lynne Rienner; Brandt 
Commission, 1980, North-South: A Programme for Survival, London: Pan; B. M0i1er, 1994, 'Non-
Offensive Defence: A European(ised) Concept with Wider Application?', Strategic Review for Southern 
Africa, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 1-24; and T.G. Weiss, (ed), 1993, Collective Security in a Changing World, 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
53 On the application of this approach to Southern Africa, see Booth, 'A Security Regime in Southern 
Africa', op cit; and L. Nathan, 1992, 'Beyond Arms and Armed Forces: A New Approach to Security', 
South African Defence Review, Institute for Defence Policy, pp. 12-21. 
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in the 1980s through the reports of the Palme Commission on Disarmament and Security 
Issues.54 The Commission argued that countries had become increasingly interdependent 
in the modem technological age and that common problems transcended national borders 
as never before. States could no longer protect their citizens through unilateral military 
means. They shared an interest in joint survival and should begin to organise their 
security policies in co-operation with each other. 
The ideas outlined above were incorporated into SADC's 1993 Framework and Strategy 
document, prepared for the Council of Ministers by the Secretariat and the resource 
people it had commissioned and then convened in Gaborone. The aim of the document 
was to translate the principles and objectives of the SADC Treaty into a practical 
programme for regional integration. This was done by identifying and addressing the 
strategic challenges of integration in a range of areas, such as human resources 
development, science and technology; food security, land and agriculture; transport and 
communications; social welfare and health; employment and labour; investment and 
trade; energy; and natural resources and the environment. 
The section on 'politics, diplomacy, peace and security' in the Framework and Strategy 
document was SADC's first detailed policy statement on these topics.55 It called for the 
forging of common political values based on democratic norms, the establishment of 
mechanisms for conflict avoidance, management and resolution, and the creation of a 
'non-militaristic security order' that was not dependent on armed forces and military 
action. The new security order was motivated on two grounds. First, the military steps 
taken by a state to enhance its security might make other states feel threatened, leading to 
an escalating arms race, a heightened risk of war and a lower level of security for all the 
states concerned.56 Second, non-military problems like abuse of human rights, economic 
underdevelopment and a lack of food and energy were serious threats to the security of 
54 Pal me Commission, 1984, Common Security: A Programmefor Disarmament, London: Pan; and Palme 
Commission, 1989, 'Final Statement of the Palme Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues', 
Disarmament, 1990, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 165-186. 
55 See SADC, Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy, op cit, pp. 24-26. 
56 In the International Relations literature this classic problem is referred to as the 'security dilemma'. See 
R. Jervis, 1978, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', World Politics, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 167-214. 
56 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
people. These problems, which could also threaten the security of states since they might 
lead to conflict between governments and citizens, could not be tackled by military 
means. 
The Framework and Strategy document presented the following additional strategies for 
ensuring peace and security: the cultivation of a new discourse that promotes peace, 
reconciliation and unity; the creation of a forum for mediation and arbitration; greater 
transparency and public debate on the formulation of national and regional security 
policy; the strengthening of mechanisms to ensure the accountability of armed forces to 
governments and parliaments; the ratification by member states of key principles of 
international law governing inter-state relations; the adoption by states of the military 
doctrine of non-offensive defence, which aims to ensure adequate defence while 
minimising offensive capabilities; reductions in force levels and military expenditure; the 
conclusion of a non-aggression treaty that includes a commitment by states to defend 
each other in the event of an external attack; and the introduction of confidence- and 
security-building measures such as exchange of military information and joint military 
training. 
The section on peace and security in the Framework and Strategy document concluded 
with a passage that was inconsistent with the preceding anti-militarist philosophy: 
There is a sense in which military force is an acceptable form of foreign 
policy. The region would have to agree on conditions under which this will be 
acceptable. The region would also need to consider conditions under which 
military intervention in a fellow member State might be acceptable. 
Humanitarian considerations, peacekeeping and the restoration of 
constitutional order would be acceptable grounds for such intervention.57 
This passage did not appear in the draft prepared by the Secretariat's resource team and 
was probably added by the Council of Ministers before the document was presented to 
57 SADC, Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy, op cit, pg. 26. 
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the Summit. The significance of the passage is heightened by comparing it with the 
drafter's original formulation: "Military force is a legitimate means of defence against 
external aggression but an unacceptable instrument for conducting foreign policy and 
resolving inter-state conflict".58 The differences between the two texts - the official 
version viewing the use of force as an acceptable instrument of foreign policy under 
certain circumstances and the draft version depicting force as an unacceptable policy 
instrument - presaged the divisive debates in the second half of the 1990s around the 
orientation of the Organ (Chapter 3) and SADC's response to the DRC rebellion of 1998 
(Section 4.4). 
2.7 The early disputes over regional security structures 
In July 1994 the Secretariat organised the Ministerial Workshop on Democracy, Peace 
and Security in Windhoek with the aim of elaborating on the Framework and Strategy 
document and identifying the mechanisms required to promote, co-ordinate and oversee 
regional security. The workshop was attended by ministers, government officials, 
parliamentarians and members of non-governmental organisations. It ended with a closed 
ministerial meeting that recommended to the Council of Ministers that a Protocol on 
Peace, Security and Political Co-operation be concluded and that the following structures 
be set up: an independ nt human rights commission; a SADC committee of foreign 
ministers charged with "peace promotion"; a SADC committee of defence and security 
ministers; and a SADC Sector on Conflict Resolution and Political Co-operation.59 
Shortly thereafter, the SADC countries that comprised the Frontline States proposed the 
formation of a new organisation, named the Association of Southern African States 
CASAS), to serve as the regional forum for security and peacemaking.6o In two major 
respects this proposal was at odds with the ministerial recommendations made at the 
58 Nathan, 'A Framework and Strategy for Building Peace and Security', op cit, para 2.6.7. 
59 SADC Secretariat, 1994, 'Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security. Workshop Resolutions. 
Windhoek, Namibia, 11-16 July 1994', unpublished document. 
60 A. Pahad, 1995, 'Regional Security in Southern Africa', ISSUP Bulletin, no. 5195, Institute for Strategic 
Studies, University of Pretoria, pg. 3. 
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Windhoek workshop. Whereas the envisaged Sector on Conflict Resolution and Political 
Co-operation would be a SADC institution that functioned in a formal manner, the 
Frontline States grouping wanted ASAS to be independent of SADC and to have an 
informal and flexible modus operandi.61 In August 1994 the Summit approved the 
creation of a Sector on Politics, Diplomacy, International Relations, Defence and Security 
but did not speci fy its objectives, features and structures. 62 Instead, the heads of state 
requested their foreign ministers to harmonise the proposals of the Namibia workshop 
and the Frontline States.63 
In February 1995 SADC held a consultative conference in Lilongwe, attended by the 
Council of Ministers and representatives of the EU and other international donors. 
Amongst other things, the conference welcomed the creation of the sector on politics, 
peace and security. According to the conference communique, the "international 
Cooperating Partners also expressed their interest to cooperate actively with SADC in 
that Sector. They, however, urged SADC to expeditiously work out the modalities, 
structures and mandates for the Sector".64 The interest shown by the international partners 
proved more of a hindrance than a help. Within SADC circles the proponents of ASAS 
were able to win support for their position on the grounds that the EU was pushing the 
option of a sector, wanted to fund it and would thereby have the power to dictate the 
regional security agenda; in the interests of national and regional sovereignty, an 
independent ASAS free of foreign interference was the better course of action.65 At a 
meeting in Harare in March 1995 the SADC foreign ministers recommended the 
establishment of ASAS as the institutional mechanism for security co-operation.66 
After the Harare meeting the Secretariat took the bold step of urging the Council of 
Ministers to reject the foreign ministers' recommendation, insisting that the concerns 
61 Pahad, 'Regional Security in Southern Africa', op cit, pp. 3-4. 
62 SADC, 1994, 'Communique. Botswana - Gaborone: 29th August, 1994', communique issued after the 
Summit meeting. 
63 Pahad, 'Regional Security in Southern Africa, op cit, pg. 3. 
64 SADC Secretariat, 1995, '1995 Annual Consultative Conference Communique', para 6.1. 
65 Author's correspondence with SADC Secretariat officials, March 1995. 
66 SADC Secretariat, 1995, 'Political Cooperation, Democracy, Peace and Security. Note from the 
Secretariat', unpublished document prepared by the Secretariat for the Council of Ministers. 
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about donor interference could be accommodated in a SADC sector co-ordinated by a 
member state.67 At the Council meeting in August 1995, the ministers were unable to 
reach consensus on the matter. In the absence of ministerial consensus, the Summit 
meeting in 1995 could not make progress towards setting up a common security forum. A 
further controversy arose when Zimbabwe insisted that the forum should follow the 
tradition of the Frontline States and be chaired on a permanent basis by the longest-
serving head of state in the region, namely President Mugabe; other countries preferred 
the option of a rotating chair.68 Mugabe was reportedly piqued that his seniority and 
leading role in regional politics were being undercut by the emerging dominance of post-
apartheid South Africa and the international stature of President Mandela.69 The Summit 
ended up accepting the request by foreign ministers to defer the allocation of the peace 
and security sector to a member state and to be given more time for ministerial 
consultations on the sector's structures, terms of reference and operating procedures.7o 
At the time, the disputes and tension around SADC's security arrangements were hard to 
understand. While some differences on strategy were apparent, it seemed as if the main 
issues in contention related to less significant questions about the status, structure and 
procedures of the security body.71 This impression turned out to have been mistaken. 
Over the next few years it became clear that states were divided on substantive political 
grounds and that many of them did not support the anti-militarist and democratic norms 
championed by the Secretariat. As discussed in the following Chapter, antagonistic and 
recriminatory debates around the security body's status and structure persisted throughout 
the 1990s as manifestations ofthe underlying political and strategic differences. 
It became evident too that most of the SADC members viewed regional security in 
excessively statist terms. States were not only the sole providers of security and the 
primary objects of security, they were also to be the exclusive drafters of regional 
67 Ibid. 
68 J. Cilliers, 1995, 'The Evolving Security Architecture in Southern Africa', African Security Review, vol. 
4, no. 5, pp. 30-47. 
69 Ibid; and A. Zacarias, 2003, 'Redefining Security', in M. Baregu and C. Landsberg (eds), From Cape to 
Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 31-51. 
70 SADC, 1995, 'SADC Summit Communique, Johannesburg, 28 th August, 1995', para 16. 
71 Nathan and Honwana, 'After the Storm', op cit. 
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security policy. At the Council of Ministers meeting in 1995 the majority of states 
supported the argument that defence and security were so sensitive that they should be 
discussed at the level of ministers and presidents without "interference from the SADC 
Secretariat bureaucracy" and "unnecessary long lines of accountability".72 Subsequent to 
the 1994 Windhoek workshop, parliamentarians and non-governmental organisations 
were excluded from SADC's deliberations on regional security. Over the following 
decade no effort was made to consult or even brief the SADC Parliamentary Forum,13 
which was formed in 1996 as an autonomous institution of SADC and comprised 
parliamentarians from all the member states.74 The Secretariat was itself excluded from 
the process of drafting the Organ protocol in Swaziland in 1999-2000.75 
Nor did the Summit consider it necessary to issue meaningful public reports on its 
regional security discussions. Many member states believed that transparency on security 
matters was foolhardy and they were unwilling to admit publicly that SADC was 
disunited. As a result, the communiques issued after Summit meetings were deliberately 
bland and uninformative. We will see in the following Chapter that this had the perverse 
effect of generating intense disagreements among states on what they had decided at 
previous meetings. It also left government officials unclear about the Summit mandates 
they were expected to implement.76 
By 1995 the short-lived era of hope was over. Contrary to the optimistic expectations that 
had prevailed at the birth of SADC, the region was about to be plunged into bitter 
disputes on regional security arrangements (Chapter 3), deep divisions over the 1998 
rebellion in the DRC (Section 4.4) and, most seriously, violent conflicts and repression in 
several member states (Chapter 4). 
72 Author's correspondence with a Mozambican official who attended the Council of Ministers meeting in 
Johannesburg on 25-26 August 1995. 
73 This observation is based on the author's discussions with NtIhoi Motsamai, Chairperson of the SADC 
Parliamentary Forum and Speaker of Parliament in Lesotho, between 1999 and 2002. 
74 For information about the SADC Parliamentary Forum, see www.sadcpf.org. 
75 This observation is based on the author's participation in the drafting of the Organ protocol in Swaziland 
in 1999-2000. 
76 AW. Tapfumaneyi, 1999, 'The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: Interpreting the 
Decision of the Maputo 1997 SADC Summit', ACCORD Occasional Paper, no. 9, African Centre for the 
Constructive Resolution of Disputes. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH THE ORGAN 
3.1 Introduction 
The main protagonists in the regional security debates were Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
Of all the Southern African countries, Zimbabwe was by far the most committed to the 
creation of a regional security body and President Mugabe showed greater interest in this 
matter than any other SADC head of state. Pretoria's attention was comparatively low. 
The Mandela government between 1994 and 1999 was preoccupied with the domestic 
challenges of consolidating the new state and democratic dispensation, and the Mbeki 
presidency between 1999 and 2004 was more interested in building political and security 
structures at the continental level through the AU than at the regional level through 
SADC. Nevertheless, South Africa's status as the regional power was inescapable and its 
defence and foreign affairs officials who participated in the Organ debates were assertive 
and influential. 
As far as the other states were concerned, Angola and Namibia supported Zimbabwe as 
close allies, Botswana, Mauritius, Mozambique, the Seychelles, Swaziland and Tanzania 
generally backed South Africa, the DRC had no presence in the debates and Malawi, 
Lesotho and Zambia contributed erratically without conforming to any discernible 
pattern. In truth, it was only Zimbabwean and South African officials that consistently 
arrived at meetings on regional security arrangements with a prepared position. Because 
South Africa and Zimbabwe dominated the discussions and were the only SADC states to 
articulate their positions publicly, the account that follows focuses on these countries. 
This Chapter explores the main developments and debates regarding the orientation, 
methods, structures and status of SADC's collective security body. It discusses the 
reasons for the Organ impasse in the second half of the 1990s and describes the initiative 
taken by the Swazi Foreign Minister to finalise the Organ Protocol. It then summarises 
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the content of the Protocol and SIPO, examines the fractious evolution of SADC's 
Mutual Defence Pact and outlines the activities of the ISDSC. 
The Chapter highlights the acute tension between South Africa and Zimbabwe, which to 
some extent was a product of historical circumstances but was more importantly a clash 
of ideas around norms and strategy. At the heart of the Organ imbroglio were 
fundamentally different approaches to regional conflict management and resolution, with 
one group of states led by Pretoria emphasising diplomatic methods and the other group 
led by Harare favouring a military approach. This normative cleavage similarly 
bedevilled the process of concluding the Mutual Defence Pact, although here it was 
Botswana that most forcefully opposed a militarist position. 
3.2 The launch of the Organ 
In June 1996 the Summit met in Gaborone to launch the Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security Co-operation. The Summit communique stated that the Organ would be 
governed by the principles contained in the SADC Treaty, and added a further principle: 
"Military intervention of whatever nature shall be decided upon only after all possible 
political remedies have been exhausted in accordance with the Charter of the OAU and 
the United Nations".i This formulation was significant in the context of the tussle 
between the militarist and pacific tendencies in SADC. It will be recalled that in SADC's 
1993 Framework and Strategy document, member states had rejected the view that 
military force is an unacceptable instrument for conducting foreign policy and resolving 
conflict; instead, they maintained that "there is a sense in which military force is an 
acceptable form of foreign policy", noting that "the region would have to agree on 
conditions under which this will be acceptable" (Section 2.6).2 Now, in the 1996 Summit 
! SADC, 1996, 'Communique: Summit of Heads of State or Governments ofthe Southern African 
Development Community (SADC)" Gaborone, 28 June, para 4.1 
2 SADC, 1993, Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy for Building the Community, Harare, January, 
pg.26. 
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the content of the Protocol and SIPO, examines the fractious evolution of SADC's 
Mutual Defence Pact and outlines the activities ofthe ISDSC. 
The Chapter highlights the acute tension between South Africa and Zimbabwe, which to 
some extent was a product of historical circumstances but was more importantly a clash 
of ideas around norms and strategy. At the heart of the Organ imbroglio were 
fundamentally different approaches to regional conflict management and resolution, with 
one group of states led by Pretoria emphasising diplomatic methods and the other group 
led by Harare favouring a military approach. This normative cleavage similarly 
bedevilled the process of concluding the Mutual Defence Pact, although here it was 
Botswana that most forcefully opposed a militarist position. 
3.2 The launch of the Organ 
In June 1996 the Summit met in Gaborone to launch the Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security Co-operation. The Summit communique stated that the Organ would be 
governed by the principles contained in the SADC Treaty, and added a further principle: 
"Military intervention of whatever nature shaH be decided upon only after all possible 
political remedies have been exhausted in accordance with the Charter of the OAU and 
the United Nations".l This formulation was significant in the context of the tussle 
between the militarist and pacific tendencies in SADC. It will be recalled that in SADC's 
1993 Framework and Strategy document, member states had rejected the view that 
military force is an unacceptable instrument for conducting foreign policy and resolving 
conflict; instead, they maintained that "there is a sense in which military force is an 
acceptable form of foreign policy", noting that "the region would have to agree on 
conditions under which this will be acceptable" (Section 2.6),z Now, in the 1996 Summit 
I SADC, 1996, 'Communique: Summit of Heads of State or Governments of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC)" Gaborone, 28 June, para 4.1 
2 SADC, 1993, Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy for Building the Community, Harare, January, 
pg.26. 
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communique, SADC's stance was grounded in iQternational law and the use of force was 
presented as an instrument of last resort after political efforts had failed. 
The communique stated that the Organ would have the following objectives: 
.. protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability 
arising from the breakdown of law and order, inter-state conflict and external 
aggression; 
.. promote political co-operation among member states and the evolution of common 
political values and institutions; 
.. promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within member 
states and encourage the observance of universal human rights; 
.. promote the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security; 
.. engage in regional security and defence co-operation through conflict prevention, 
management and resolution; 
.. mediate in inter-state disputes, use preventive diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the 
region and seek to end conflict as quickly as possible through diplomatic means; 
.. develop a collective security capacity, conclude a Mutual Defence Pact for 
responding to external threats and establish a regional peacekeeping force; and 
.. encourage and monitor the ratification of UN and OAD treaties on disarmament and 
arms control, human right  and peaceful relations between states.3 
The Organ's principles and objectives thus reflected a pacific, democratic and holistic 
perspective on security. This was due in large measure to the preparatory work done by 
the Secretariat, which had drafted the terms of reference of the peace and security sector 
for consideration at a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs, defence and SADC affairs in 
Gaborone in January 1996.4 Once again, but for the last time, the Secretariat sought to 
steer the security debate in a progressive direction. 
3 SADC, Gaborone Summit communique, op cit. 
4 SADC Secretariat, 1996, 'Terms of Reference for the SADC Sector on Political Cooperation, Democracy, 
Peace and Security', unpublished document prepared for the meeting of SADC ministers responsible for 
foreign affairs, defence and SADC affairs in Gaborone on 18-19 January 1996. 
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In light of the prevailing disputes among member states, the terms of reference prepared 
by the Secretariat included three institutional options for the sector. The ministers could 
not reach consensus on the matter. In their memorandum to the Summit, they omitted the 
options and simply presented a brief and insufficiently clear set of proposals on 
organisational arrangements.s As on other occasions, an inability to reach agreement was 
'resolved' by the expedient of recording an artificial consensus in a bland and ambiguous 
manner. The ministers gave the sector a new appellation - the SADC Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security, named after the Central Organ of the OAU's Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The ministers added that the Organ 
would operate in a flexible and informal manner.6 
At the Gaborone Summit the heads of state rejected the reference to flexibility and 
informality but otherwise accepted, and reproduced in the communique, the ministers' 
brief proposals on the Organ's structural arrangements: the Organ would operate at 
Summit, ministerial and technical levels; it would function independently of other SADC 
structures; it would incorporate the ISDSC; the Chair of the Organ would rotate annually 
among member states; and the Chair would serve on a Troika basis, meaning that he or 
she must act in consultation with the outgoing Chair and the incoming Chair for the 
following year.7 The Summit appointed Mugabe as the first Chair of the Organ and he 
"assured the Summit that he [would] work closely with all member States and consult on 
all issues pertaining to the work ofthe Organ".8 The Secretariat was given no role to play 
in the administration of the security body. Instead, the country that held the annually 
rotating chair of the Organ would be responsible for administrative, logistical and 
financial matters. 
The Summit's decisions in Gaborone generated much unhappiness and friction in 
subsequent years. This was partly because the launch of the Organ was premature given 
5 SADC Secretariat, 1996. 'The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. Meeting of SADC 
Ministers Responsible for Foreign Affairs. Defence and SADC Affairs', unpublished record of the meeting 
of the SADC ministers in Gaborone on 18-19 January 1996. 
6 Ibid. 
1 SADC, Gaborone Summit communique, op cit. 
8 Ibid, pg. 4. 
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the lack of consensus among member states; most seriously, the strategies and 
jurisdiction of the Organ were unclear and disputed. In terms of the SADC Treaty, 
moreover, the formation of the Organ required a protocol approved by the Summit and 
ratified by two-thirds of the member states, a process that was not completed until 2004. 
Prior to this, the Organ did not exist de jure. Nor did it exist properly de facto: Mugabe 
did not set up any of its envisaged structures, the Chair did not rotate annually and the 
ISDSC continued to operate independently of SADC. Over the next five years Mugabe 
made pronouncements and decisions as the Chair of the Organ without consulting all 
member states. The most controversial decision related to the deployment of troops from 
Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola to support President Kabila during the 1998 rebellion in 
the DRC. This was done in the name of SADC but without the organisation's blessing 
and contrary to the wishes of South Africa and the other member states that wanted to 
tackle the DRC crisis through diplomatic rather than military action (Section 4.4). 
Further problems arose from the Gaborone Summit's decision that the Organ would 
function independently of other SADC structures and at a summit level. This gave rise to 
the anomalous prospect of two separate entities at the level of heads of state being 
responsible for addressing conflict in the region. The mandates of both the Organ and the 
SADC Summit covered peacemaking and security but the Gaborone communique did not 
specify the respective jurisdictions of these bodies and the relationship between them. 
During his tenure as the SADC Chairperson in 1997/8, President Mandela became so 
frustrated with Mugabe's rival authority as the Chair of the Organ that he threatened to 
resign if the Organ were not properly integrated into SADC and made accountable to the 
Summit.9 The threat did not receive a great deal of media attention but within SADC 
circles it was a controversial and provocative move that reflected and exacerbated the 
growing tension around regional security arrangements. 
The Summit was unable to resolve the Organ disputes at its meetings in Maputo and 
Mauritius in 1998. At the former meeting the issue was referred to an ad hoc working 
group comprising Mozambique, Malawi and Namibia. The foreign ministers of these 
91. Wetherell, 1998, 'SADe Security Split Threatens', Mail and Guardian, 17-23 July. 
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countries produced a stillborn 'compromise' proposal that the Organ should be 
constituted as a committee of five member states with a mandate to "intervene in all 
conflicts arising within the region". 10 South African officials claimed that the Maputo 
Summit effectively suspended the Organ.!! This view was contested by Zimbabwean 
officials.!2 In August 1999, following the DRC crisis that had rent SADC asunder 
(Section 4.4), the Summit decided that the Organ should continue to operate and be 
chaired by Mugabe but that the Council of Ministers would review the operations of all 
SADC institutions, including the Organ, and revert to the Summit within six months.13 
Mugabe was reported to have agreed that he would not act in the name of the Organ 
without consulting the Chair of SADC. 14 
3.3 The 'two summits' debate 
Pretoria's position on the Organ's status was set out publicly by Horst Brammer, who 
was centrally involved in the debates on regional security arrangements in his capacity as 
the Deputy Director for SADC Political Affairs in the South African Department of 
Foreign Affairs. He argued that while regional security was a principal responsibility of 
the Organ, it was also, by virtue of the SADC Treaty, a core function of SADC and 
therefore of the SADC Summit. ls As noted in Section 2.4, the Treaty includes the 
promotion and defence of peace and security as one of the institution's objectives, it 
anticipates the ratification of a protocol on politics, peace and security, and it states that 
the SADC Summit is the supreme decision-making body of the organisation. Brammer 
concluded that the Organ was subsidiary to the Summit and should be answerable to it. 
10 Quoted in M. Malan, 1998, 'Regional Power Politics under Cover of SADC - Running Amok with a 
Mythical Organ', ISS Paper, no. 35, Institute for Security Studies, pp. 4-6. 
11 H. Brammer, 1999, 'In Search of an Effective Regional Security Mechanism for Southern Africa', 
Global Dia/ogue, vol. 4, no. 2, Institute for Global Dialogue, August, pp. 21-22 at pg. 21. 
12 A. W. Tapfumaneyi, 1999, 'Regional Security Cooperation in Southern Africa: A View from 
Zimbabwe', Global Dialogue, vol. 4, no. 2, Institute for Global Dialogue, August, pp. 23-26 and pg. 35. 
13 SADC, 1999, '1999 SADC Summit Communique', Maputo, 18 August, para 46. 
14 H. Barrell, 1999, 'SADC Stops Mugabe's Organ Abuse', Mail and Guardian, 17-23 September. 
15 Brammer, 'In Search of an Effective Regional Security Mechanism', op cit. 
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Brammer also reasoned that Southern Africa needed a single organisation covering 
political, security and economic co-operation. His motivation mirrored the holistic 
perspective expressed in the CSCE and the CSSDCA (Section 2.6), namely that the 
political, security, social and economic spheres were so intertwined that progress in any 
one sphere depended on progress in, and institutional linkages with, the others. Brammer 
elaborated further: 
If southern African governments are serious about [economic] integration, they 
will have to agree on a structure that would ensure regional stability and 
security. Security and economic development go hand in hand - one is 
inconceivable without the other. Investor confidence and donor assistance can 
only be promoted if the region proves to the international community that it is 
willing and able to harmonise and implement policies which promote an 
environment conducive to peace and stability. 16 
Zimbabwe's stance on the status of the Organ was put across by Lt. Col. Walter 
Tapfumaneyi, a defence ministry official based in the Directorate of Defence Policy in 
Harare. Like Brammer, he was a key participant in the drafting of the Organ Protocol. He 
maintained that South Africa's "legal argument against two summits [was] contrived and 
untenable".!7 It was clear from the Gaborone communique that the regional leaders had 
intended to "create a parallel and independent structure from the SADC economic 
forum".18 As heads of state, they were entitled to "create new institutions, dissolve old 
ones, or sign new treaties as they see fit" ,19 It was therefore "mischievous to engage in 
superfluous legalese in a bid to imprison the SADC Organ in the SADC Treaty".20 
Tapfumaneyi asserted that while South Africa's legal status in SADC was equal to that of 
the other members, "the peculiar historical circumstances which saw South Africa as an 
adversary to the rest of southern Africa for many decades dictate that it is morally 
16 Brammer, 'In Search of an Effective Regional Security Mechanism', op cit. 
17 Tapfumaneyi, 'Regional Security Cooperation in Southern Africa', op cit, pp. 25-26. 
18 Ibid, pg. 25. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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incompetent to challenge the substance of the Treaty, or to invoke it in a manner that 
defeats its spirit and purpose,,?l 
The tone and substance of Tapfumaneyi's remarks revealed Zimbabwe's hostility 
towards Pretoria. The antagonism stemmed from a range of factors: apartheid aggression 
in the 1980s; Mandela's iconic status and Pretoria's lack of deference to Mugabe as the 
regional leader; South Africa's perceived domination of SADC; and Harare's belief that 
state decision-making in South Africa was still firmly in the clutches of apartheid era 
officials. Tapfumaneyi identified the causes of the Organ impasse as including Mandela's 
threat to resign as the SADC Chair in 1997, Pretoria's "isolationist and hegemonic 
behaviour", its domineering presence at SADC and Organ meetings and, when its opinion 
failed to prevail, its unilateral actions that were usually at cross-purposes with the rest of 
SADC. Tapfumaneyi went so far as to claim that Pretoria was being manipulated by the 
US administration and that the retention of white personnel in the South African state had 
resulted in a "hidden but potent pro-apartheid hand that is manipulating South Africa's 
domestic and foreign policy in a counter-progressive direction vis-a.-vis a regional 
security consensus in Southern Africa".22 
The apparent anomaly of two summits reflected Harare's long-standing conviction that 
the regional security forum should be independent of SADC. In the early 1990s 
Zimbabwe had argued that SADC, like its predecessor SADCC, should focus exclusively 
on economic matters and that a revamped version of the Frontline States should be 
responsible for politics, defence and security. As noted in Section 2.7, in 1995 Zimbabwe 
and the other members of the Frontline States had proposed that a new organisation, the 
Association of Southern African States, be set up as the regional security body. 
Harare's position was based on three considerations. First, Zimbabwean ministers and 
officials insisted privately that the SADC Secretariat would not maintain confidentiality 
on security issues because it was beholden to foreign donors; at meetings with donor 
21 Ibid, pg. 26. 
22 Ibid, pp. 23-26. 
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representatives, Secretariat staff were bound to pass on classified information.23 In his 
article cited above, Tapfumaneyi raised this contention publicly: "It is no secret that 
SADC is over 90 per cent donor funded, and donors of all hues and persuasions sit on its 
boards. For this reason, more than anything else, SADC is an inappropriate forum to 
preside over sensitive regional security issues".24 Underpinning this perspective was the 
strong anti-imperialist stance that remains firmly in place in Southern Africa as a result of 
colonialism and its modern incarnations like structural adjustment programmes. 
Second, Zimbabwe was convinced that conflicts in the region should be dealt with along 
the lines of the informal and flexible arrangements of the Frontline States. During the 
liberation struggles and after the SADCC countries gained independence, the regional 
leadership developed a close rapport. As a result, Mugabe, Samora Machel of 
Mozambique, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Sam Nujoma of Namibia and Eduardo Dos 
Santos of Angola were able to communicate quickly and easily without the burden of 
excessive protocol and bureaucracy; formal rules and procedures, on the other hand, 
would limit the freedom of SADC presidents and their speed of manoeuvre in times of 
crisis.zs Thomas Ohlson captures the appeal of the informal character of the Frontline 
States as follows: "Each national leader can pursue the foreign policy of his country, 
while the summitry format allows for flexibility, pragmatism, and rapid collective 
responses to questions of vital importance to the common goals".26 
Third, Zimbabwe's preference for informality derived from its concern that formal rules 
and procedures would undermine sovereignty by constraining national decision-making. 
According to Tapfumaneyi, sovereignty should not be compromised: 
23 Author's discussions with Zimbabwean officials at SADC's Ministerial Workshop on Democracy, Peace 
and Security in Windhoek in July 1994 and at the meeting ofthe ISDSC in Cape Town in September 1995. 
24 Tapfumaneyi, 'Regional Security Cooperation in Southern Africa', op cit, pg. 26. 
25 Author's discussions with Zimbabwean officials at workshops on regional security in 1991-1994. See 
also Malan, 'Regional Power Politics under Cover of SADC', op cit, pp. 2-3. 
26 Quoted in E.G. Bennan and K.S. Sams, 2000, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Cuipabilities, 
Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, pg. 
153. 
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Any fears about the separate SADC Organ Summit being abused by the SADC 
Organ Chairman are unfounded. This is not only because the leaders have the 
prerogative to limit the SADC Organ Chairman's powers in the documents that 
lay down the Organ's structures and operational modalities, but more 
importantly, because all the member states retain their sovereign right to act 
independently or to stand aloof if they are unhappy with the collective 
arrangements.27 
As discussed further in Chapter 5, Zimbabwe's opposition to diluting sovereignty was 
shared by most if not aU of the SADC states. Inevitably, their aversion to subordinating 
national decision-making to regional decisions and norms had negative consequences. It 
stifled progress towards integration, building a regional community, creating a viable 
security regime and acting with common purpose in crisis situations. 
3.4 The pacific-militarist debate 
In addition to the debate around 'two summits', SADC was polarised around 
incompatible pacific and militarist models of regional security. One camp, comprising 
Botswana, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania, regarded the Organ as a 
common security regime whose primary basis for co-operation and peacemaking would 
be political and not military. The militarist camp, comprising Angola, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe, preferred a mutual defence pact and prioritised defence co-operation and 
military responses to conflict. Mugabe stated that he foresaw the Organ evolving into a 
"kind of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation for the region".28 
27 A.W. Tapfumaneyi, 1999, 'The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: Interpreting the 
Decision ofthe Maputo 1997 SADC Summit', ACCORD Occasional Paper, no. 9, African Centre for the 
Constructive Resolution of Disputes, pg. 4. 
28 Quoted in 'Congo Wins Membership in Sudden Expansion of SA DC', SouthScan, vol. 12, no. 33,12 
September 1997, pg. 258. 
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The divergent visions spawned heated debates on a range of issues, such as the structure 
of the Organ and the relative primacy of defence ministers and foreign ministers in 
relation to regional security. Brammer put the pacific case as follows: 
From South Africa's point of view it would be important to place the regional 
security organisation in the realm of foreign ministers. Only such an 
arrangement would fall into the conflict resolution paradigm, which places 
emphasis on political, rather than military solutions to conflicts. Southern 
Africa should not follow an approach that falls out of this accepted 
international norm?9 
In 1999 Tapfumaneyi maintained that a primary reason for the Organ impasse was 
Pretoria's opposition to the use of armed force in peacemaking. He argued that this 
approach was severely mistaken: 
All the conflicts that have arisen in southern Africa since 1989 have shown 
that is necessary, at least in the early stages of the conflict resolution and 
peace-building continuum, to apply collective military force, not as an end in 
itself, but as a catalyst to an effective political solution. It is therefore 
superfluous and hypocritical for the South African government and its 
apologists to advocate a strict adherence to early warning and diplomatic 
solutions to SADC conflicts.3o 
Tapfumaneyi's historical observation was correct in the sense that armed struggles and 
military support from the Frontline States in the 1970s and 1980s had been successful 
strategies in the fight for independence in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe. 
Flowing from that history, the foreign policies of independent Angola, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe had retained a strongly militarist ethos. Tapfumaneyi also poured scorn on 
South Africa's pacific posture in light of its military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 after 
29 Brammer, 'In Search of an Effective Regional Security Mechanism', op cit, pg. 22. 
30 Tapfumaneyi, 'Regional Security Cooperation in Southern Africa', op cit, pg. 26. 
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a mutiny in that country (Section 4.3). He described the deployment by Pretoria, with 
Botswana's "token support", as an invasion that had occurred without SADC's 
endorsement and that was reminiscent of apartheid destabilisation.31 
Notwithstanding the Lesotho intervention, however, Pretoria had indeed embarked on a 
radical demilitarisation of its national and regional security policy after the democratic 
election in 1994. Under the new ANC government, the armed forces were no longer a 
major instrument of policy and were no longer involved in state decision-making. The 
government proclaimed that national security was "no longer viewed as a predominantly 
military and police problem" but had been "broadened to incorporate political, economic, 
social and environmental matters".32 The security of people rather than the security of the 
state was declared to be the paramount concern and the primary threats to security were 
perceived to be social and economic problems like poverty, unemployment, poor 
education and limited social services, none of which could be solved by military means.33 
Defence spending began to fall sharply and the government announced that the armed 
forces would have a primarily defensive orientation and posture. 34 
In the course of the 1990s South Africa was the only SADC country to publish its policy 
on regional security. Incorporated into the 1996 White Paper on Defence, the policy was 
based on an avowedly anti-militarist posture and the concept of common security: 
Regional instability and underdevelopment can only be addressed 
meaningfully through political reform, socio-economic development and inter-
state co-operation in these spheres. Similarly, the prevention and management 
of inter- and intra-state conflict is primarily a political and not a military 
matter. 
31 Ibid, pg. 25. 
32 Republic of South Africa, 1996, White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, 
chapter 2. The White Paper can be viewed at http://www.info.gov.zalwhitepapers/1996/defencwp.htm. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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Following trends in other parts of the world, South Africa will encourage the 
development of a multi-lateral 'common security' approach in Southern 
Africa. In essence, the SADC states should shape their political, security and 
defence policies in co-operation with each other. . .. Common security 
arrangements would have many advantages in [the Southern African] context. 
They could facilitate the sharing of information, intelligence and resources; the 
early warning of potential crises; joint problem-solving; implementing 
confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs); negotiating security 
agreements and treaties; and resolving inter-state conflict through peaceful 
means.35 
The White Paper thus sought to entrench the primacy of political action over military 
engagement in maintaining regional security. Along these lines, the document added that 
certain common security activities were the responsibility of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, chief among them the settlement of conflict through preventive diplomacy, 
mediation or arbitration. The Department of Defence would be responsible for other 
activities, such as regional defence co-operation, CSBMs, military support for disaster 
relief and assistance with clearing minefields in neighbouring countries.36 
Pretoria was convinced that pacific methods of conflict resolution were the most effective 
forms of peacemaking in civil wars and other crises in Africa. This conviction stemmed 
from the success of South Africa's own negotiated settlement and from the relatively low 
impact of the ANC's armed wing during the liberation struggle. Military action had been 
important symbolically but, in contrast to Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, it had not 
been a major factor in achieving liberation. The other relevant consideration was the style 
of politics favoured by both Mandela and Mbeki. They preferred the art of persuasion, 
and negotiations they could direct, to the blunt and unpredictable use of force. Force was 
seen as a limited tool, applicable only in exceptional situations and then mainly in order 
to provide space for diplomacy and negotiations. 
35 Ibid, chapter 4. 
36 Ibid. 
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The government was supportive of traditional peacekeeping that enjoyed the consent of 
the belligerents, it was uneasy with more robust peace enforcement and it insisted that its 
external military deployments should conform to international law and have the approval 
of the UN Security Council.37 The 1999 White Paper on South African Participation in 
Peace Support Operations asserted that the main pillars of peace operations were the non-
military endeavours of preventive diplomacy, peacebuilding and peacemaking.38 During 
the DRC crisis in 1998 and over the subsequent decade, South Africa's international 
behaviour was consistent with its stated policy preference for diplomatic forms of conflict 
resolution and for military action to take place under UN auspices (Section 4.4). The one 
major exception was its military deployment in Lesotho in 1998 (Section 4.3). 
The other members of the pacific camp in SADC shared South Africa's disinclination to 
give the regional security regime a predominantly military orientation. In light of the 
history, contemporary disputes and uncertain political future of Southern Africa, they 
were especially opposed to the grand strategy of collective defence via a Nato-type treaty; 
they believed that this strategy carried the grave danger of being sucked into a war 
without good cause and proper deliberation (Section 3.8). As Major-General Herman 
Lupogo from Tanzania put it in 1997, there was no need for a mutual defence pact since 
this would only serve to draw states into "unnecessary wars which were not of their own 
making" and the better option was "friendly co-operation that exists in security and 
defence issues". 39 
Of the various disputes that impeded the construction of SADC's security architecture, 
the differences between the militarist and pacific camps were the most significant and the 
most divisive. There were three reasons for this: the approaches derived from core 
national values and policies that were held so firmly by states that they were unwilling to 
37 Republic of South Africa, 1999, White Paper on South African Participation in Peace Support 
Operations. The White Paper can be viewed at www.info.gov.za/whitepaperslI999/peacemissions.pdf. 
38 Ibid, chapter 4. 
39 Quoted in N. Ngoma, 2005, Prospects/or a Security Community in Southern Africa: An Analysis 0/ 
Regional Security in the Southern African Development Community, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 
pg.146. 
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compromise their positions; the different emphases of the two approaches proved too 
divergent to be ignored, finessed or bridged satisfactorily; and the strategic implications 
went to the heart of the most serious business of all, war. 
The DRC rebellion in 1998 brought these strategic implications into sharp relief when the 
pacific group promoted negotiations and a cease fire while Namibia, Zimbabwe and 
Angola engaged in hostilities. According to Brammer, this "difference in approach 
towards conflict resolution was identifiably along the same lines as the debate on the 
Organ".40 The cleavage around the DRC crisis led to dramatic public sparring between 
Pretoria and Harare, generated lasting antagonism between member states and crippled 
the Organ (Section 4.4). Rocky Williams, a senior official in the South African 
Department of Defence, captured these dynamics when he invoked the notion of "two 
SADCs".41 In 1999 Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and the DRC signed a defence treaty 
without official notice to the Summit,42 a controversial move that reinforced the 
impression of 'two SADCs' split along militarist and pacific lines (Section 3.8). 
3.5 The Swaziland breakthrough 
In August and September 1999 the South African Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota, 
held consultations with his Namibian and Zimbabwean counterparts on taking the Organ 
process forward. With their consent, he approached King Mswati III of Swaziland, which 
held the rotating chair of the ISDSC, to convene an extraordinary ministerial meeting 
aimed at finalising the Organ Protocol and structure. A working group comprising 
officials from Swaziland, South Africa and Zimbabwe was set up to prepare the 
documentation for this meeting.43 
40 Brammer, 'In Search ofan Effective Regional Security Mechanism', op cit. 
41 R. Williams, 2000, 'From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding? South African Policy and Practice in Peace 
Missions', International Peacekeeping, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 84-104 at pg. 97. 
42 See 1. Wetherell, 'Mugabe Forms New Defence Pact', Mail and Guardian, 16-22 April 1999. 
43 The information in this paragraph is based on the author's discussions with South African defence and 
foreign affairs officials, September 1999. 
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The tiny landlocked kingdom of Swaziland was one of the least influential members of 
SADC and this seemed unlikely to change in relation to the politically charged subject of 
regional security arrangements. Moreover, the ISDSC was subordinate to the Organ and 
had a technical rather than an overtly political character (Section 3.9). Yet the Swazi 
Foreign Minister, Albert Shabangu, seized the initiative with a sense of purpose and 
energy that had hitherto been absent. Whether through lack of interest or excessive 
caution, the ministers whose countries had held the chair of the Organ, the ISDSC and 
SADC in previous years had done little to drive the Organ process. A former member of 
the democratic trade union movement, Shabangu was an activist at heart. Given his 
outspoken opposition to the authoritarian monarchy in his country, he was surprised to 
have been appointed Foreign Minister and was uncertain how long he would remain in 
that post.44 He was determined to "do something useful" and finalise the Organ Protocol 
during the one-year period that Swaziland held the ISDSC chair. He invited me to be his 
advisor on this mission. 
Fortuitously, Shabangu was able to convene combined meetings of foreign ministers and 
defence and security ministers. In Swaziland the defence portfolio was held by the King 
who, as head of state, did not attend the ministerial meetings of the ISDSC but instead 
delegated his Foreign Minister to represent the country. So it was that in October 1999 
and May 2000 Shabangu convened two extraordinary meetings of ISDSC ministers and 
SADC ministers for foreign affairs to finalise the Protocol on Politics, Defence and 
Security Co-operation, which specifies the objectives, methods, structures and 
jurisdiction of the Organ. Notwithstanding the prior consultation undertaken by Lekota, 
Zimbabwean officials argued that the Chair of the ISDSC had no authority to call 
meetings of foreign ministers and that the responsibility for drafting the Protocol lay with 
the Chair of the Organ rather than the ISDSC.45 When the Zimbabwean officials told 
Shabangu that their ministers would boycott the meeting scheduled for October 1999, he 
44 Author's discussion with Minister Shabangu, Mbabane, September 1999. As it turned out, Shabangu was 
later 'demoted' to Minister of Housing. 
45 The author was present at this discussion, which took place during the preparations for the ministerial 
meeting in Mbabane on 26-27 October 1999. 
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called their bluff and said that it would go ahead regardless.46 In the event, the 
Zimbabwean ministers did attend the meeting. 
In the course of finalising the Protocol it was necessary to confront the various disputes 
that had prevented the Organ from being set up earlier. The structural disagreement 
around the Organ's status was resolved in favour of the security body being part of 
SADC, rather than independent of it, and being subordinate and accountable to the 
Summit. The major strategic disagreement between the pacific and militarist camps could 
not be resolved, leading to an uneasy compromise whereby the Organ would have a 
pacific orientation and, in accordance with the Gaborone communique of 1996, states 
would later draw up a regional defence treaty. The Protocol thus provides that one of the 
Organ's objectives is to consider the development of a collective security capacity and 
conclude a Mutual Defence Pact to respond to external military threats.47 
The other disputes over the structural features of the security body were dealt with 
through compromise agreements, described below, that were inefficient in terms of the 
Organ's responsibility for regional security, crisis management and peacemaking. 
II Given Mugabe's tenacious hold on the Organ for several years and his controversial 
actions as its Chair, most of the member states were keen to avoid a concentration of 
power in the hands of one country. They also wanted to ensure that the Chair could 
not make significant decisions without adequate consultation. The Protocol therefore 
provides that the Organ Chair must rotate annually but may not simultaneously be the 
Chair of the Summit;48 the Organ will have a Troika structure (Section 3.2);49 and the 
head of the Organ must consult not only the Organ Troika but also the Troika of the 
Summit. 50 A more expeditious arrangement would have been to make the Chair of 
46 Ibid. 
47 SADC, 2001, Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, Blantyre, article 2(h). The 
Protocol can be viewed on the SADC website at www.sadc.int. 
48 Ibid, article 4. 
49 Ibid, article 3. 
50 Ibid, article 4. The Troika of the Summit comprises the current Chair of SADC, the incoming Chair for 
the following year and the outgoing Chair from the previous year. 
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SADC simultaneously the head of the Organ, working with the SADC Troika and 
answerable to the Summit. 
II Zimbabwe prevailed in its view that the SADC Secretariat should not be linked to the 
Organ. The draft Protocol of May 2000 stated that the Organ secretariat would rotate 
annually with the rotating Chair of the Organ.51 This provision, which was later 
overturned by the Summit, would have greatly compromised efficiency and 
effectiveness, preventing the development of sound systems and procedures and 
precluding institutional capacity-building and learning over time. 
.. The dispute over the relative primacy of foreign ministers and defence ministers was 
resolved by providing that the Organ would have three ministerial committees - one 
comprising foreign ministers, a second comprising the ministers responsible for 
defence, policing and intelligence and the third comprising all these ministers - and 
that each of these committees could report directly to the Chair of the Organ (Section 
3.7) .52 
In May 2000 the King of Swaziland presented the draft Protocol to Mugabe in the latter's 
capacity as the Chair of the Organ. This was followed by another fifteen months of 
procrastination and behind-the-scenes wrangling, during which time Zimbabwe sought to 
shelve the document on the grounds that the preparation of the Organ Protocol lay with 
the Chair of the Organ and not the Chair of the ISDSC.53 There was unconfirmed 
speculation that Botswana threatened to walk out of SADC if the draft Protocol were not 
tabled at a Summit meeting. 54 Finally, in August 2001 the Summit approved the Protocol 
at its meeting in Blantyre and appointed President Chissano of Mozambique as the new 
Chair of the Organ. The Summit amended the draft Protocol to provide that the SADC 
51 SADC, 2000, 'Draft SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation'. unpublished Piggs 
Peak draft, 26 May, article 9. 
52 SADC, Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, op cit, articles 5-7. 
53 Author's correspondence with South African government official on 16 August 2000 and with Minister 
Shabangu on 21 August 2000. 
54 Author's telephonic discussion with Minister Shabangu, June 2001. 
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Secretariat would render administrative services to the Organ.55 The requirement that the 
Organ Protocol be ratified by two-thirds of the SADC states was met in March 2004. 
It is to be expected that efforts to create multilateral institutions will give rise to disputes 
between states because they have different interests, values and ideologies. The creation 
of institutions that regulate security, defence and foreign policy are likely to be especially 
difficult and disputatious because of the sensitivity of these sectors and the reluctance of 
states to surrender sovereignty and make concessions on issues that lie at the heart of 
their statehood and surviva1.56 In the course of negotiations, states might nevertheless be 
able to reconcile their differences, forge common ground and consequently conclude 
agreements that reflect a genuine consensus and commitment. This was not the case with 
the Organ Protocol. The Protocol formally resolved the disputes around SADC's security 
mechanism but it did not overcome the mistrust and tension among states and it did not 
bridge or transcend the deep political and normative divisions between them. As a result, 
the signing of the Protocol did not establish a stable platform for managing conflict and 
enhancing security in the region. 
3.6 The amended Treaty of 2001 and the RISDP 
The Blantyre Summit of 2001 endorsed a far-reaching plan to restructure SADC and 
centralise its operations in the Secretariat.57 Over a two-year period the organisation's 
twenty-one sectors that had been co-ordinated by member states would be grouped into 
programme clusters co-ordinated by four directorates in the Secretariat.58 The directorates 
would concentrate on regional integration, mobilisation of financial resources and policy 
development and harmonisation. An Integrated Committee of Ministers, comprising two 
55 SADC, Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, op cit, article 9. 
56 For an account ofthe EU's difficulty in developing a common security and foreign policy at the same 
time as the Organ debates, see P.H. Gordon, 1997/8, 'Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy', International 
Security, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 74-100. 
57 J. Isaksen and E. Tjonneland, 2001, Assessing the Restructuring of SADC - Positions, Policies and 
Progress, Report of the Chr. Michelsen Institute, R 2001:6, December. 
58 The four directorates cover trade, industry, finance and investment; food, agriculture and natural 
resources; social and human development and special programmes; and infrastructure and services. 
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ministers from each member state, would oversee the work of the directorates and make 
decisions on strategic direction and integration. 59 Each member state would set up a 
SADC National Committee to ensure co-ordination and implementation of the 
organisation's policies and programmes.60 The restructuring led to the amendment of the 
SADC Treaty.61 The revised Treaty reformulates SADC's objectives, which are described 
as the Common Agenda of the organisation and include the promotion of "common 
political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through 
institutions which are democratic, legitimate and effective".62 
The amended Treaty states that the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation 
is an institution of SADC.63 It contains the following provisions in this regard: the 
Summit shall elect from among its members a Chair and Deputy Chair of the Organ, save 
that the Chair of the Summit shall not simultaneously be the Chair of the Organ; the 
Chair of the Organ shall consult the Troika of the Summit and report to the Summit; there 
will be a Ministerial Committee of the Organ, comprising the ministers responsible for 
foreign affairs, defence, public security (i.e. policing) and state security (i.e. intelligence) 
from each of the member states, which will co-ordinate the work of the Organ; the 
structure, functions, powers and procedures of the Organ shall be prescribed in a 
Protocol; the Secretariat will provide secretariat services to the Organ; and decisions of 
the Organ shall be taken by consensus.64 The organogram appended to this dissertation 
indicates the new structure of SA DC and the place of the Organ therein (Appendix 1). 
In 2003 the Summit approved the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ, referred to 
SIPO (Section 3.7); the Mutual Defence Pact (Section 3.8); and the Regional Indicative 
59 For a review of the implementation of the restructuring, see G. Ie Pere and E. Tjonneiand, 2005, 'Which 
Way SADC? Advancing Co-operation and Integration in Southern Africa', Occasional Paper, no. 50, 
Institute for Global Dialogue, October. 
60 An organogram of SA DC's new structure can be found in Le Pere and Tjonneland, 'Which Way 
SADC?', pg. 48. 
61 SADC, 2001, Agreement Amending the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, 
Blantyre; and SADC, 2001, Amended Declaration and Treaty of SA De. These documents are available on 
the SADC website at www.sadc.int. 
62 SADC, Amended Declaration and Treaty, op cit, article 5A. 
63 Ibid, article 9. 
64 Ibid, article lOA. 
81 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). The RISDP is intended to be a fifteen-year 
regional integration development framework that sets out the priorities, policies and 
strategies for achieving SADC's long-term goals. Its objectives are to define the priority 
integration areas; set up a logical implementation programme; ensure effective sectoral 
linkages and enhance synergy amongst sectors; and provide members states, the 
Secretariat and other stakeholders with a coherent and comprehensive long-term 
implementation agenda. The intervention areas of the RISDP are divided into two 
categories. First, there are 'cross-sectoral intervention areas', which include poverty 
alleviation; combating the HIV / AIDS pandemic; gender equality and development; 
science and technology; information and communication technology; environment and 
sustainable development; private sector development; and statistics. Second, there are 
'sectoral co-operation and integration intervention areas', covering trade/economic 
liberalisation and development; infrastructure support for regional integration and poverty 
eradication; sustainable food security; and human and social development.65 
After the Regional Plan was approved, a tighter focus was provided by the 2004 RISDP 
Implementation Framework, which contains detailed implementation plans over fifteen 
years, five years and one year for each of the directorates in the Secretariat. The 
Framework was followed in tum by the preparation of business plans for the directorates, 
a list of priorities and a ranking of RISDP projects. In 2005 SADC's overarching 
priorities for the next five years were as follows: integration of markets and economic 
development; infrastructure, including information and communication technology; 
statistics; and emergency services, including HIV/AIDS and food security.66 The 
organisation's political and security plans and priorities were not addressed in the RISDP 
documents but were dealt with separately in the Organ Protocol and SIPO, reflecting the 
long-standing cleavage within SADC between socio-economic issues and politico-
security matters. 
65 This summary is taken from SADC, 2003, 'Summary of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development 
Plan', Gaborone. See also SADC, 2003, Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, Gaborone. Both 
documents are available on the SADC website at www.sadc.int. 
66 This information in this paragraph is drawn from Le Pere and Tj0nneland, 'Which Way SADC?', op cit, 
pp.26-27. 
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3.7 The Organ Protocol and SIPO 
The Summit's approval of the Organ Protocol in 2001 marked an official end to the 
disputes around the status and character of the common security regime. The Organ is 
part of SADC and reports to the SADC Summit, its secretariat is housed in the SADC 
Secretariat and its structures, methods and procedures have a formal character. The 
normative orientation of the security body revolves around four pillars: democratic 
nonns; political, security and defence co-operation; respect for international law; and a 
pacific approach to peacemaking. The main provisions of the Protocol are presented 
below. 
The Preamble reaffinns the principles of strict respect for sovereignty, sovereign equality, 
territorial integrity, political independence, good neighbourliness, interdependence, non-
aggression and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. It acknowledges the 
primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, as well as the role of the Central Organ of the OAU's Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. According to the Preamble, peace, 
security and strong political relations are critical factors in creating a conducive 
environment for regional co-operation and integration. The achievement of peace and 
security must be pursued through close co-operation on matters of politics, defence and 
security. Such co-operation must at all times promote the peaceful settlement of disputes 
by negotiation, conciliation, mediation or arbitration 
Article 2 of the Protocol provides that the general objective of the Organ is to promote 
peace and security in the region. The specific objectives of the Organ are as follows: 
a) protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability 
arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict, inter-state conflict 
and aggression; 
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b) promote political co-operation among the State Parties and the evolution of common 
political values and institutions;67 
c) develop common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual concern and advance 
such policy collectively in international fora; 
d) promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related to security and 
defence and establish appropriate mechanisms to this end; 
e) prevent, contain and resolve inter-and intra-state conflict by peaceful means; 
t) consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of 
last resort where peaceful means have failed; 
g) promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the 
territories of the State Parties and encourage the observance of universal human rights 
as provided for in the charters and conventions of the UN and the OAU; 
h) consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual 
Defence Pact to respond to external military threats; 
i) develop close co-operation between the police and the state security services of the 
State Parties in order to address cross border crime and promote a community based 
approach to domestic security; 
j) observe, and encourage the State Parties to implement, UN, AU and other 
international conventions and treaties on arms control, disarmament and peaceful 
relations between states; 
67 Article I provides that a "State Party" means a SADC state that has ratified or acceded to the Protocol. 
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k) develop the peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and co-ordinate the 
participation of the State Parties in international and regional peacekeeping 
operations; and 
1) enhance regional capacity in respect of disaster management and co-ordination of 
international humanitarian assistance. 
Article 3 provides that the Organ is an institution of SADC that will report to the Summit 
and function through a Troika consisting of the Chair of the Organ, the outgoing Chair 
and the incoming Chair for the following year. Article 4 states that the Summit will elect 
the Chair and the Deputy Chair of the Organ from among its members on a rotating basis 
and for a period of one year, provided that neither the Chair nor the Deputy Chair of the 
Summit may simultaneously be the Chair of the Organ. The Organ Chair may request any 
ministerial committee of the Organ to consider any matter within its competence and may 
request the SADC Chair to table matters for consideration by the Summit. The Chair will 
report to the Summit, consult with the SADC Troika and be responsible for the overall 
policy direction of the Organ and the achievement of it objectives. 
In addition to the Troika, the main structures of the Organ are the Ministerial Committee, 
the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (lSPDC) and the ISDSC. The 
Ministerial Committee comprises the ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, 
public security and state security from each of the State Parties. It reports to the Organ 
Chair and is responsible for co-ordinating the work of the Organ and its structures. The 
ISPDC comprises foreign ministers and must perform such functions as are necessary to 
achieve the Organ's objectives relating to politics and diplomacy. The ISDSC comprises 
the ministers responsible for defence, policing and intelligence and must perform the 
functions that are necessary to achieve the Organ's objectives relating to defence and 
security; this committee will assume the objectives, functions and structures of the 
existing ISDSC. The ISPDC and the ISDSC will report to the Ministerial Committee 
without prejudice to their obligation to report regularly to the Chair. 
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b) promote political co-operation among the State Parties and the evolution of common 
political values and institutions;67 
c) develop common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual concern and advance 
such policy collectively in international fora; 
d) promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related to security and 
defence and establish appropriate mechanisms to this end; 
e) prevent, contain and resolve inter-and intra-state conflict by peaceful means; 
f) consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of 
last resort where peaceful means have failed; 
g) promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the 
territories of the State Parties and encourage the observance of universal human rights 
as provided for in the charters and conventions of the UN and the OAU; 
h) consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual 
Defence Pact to respond to external military threats; 
i) develop close co-operation between the police and the state security services of the 
State Parties in order to address cross border crime and promote a community based 
approach to domestic security; 
j) observe, and encourage the State Parties to implement, UN, AU and other 
international conventions and treaties on arms control, disarmament and peaceful 
relations between states; 
67 Article 1 provides that a "State Party" means a SADC state that has ratified or acceded to the Protocol. 
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k) develop the peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and co-ordinate the 
participation of the State Parties in international and regional peacekeeping 
operations; and 
I) enhance regional capacity in respect of disaster management and co-ordination of 
international humanitarian assistance. 
Article 3 provides that the Organ is an institution of SADC that will report to the Summit 
and function through a Troika consisting of the Chair of the Organ, the outgoing Chair 
and the incoming Chair for the following year. Article 4 states that the Summit will elect 
the Chair and the Deputy Chair of the Organ from among its members on a rotating basis 
and for a period of one year, provided that neither the Chair nor the Deputy Chair of the 
Summit may simultaneously be the Chair of the Organ. The Organ Chair may request any 
ministerial committee of the Organ to consider any matter within its competence and may 
request the SADC Chair to table matters for consideration by the Summit. The Chair will 
report to the Summit, consult with the SADC Troika and be responsible for the overall 
policy direction of the Organ and the achievement of it objectives. 
In addition to the Troika, the main structures of the Organ are the Ministerial Committee, 
the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) and the ISDSC. The 
Ministerial Committee comprises the ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, 
public security and state security from each of the State Parties. It reports to the Organ 
Chair and is responsible for co-ordinating the work of the Organ and its structures. The 
ISPDC comprises foreign ministers and must perform such functions as are necessary to 
achieve the Organ's objectives relating to politics and diplomacy. The ISDSC comprises 
the ministers responsible for defence, policing and intelligence and must perform the 
functions that are necessary to achieve the Organ's objectives relating to defence and 
security; this committee will assume the objectives, functions and structures of the 
existing ISDSC. The ISPDC and the ISDSC will report to the Ministerial Committee 
without prejudice to their obligation to report regularly to the Chair. 
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The three ministerial committees must convene at least one annual meeting but may hold 
other meetings that are deemed necessary. They may establish sub-structures as they see 
fit. Each of the committees will be chaired by a minister from the same country as the 
Chair of the Organ, for a period of one year and on a rotating basis. The committees may 
determine their own rules of procedure but must make decisions by consensus and the 
quorum for an meetings will be two-thirds of the State Parties. The SADC Secretariat 
will provide secretariat services to the Organ. 
Article 11 deals with the Organ's international obligations, functions, jurisdiction, 
methods and procedures in respect of conflict prevention, management and resolution. It 
states that, in accordance with the UN Charter, the State Parties must refrain from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
other than for the legitimate purpose of individual or collective self-defence against an 
armed attack. The exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence must be 
reported immediately to the UN Security Council and the Central Organ of the OAU's 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. 
The State Parties must manage and seek to resolve any dispute between two or more of 
them by peaceful means. Similarly, the Organ must seek to manage and resolve conflict 
by peaceful means. The methods employed by the Organ to prevent, manage and resolve 
conflict by peaceful means shall include preventive diplomacy, negotiations, conciliation, 
mediation, good offices, arbitration, and adjudication by an international tribunal. The 
Organ will endeavour to obtain the disputant parties' consent to its peacemaking efforts. 
The Organ may seek to resolve any "significant inter-state conflict" between the State 
Parties or between a State Party and another state. A "significant inter-state conflict" 
includes a conflict over territorial borders or natural resources; a conflict in which an act 
of aggression or other form of military force has occurred or been threatened; and a 
conflict which threatens peace and security in the region or in the territory of a State 
Party which is not a party to the conflict. External military threats to the region will be 
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addressed through collective security arrangements to be agreed upon by the State Parties 
in a Mutual Defence Pact. 
The Organ may also seek to resolve any "significant intra-state conflict" within the 
territory of a State Party. Such conflict includes large-scale violence between sections of 
the population or between the state and sections of the population, including genocide, 
ethnic cleansing and gross violation of human rights; a military coup or other threat to the 
legitimate authority of a state; a condition of civil war or insurgency; and a conflict that 
threatens peace and security in the region or in the territory of another State Party. The 
Organ must respond to a request by a State Party to mediate in a conflict within the 
territory of that state and must strive by diplomatic means to obtain such request where it 
is not forthcoming. 
Where peaceful means of resolving a conflict are unsuccessful, the Chair acting on the 
advice of the Ministerial Committee may recommend to the Summit that enforcement 
action be taken against one or more of the disputant parties. The Summit will resort to 
enforcement action only as a matter of last resort and, in accordance with Article 53 of 
the UN Charter, only with the authorisation of the UN Security Council. The Organ must 
seek to ensure that the State Parties adhere to and enforce all sanctions and arms 
embargoes imposed on any party by the UN Security CounciL 
Article 15 provides that the Protocol in no way detracts from the rights and obligations of 
the State Parties under the charters of the UN and the OAU; it in no way detracts from the 
responsibility of the UN Security Council to maintain international peace and security; 
and it does not derogate from existing agreements between a State Party and another 
State Party, another state or an international organisation other than SADC, provided that 
such agreements are consistent with the principles and objectives of the ProtocoL The 
Protocol will be subject to ratification by the Signatories in accordance with their 
respective constitutional procedures. It will enter into force thirty days after the deposit of 
the instruments of ratification by two-thirds of the State Parties. 
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At its meeting in Blantyre in January 2002, the Summit mandated the Organ to prepare 
SIPO. The Plan is intended to operationalise the Protocol and provide guidelines and an 
institutional framework for the day-to-day implementation of the Organ's activities.68 The 
document considers these activities in four sectors, covering politics, defence, state 
security and public security. For each of these sectors, the Plan provides a brief analysis, 
identifies the key challenges, reproduces the relevant objectives from the Protocol and 
presents a list of strategies and activities per objective. 
SIPO is a weak document that does not amount to a viable plan because most of the 
designated strategies and activities are overly general and vague. Three examples of this 
problem are presented below: 
.. In the political sector, the first objective is to protect the people and safeguard the 
development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and 
order, intra- and inter-state conflict and aggression. This objective has the following 
strategies and activities: promote exchanges of information on and reviews of 
regional and other developments; establish appropriate mechanisms to avert 
aggression against Member States through diplomatic initiatives; consolidate peace, 
security and stability to achieve sustainable socio-economic development and 
eradicate poverty; establish and strengthen bilateral commissions; and devise 
measures to combat the HIV and AIDS pandemic.69 
.. In the state security sector, one of the objectives is to promote regional co-ordination 
and co-operation on matters related to security and defence and establish appropriate 
mechanisms to this end. The strategies and activities are as follows: undertake regular 
exchange of intelligence; hold regional workshops, seminars and training 
programmes; hold regional meetings; and share financial and technological 
resources.70 
68 SADC, 2004, Strategic Indicative Planfor the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. 
This document can be viewed on the SADC website at http://www.sadc.intJ. 
69 Ibid,pp. 17-18. 
70 Ibid, pg. 33. 
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.. In the public security sector, one of the objectives is to promote the development of 
democratic institutions and practices within the territories of State Parties and 
encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the charters 
and conventions ofthe AU and the UN. The strategies and activities are to develop a 
common code of conduct for law enforcement agencies; undertake regular joint 
training programmes; and develop a culture of observance of the existing 
international provisions on human rights. 71 
The strategies and activities listed above are too bland (e.g. 'hold regional meetings'), too 
general and lofty (e.g. 'consolidate peace, security and stability') and too vague (e.g. 
'establish and strengthen bilateral commissions') to constitute a meaningful strategic 
plan. By contrast, SIPO's provisions on structure and staffing are concrete and clear. The 
SADC Secretariat must provide administrative services to the Chair and committees of 
the Organ, keep records of meetings, assist in policy development and monitor the 
implementation of decisions. To this end, a department for politics, defence and security 
would be set up in the Secretariat, headed by a Chief Director who reports to the 
Executive Secretary. The department would comprise a directorate for politics and 
diplomacy, a directorate for defence and security and a strategic analysis unit, also 
responsible for the Situation Room.72 In the implementation of SIPO, the department was 
downgraded to a directorate, which suffers from a range of organisational problems 
(Section 5.5).73 
3.8 The tussle over the Mutual Defence Pact 
The normative and strategic cleavages between the pacific and militarist tendencies that 
hampered the formation of the Organ over a ten-year period also greatly hindered the 
71 Ibid, pg. 40. 
72 Ibid, pp. 47-50. 
73 This observation is based on the author's work with the Department in a project to build SADC's 
capacity and expertise in the area of mediation, 2007-2009. 
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formulation of the Mutual Defence Pact and made this process every bit as fractious as 
the Organ deliberations. As noted previously, the official call for a mutual defence pact 
against external military threats first appeared in SADC's 1993 Framework and Strategy 
document and was reiterated in the 1996 Gaborone Summit communique and the Organ 
Protocol of 2001. When the Summit finally approved the Pact in 2003, the text had been 
so watered down as a result of the pacific camp's concerns that it did not entail a binding 
commitment to collective self-defence.74 Whereas South Africa had championed the 
pacific position in the Organ debates, it was Botswana that pushed this position most 
concertedly in relation to the Pact. 
The pacific group was adamant that the decision to go to war should not be triggered 
automatically by a treaty but should in every case be based on an assessment of the 
prevailing circumstances. In the heat of conflict between states, a defence treaty might be 
activated in a hasty manner that precluded such assessment and foreclosed the options for 
dealing with the conflict. This would be imprudent, dangerous and contrary to the pacific 
camp's preference for tackling conflict through diplomatic rather than military means. 
The further major consideration was that the SADC states did not have a sufficiently 
close political relationship to justify the risks associated with a collective defence 
agreement. From the perspective of the pacific group, all these factors were reinforced by 
the SADC rift over the DRC crisis in 1998 (Section 4.4). 
During the official drafting of the Organ Protocol in Swaziland in 1999, the Zambian 
government distributed a draft defence pact for discussion.75 Lusaka was no doubt 
motivated by Angola's recent threat to invade Zambia on the grounds that it was 
providing sanctuary to Unita and supplying arms to the Angolan rebel movement. Albert 
Shabangu, the Swazi foreign minister who was chairing the proceedings on the Organ 
Protocol, declined to table the document. Given the controversy around the idea of a 
defence pact, he regarded the matter as a distraction from the business of finalising the 
74 SADC Mutual Defence Pact, 2003, Dar es Salaam. The signed version ofthe Pact is available at 
hUp:/lsadc-tribunal.orgldocs/MutualDefencePact.pdf, last retrieved on 1 February 2009. 
15 Republic of Zambia, 2000, 'Zambia's Non-Paper on Southern African Development Community 
(SADe) Defence Pact', unpublished document distributed at the extraordinary meeting of SADC ministers 
to finalise the drafting of the Organ Protocol, Mbabane, October 1999. 
90 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Protoco1.76 Nevertheless, the Zambian document became the basis for subsequent 
versions of the SADC defence pact. 
Modelled on the NATO Treaty of 1949, the Zambian text provided that an attack on one 
of the parties was an attack on all of them: 
[The parties agree] that an armed attack against one of them shall be 
considered an attack against [the] others and that in the event of such an attack, 
each of them will assist the Party so attacked by taking forthwith in 
collaboration with other Parties such action as it deems necessary, including 
the use of armed force, to restore peace and security in the territory of the 
Party. Any such attack and measures taken as a result thereof shall 
immediately be reported to the United Nations Security Council.77 
This formulation was typical of a collective defence arrangement but the Zambian text 
had an additional feature. It defined 'attack' to mean not only an armed invasion of a 
signatory state but also "internal subversive activities that threaten the legitimate 
authority of a constitutionally established government".78 The motivation for this unusual 
definition of 'attack' stemmed from Zambia's belief that its own internal subversion and 
external threats were closely linked. In 1997 the country had experienced a failed coup 
attempt, and a retired military officer testified in the subsequent treason trial that the 
Zambian armed forces had obtained intelligence warning that the coup was to be 
followed by an Angolan invasion.79 
76 The author was present at this meeting in Mbabane in October 1999. 
77 Zambia, 'Non-Paper', op cit, article 6. This provision is based on article 5 of the NATO Treaty, which 
reads as follows: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed 
attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking 
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including 
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security ofthe North Atlantic area". See the North 
Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC, 4 April 1949, available at www.nato.intldocu/basictxt/treaty.htm. 
78 Zambia, 'Non-Paper', op cit, article 1. 
79 South African Press Association, 'Zambia Prepared for Invasion By Angola after Botched Coup: Court', 
Lusaka, 27 June 1998. 
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While SADC as a whole was split on the issue of a collective self-defence commitment, 
the militarist allies of Angola, the DRC, Namibia and Zimbabwe were united and 
decisive. In 1999 these countries signed a defence treaty, stipulating that an armed attack 
against one of the signatories would be considered an attack against the others and that 
each of them would assist a signatory under attack through such action as it deemed 
necessary, including the use of armed force, to repel the attack and restore peace and 
security.80 It is possible that Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe drew up the treaty at this 
time because they wished to legitimate their 1998 deployment in the DRC, which they 
justified as being in defence of the Congolese government against an external attack by 
Rwanda (Section 4.4). The signatories were also manifestly frustrated with the delays in 
getting the Organ off the ground.S] It will be recalled, too, that Mugabe's vision of 
regional security arrangements was modelled on NATO (Section 3.4).82 
The conclusion of the treaty, without official notice to SADC, was extremely divisive. 
Naison Ngoma goes so far as to say that the treaty and the DRC deployment constituted 
"the region's most serious test to the survival of SADC as a political unit ... [and] almost 
dealt a mortal blow to the sub-region's efforts at enhancing co-operation".83 At the time, 
Tapfumaneyi rejected claims that the treaty sounded the death knell for the Organ and 
signified dwindling confidence in SADC. He insisted that "although a toothless Organ, 
divided by internal rifts and perpetual procrastination in the face of crises, is a worrying 
encumbrance to regional progress, the [treaty] is not intended to undermine or replace the 
SADC Organ".84 Rather, said Tapfumaneyi, the treaty was in line with the 1996 
Gaborone Summit communique, which envisioned the introduction of a SADC mutual 
defence pact. Because of South Africa's stance, however, the sub-region still lacked a 
legal instrument that regulated collective action to prevent, manage and resolve conflict.85 
80 Defence Treaty among the Republic of Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of 
Namibia and the Republic of Zimbabwe, 1999, Luanda, article 4. 
81 Tapfumaneyi, 'Regional Security Cooperation in Southern Africa', op cit, pg. 35. 
82 Quoted in 'Congo Wins Membership in Sudden Expansion of SADC', SouthScan, vol. 12, no. 33, 12 
September 1997, pg. 258. 
83 Ngoma, Prospects for a Security Community, op cit, pg. 157. 
84 Tapfumaneyi, 'Regional Security Cooperation in Southern Africa', op cit, pg. 35. 
85 Ibid. 
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Military officers from Zimbabwe and Namibia maintained further that there was nothing 
divisive in countries belonging simultaneously to several security arrangements, a 
practice that occurred elsewhere in the world, most notably in Western Europe.86 The 
treaty was simply a more advanced form of security co-operation than the Organ, 
entailing a military commitment that some but not all the SADC states were ready to 
embrace; in due course, the other states might come on board.87 Tapfumaneyi made this 
point as follows: 
Historically it has always been difficult to reach consensus on issues of high 
politics in southern Africa - the original approach of SADC towards the SADC 
Organ may therefore have been attempting the impossible. Like the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the [defence treaty concluded by 
Angola, the DRC, Namibia and Zimbabwe] could, in time, begin to attract new 
members and, perhaps in the not so distance future, all SADC states would 
become members.88 
There is no doubt that a defence pact entails a higher level of commitment than a 
common security regime and it is also true that state membership of more than one 
security arrangement is not intrinsically divisive. Yet in the midst of the crisis in Southern 
Africa over the Organ and the DRC intervention, the treaty confirmed the impression of 
two SADCs, split along pacific and militarist lines. 
In July 2001 the SADC defence ministers met in Lesotho and approved a draft mutual 
defence pact. The South African Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota, announced that 
the pact provided a mechanism for preventing conflict between SADC countries and for 
these countries to act together against outside aggressors. Peaceful means would always 
be the first course of action when there were "difficulties" but if these means failed, then 
SADC would have to take enforcement action. Lekota added that the draft pact would be 
86 Author's discussions with Namibian and Zimbabwean military officers at the United Nations Workshop 
on the UN Arms Register, hosted by the Namibian government, Windhoek, 18-20 June 2002. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Tapfumaneyi, 'Regional Security Cooperation in Southern Africa', op cit, pg. 35. 
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studied by member states and then submitted for adoption at the Council of Ministers 
meeting in Blantyre in August 2001.89 
It turned out that the enthusiasm of the defence ministers was not shared in all cases by 
their cabinet colleagues and presidents. At the Council meeting in 2001 and again at the 
Summit meeting in Luanda in 2002, Botswana rejected the pact, resolute that disputes 
should be settled through dialogue and consensus-building rather than military action. 
Botswana objected in particular to the provision that made it mandatory for SADC 
countries to undertake collective military action in the event of one of them being 
attacked. This provision, declared President Festus Mogae, undermined the sovereignty 
of states and their right to make independent decisions.9o 
In 2003 the Summit finally approved a watered down text. 9 I The articles that deal with 
"collective self-defence and collective action" are as follows: 
III An armed attack against a State Party shall be considered a threat to regional peace 
and security and such attack shall be met with immediate collective action (article 
6(1)). 
III Collective action shall be mandated by the Summit on the recommendation of the 
Organ (article 6(2)). 
III Each State Party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems 
appropriate (article 6(3)). 
II Any such attack, and measures taken in response thereto, shall immediately be 
reported to the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council (article 
6(4)). 
89 'Southern Africa: SADC Adopts Mutual Defence Pact', IRIN News Briefs, Integrated Regional 
Information Network, United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 30 July 2001. 
90 M. Mathuthu, 2002, 'Another Blow to Mugabe in Luanda', The Zimbabwe Independent, 18 October. 
91 SADC Mutual Defence Pact, op cit. 
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It will be evident that these articles are quite different from the collective defence 
provision in the Zambian document of 1999. Through negotiations around the draft Pact 
at meetings of the ISDSC and other SADC forums between 2000 and 2003, three major 
amendments were made in order to accommodate the concerns of the pacific camp: the 
conception of an armed attack against a state party was changed from being an attack on 
all the parties to being a threat to regional peace and security; collective defence action 
could not be initiated by states acting on their own discretion but required a mandate from 
the Summit; and states were permitted to participate in the collection action in any 
manner they deemed appropriate. South Africa's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Aziz Pahad, made a point of explaining that the Pact was not as binding as the NATO 
Treaty because it did not view 'an attack on one' as 'an attack on all'; ifan act of external 
aggression occurred, then SADC would have to decide whether collective intervention 
was warranted. 92 
Article 6(3) effectively removes the collective self-defence obligation. Naison Ngoma's 
disapproving conclusion is that this squanders the promise of the Pact since collective 
action could now amount to a mere charade.93 He notes correctly that the provision was 
included in order to avoid a situation where some states refused to sign the document, 
adding that it might also have been the result of lobbying by foreign powers that wanted 
to prevent Zimbabwe from receiving military assistance from its neighbours. He offers no 
evidence to support this assertion, which downplays the long history of resistance to a 
mutual defence pact among certain SADC states. 
The objective of the Pact is to "operationalise the mechanisms of the Organ for mutual 
cooperation in defence and security matters".94 In order to achieve this objective, the 
parties "shall individually and collectively, by means of continuous co-operation and 
assistance, maintain and develop their individual and collective self-defence capacity to 
92 Quoted in 'Southern African Defence Pact Launched', Mail and Guardian, 28 August 2003. 
93 N. Ngoma, 2004, 'SADC's Mutual Defence Pact: A Final Move to a Security Community?', The Round 
Table, vol. 93, no. 375, pp. 411-423 at pg. 417. 
94 SADC Mutual Defence Pact, op cit, article 2. 
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maintain peace, stability and security".95 Further, the parties shall co-operate in defence 
matters and facilitate interaction among their armed forces and defence-related industries 
in areas such as military training, joint exercises, military intelligence and production, 
supply and procurement of military equipment and services.96 The Secretariat of the 
Organ will co-ordinate the implementation of the Pact.97 
The Pact reiterates some of the principles that are contained in the Organ Protocol, stating 
that the parties must settle any international dispute in which they are involved by 
peaceful means, avoid the threat or use of force in their international relations, respect 
each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and refrain from interfering in each 
other's domestic affairs.98 The parties also undertake not to nurture, harbour or support 
any person, group or institution whose aim is to destabilise the political, military, 
territorial, economic or social security of a State Party.99 The term 'destabilise' covers an 
armed attack, sabotage and activities intended to change the constitutional order of a 
State Party through unconstitutional means. IOO 
3.9 The Inter-State Defence and Security Community 
The ISDSC was established in 1975 as a committee of the Frontline States, comprising 
defence ministers and s nior military commanders (Section 2.3). After the ending of 
apartheid in 1994, the Frontline States was dissolved, the ISDSC was reconstituted to 
include all the SADC countries and in 1996 it was incorporated into the Organ (Section 
2.4). The Organ Protocol stipulates that the ISDSC comprises the ministers responsible 
for defence, policing and intelligence and must perform the functions that are necessary 
to achieve the Organ's objectives relating to defence and security (Section 3.7). 
95 Ibid, article 4. 
96 Ibid, article 9. 
97 Ibid, article 11 (2). 
98 Ibid, articles 3 and 7. 
99 Ibid, article 8. 
100 Ibid, article 1(2). 
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In the period under review the ISDSC was officially divided into three sectoral sub-
committees, whose overall purpose was to promote technical co-operation and co-
ordination on security problems and goals. The members of the Defence Subcommittee 
included the ministers of defence, the chiefs of defence forces, the civilian secretaries for 
defence and their staff; the Public Security Subcommittee formally comprised police, 
customs and immigration ministers and officials; and the State Security Subcommittee 
consisted of the intelligence services. In reality, only the Defence Subcommittee was 
operational and it set up subordinate structures that covered defence intelligence, 
logistics, operations, personnel, aviation matters, maritime affairs, military chaplains and 
medical services. 10I 
The police services preferred to meet under the auspices of the Southern African 
Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO), allowing them to avoid 
the Organ travails, and the intelligence services were disinclined to conduct their business 
through multilateral forums. 102 The low level of engagement by the police and 
intelligence agencies was also due to their being treated as the junior partners of the 
armed forces. The ISDSC was always chaired by a defence minister from one of the 
SADC countries, effectively marginalising the ministers responsible for policing and 
intelligence. By the late 1990s this legacy of the Frontline States was patently 
anachronistic and dysfunctional but no effort was made to change it. 
The ISDSC had three major projects. The first was to prepare SADC's Mutual Defence 
Pact (Section 3.8). The second was to undertake training and other preparations for 
regional peace operations and the third was to establish a regional peacekeeping force. 
101 On the ISDSC in the period under review, see R. Shikapwashya, 1995, 'The Standing Aviation 
Committee of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee of the Southern African Region' , /SSUP 
Bulletin, no. 8/95, Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria; and 1. Cilliers, 1999, Building 
Security in Southern Africa: An Update on the Evolving Architecture, Monograph no. 43, Institute for 
Security Studies, November, retrieved on 1 June 2007 from 
www.iss.co.za/index.php?link id=&slink id=483&link type=12&slink type=12&tmpl id=3. 
102 On the activities ofSARPCCO, see Cilliers, Building Security in Southern Africa, op cit; and D. Bruce, 
1998, 'The Role and Achievements of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation 
Organisation (SARPCCO)" /SSUP Bulletin, no. 4/98, Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria. 
SARPCCO serves as the Southern African headquarters ofInterpol. See further 
http://www . interpol. int/pub I ic/Region/ Afri ca/Com mittees/SA RPCCO .asp. 
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The formation of this force was listed as one of the Organ's objectives in the 1996 
Gaborone Summit communique that gave birth to the security body (Section 3.2). In the 
wake of the UN's ignominious withdrawal from Rwanda after the onset of the 1994 
genocide, there was a continental-wide view that Africa should build its own capacity for 
peace operations. In 1997 a meeting of African chiefs of defence staff, held under the 
auspices of the OAU, proposed that the organisation should have at its disposal brigade-
sized standby forces from each of Africa's five sub-regions; this would enable the OAU 
to take preventive action in emergency situations prior to a more comprehensive response 
from the UN or if the UN were unresponsive. I03 
Following the Gaborone Summit in 1996, the ISDSC took a number of significant steps 
towards building national and collective capacity to engage in regional peacekeeping 
operations. It created a satellite communication system linking all the SADC 
governments, approved a training syllabus for peace support operations, developed 
appropriate operational procedures and requested the Zimbabwe Staff College to use its 
Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare to co-ordinate and harmonise 
peacekeeping education and training for all the countries of Southern Africa. 1D4 In 2005 
Zimbabwe transferred ownership of the RPTC to SADC. I05 The ISDSC also mounted 
three peacekeeping training exercises - Exercise Blue Hungwe, hosted by Zimbabwe in 
April 1997 with 1,500 troops from ten of the SADC countries; Exercise Blue Crane, 
hosted by South Africa in April 1999 with close to 5,000 troops from thirteen SADC 
states; and Exercise Thokgamo, hosted by Botswana in July 2005 at brigade level with 
the participation of all the member states except Mauritius and the DRC.106 
103 Cilliers, Building Security in Southern Africa, op cit. 
104 Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa, op cit, pp. 166-169. 
105 'SADC RPTC: Vision for the Future. Final Report of an Independent Study Commissioned by the 
Directorate of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation', 2 May 2008, retrieved on 
10 April 2009 from the website of the African Peace Support Trainers' Association at http://www.apsta-
africa. org/pdVsadcrptcmay08. pdf. 
106 For an assessment of Blue Hungwe and Blue Crane, see Bennan and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa, op 
cit, pp. 169-172. 
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In 2002 the AU endorsed the creation of the African Standby Force (ASF) and specified 
its mandate, composition and structures. I07 The Force would be composed of standby 
multi-disciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components based in their 
countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. Since 2002 a 
great deal of effort has been devoted to setting up the ASF and the regional brigades in 
North, East, Central, Southern and West Africa; the brigades are expected to be capable 
of deploying in a variety of scenarios, ranging from observer missions to complex multi-
dimensional operations, post-conflict peacebuilding and peace enforcement in a hostile 
environment. 108 The AU's decision served as a further stimulus to the endeavours of the 
ISDSC, which centralised the planning of the SADC Standby Force Brigade 
(SADCBRIG) in the Organ Directorate. SADCBRIG was launched in 2007. 109 
In terms of meeting its goals and objectives, the ISDSC, as a forum of defence officials, 
was one of the most successful of all SADC's structures. It accomplished the tasks it set 
for itself, ensured institutional memory and continuity, achieved a high level of co-
operation and co-ordination and built a sense of community among the armed forces of 
the region. The success was due principally to three factors. First, military officers in 
Southern Africa, as elsewhere, are trained to be administratively efficient, task-oriented 
and competent in the skills of planning and implementing plans. Second, from the mid-
1990s the reconstituted ISDSC regarded the building of cohesion and esprit d'corps 
within its committees and among military personnel more broadly as a primary objective; 
with notable foresight, it envisaged that the construction of dense interaction among 
soldiers and officers would serve as an important confidence- and security-building 
measure. Third, the ISDSC's members had the demeanour of 'apolitical military 
107 African Union, 2002, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the 
Aj[ican Union, Durban, article 13. 
I 8 See, for example, J. Marshall, 2009, 'Building an Effective African Standby Force to Promote African 
Stability, Conflict Resolution and Prosperity', Discussion Paper, no. 16, Crisis States Research Centre, 
London School of Economics. 
109 SADC, 2007, 'Official Launching of the Southern African Development Community Brigade 
(SADCBRlG)', media statement, 7 August, retrieved on 5 June 2009 from the SADC website at 
http://www.sadc.intJarchives/read/news/l087; SADC, 2007, Memorandum of Understanding amongst the 
Southern African Development Community Member States on the Establishment of a Southern African 
Development Community Standby Brigade, Lusaka; and D. Baker and S. Maeresera, , 'SADCBRlG 
Intervention in SADC States: Reasons To Doubt', African Security Review, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 106-110. 
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professionals', avoiding or at least downplaying regional politics even in the midst of the 
Organ storm swirling around them. As a result, the ISDSC was able to weather the storm 
and maintain collegial relations despite the tensions between member states. 
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CHAPTER 4: FAILED PEACEMAKING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
4.1 Introduction 
Between 1995 and 2003 there were a number of violent conflicts in SADC countries. 
They included the long-running civil war in Angola that ended in 2002 when the leader of 
the rebel movement Un ita, Jonas Savimbi, was killed; a rebellion and full-blown war with 
state belligerents in the DRC that began in 1998; election disputes, a mutiny and an 
external military intervention in Lesotho in 1998; a failed secessionist bid in Namibia in 
199811999; election disputes in Malawi in 1999; a constitutional crisis in Zambia in 2001; 
election disputes on the Zanzibar island of Tanzania in 2001; and, continuously from 
early 2000, state repression and violence in Zimbabwe. In 1998 Angola threatened to 
invade Zambia in order to halt supplies to Unita and in 2000 Zambia accused Angola of 
conducting military attacks on its territory. 
In addition to being unable to prevent such conflicts, SADC does not have a record of 
successful peacemaking. In most of the intra-state conflicts it refrained from critical 
comment and diplomatic engagement, treating violence and crises in governance as 
purely domestic affairs. There were several reasons for this that remain applicable at the 
time of writing in 2009. First, member states are keen to avoid adversarial relations that 
might jeopardise- trade and functional co-operation. Second, governments that are not 
fully democratic are naturally unwilling to speak out against neighbouring states that 
engage in undemocratic practices. Third, SADC states are determined to maintain a 
public posture of unity and solidarity. Forged in the heat of the struggles against 
colonialism and apartheid, this posture militates against public criticism of each other. 
The imperative of solidarity is greatest when foreign powers take positions that are 
perceived or can be portrayed as reflecting a 'neo-colonial' agenda. 
SADC's poor record of peacemaking is also attributable to the impasse around the Organ. 
The lack of an agreed set of norms, strategies and procedures for addressing high 
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intensity conflict has contributed to collective inertia, divergent and parochial approaches 
by individual states, ill-conceived interventions and a confused mixture of peacemaking 
and peace enforcement. Most of these problems were apparent during the crises in 
Lesotho and the DRC in 1998. In both cases a small group of SADC states embarked on 
military action in the name of the organisation despite the absence of a SADC mandate 
authorising such action. 
This Chapter focuses on SADC's response to three of the conflicts: the Zimbabwe 
conflict, which illustrates SADC's obsession with maintaining solidarity among states at 
the expense of protecting citizens and adhering to the organisation's formal commitment 
to democratic norms; the Lesotho conflict, which led to a remarkably inept and damaging 
military intervention by South Africa and Botswana, the two leading proponents of the 
pacific position in the Organ debates; and the bloody conflict in the DRC, which was 
Africa's biggest war and split SADC so severely that it brought the survival of the 
organisation into question. 
4.2 The Zimbabwe crisis, 2000-
As discussed in Chapter 2, SADC's founding documents appreciated the need to forge 
common values among member states as the basis for unity, co-operation and regional 
security. The common political values enshrined in the 1992 Treaty, the amended Treaty 
of2001 and the Organ Protocol of2001 were those of democracy and respect for human 
rights. In truth, however, the majority of SADC countries were not fully democratic and 
some of them were authoritarian (Chapter 5). The norms that bound member states were 
in fact those of anti-imperialism and state solidarity. 
These norms were most evident and least appropriate in the case of state repression and 
abrogation of the rule of law in Zimbabwe. In February 2000 the Zanu-PF government 
lost a constitutional referendum, its first defeat at the polls since independence in 1970. 
The defeat coincided with the emergence of a new opposition party, the Movement for 
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Democratic Change (MDC), which had its roots in the trade union movement. The rise of 
the MDC and its potential to win a free and fair election reignited the ruling party's 
authoritarian and brutal tendencies, leading to a sustained drive to crush domestic 
opposition through violence, intimidation and manipulation of elections. I 
In a parallel development, war veterans who had participated in the liberation struggle 
began to seize white-owned land and farms through violence. The land question was a 
long smouldering problem; in the late 1990s the racial inequities in land ownership 
arising from colonial conquest and white minority rule were still largely in place? The 
government backed the invasions by the war veterans and its subsequent 'land reform 
programme' was characterised by disregard for judicial rulings, the emasculation of the 
judiciary, violence perpetrated by state-sponsored militia, the accumulation of farms by 
the ruling elite and the immiseration of farm workers.3 The land invasions and political 
crisis provoked economic collapse and the risk of state failure as inflation spiralled out of 
control, there were chronic food shortages and vital services were terminated. 
In its public statements SADC endorsed the land reform programme, ignored its violent 
and illegal dimensions, trivialised the human rights violations and disparaged the 
international condemnation of Zimbabwe. After a Summit meeting in Windhoek in 2000, 
the heads of state released a statement decrying the "partisan and biased manner in which 
a sector of the international media has misrepresented the land policy of the government 
1 On repression and state-sponsored violence in Zimbabwe since 2000, see Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO 
Forum, 2001, Politically Motivated Violence in Zimbabwe 2000-2001, August, retrieved on 8 February 
2009 from the Forum's website at http://www.hrforumzim.com/frames/il1sideframereps.htm; 
International Crisis Group, 2001, 'Zimbabwe: Time for International Action', Africa Briefing, no. 5, 12 
October; International Crisis Group, 2003, 'Zimbabwe: Danger and Opportunity', Africa Report, no. 60, 10 
March; Human Rights Watch, 2006, 'You Will Be Thoroughly Beaten: The Brutal Suppression of Dissent 
in Zimbabwe', Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 18, no. 10(A), November. On the government's crushing 
ofthe Matabeleland uprising shortly after independence, see Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 
2007, Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe: A Report of the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980-
1988, London: Hurst & Co. On the causes of the conflict, see T. Addison and L. Laakso, 2003, 'The 
Political Economy of Zimbabwe's Descent into Conflict', Journal of International Development, vol. 15, 
no. 4, pp. 457-470. 
2 See S. Moyo and P. Matondi, 2003, 'The Politics of Land Reform in Zimbabwe', in M. Baregu and C. 
Landsberg (eds), From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges, Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 73-95. 
3 See, for example, Human Rights Watch, 2002, 'Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe' , Human Rights 
Watch Report, vol. 14, no. I (A), March. 
103 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
of Zimbabwe, which seeks to effect a just and equitable redistribution of land in a 
situation where one percent of the population owns seventy percent of the best arable 
land".4 The heads of state accepted Mugabe's assurance that land reform would be 
handled peacefully and within the parameters of the law. They called on the region's civil 
society groups and parliaments to rally behind the people of Zimbabwe in opposing 
foreign censure of Harare.s A few days after the Summit meeting a South African foreign 
affairs official said that the invasion and occupation of white farms were understandable 
given the war veterans' frustration at Britain's failure to fund land redistribution.6 SADC 
delegated President Mbeki and President Bakimi Muluzi of Malawi to request the British 
government to fund the purchase of farms in Zimbabwe. 
In August 2001 the Summit raised concern about the regional impact of the Zimbabwean 
economic situation and formed a task force comprising Angola, Botswana, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa "to work with the government of Zimbabwe on 
the economic and political issues affecting the country".7 In September the leaders of 
these countries publicly chastised Mugabe for the first time. The Chair of SADC, 
President Muluzi, expressed alarm about the decline in the rule of law and the rise in 
political instability, attributing the political and economic crisis to the manner in which 
the land reforms were being implemented.s 
The criticism was short-lived. In December 2001 the ministerial members of the task 
force noted the "improved atmosphere of calm and stability" in Zimbabwe, welcomed the 
mechanisms the government was putting in place to guard against violence, rejected the 
"distorted and negative perceptions of Zimbabwe projected by the international and 
regional media" and reiterated SADC's opposition to the imposition of sanctions on 
Zimbabwe.9 This statement was issued in the midst of harrowing accounts of violence 
4 SADC, 2000, 'SADC Heads of State and Government Support Zimbabwe', Windhoek, 7 August. 
5 Ibid. 
6 B. Peta and P. Thomycroft, 2000, 'Mugabe Outmanoeuvres Mbeki at SADC', Sunday Independent, 12 
August. 
7 SADC, 2001, 'SADC Summit Final Communique', Blantyre, 14 August. 
sM. Granelli, 2001, 'SADC Heads Read Riot Act to Mugabe', Cape Times, 11 September. 
9 SADC, 2001, 'Final Communique ofthe SADC Ministerial Task Force on Developments in Zimbabwe', 
Harare, 11 December. 
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against members of the MDC.IO In 2002 the ISDSC denounced "the continued foreign 
interference in the internal affairs of some Member States, especially in Zimbabwe which 
has embarked on an agrarian reform programme aimed at addressing the problem of 
poverty". II In 2003 the Ministerial Committee of the Organ "took note that those opposed 
to Zimbabwe have tried to shift the agenda from the core issue of land by selective 
diversion of attention on governance and human rights issues".12 For its part, the Summit 
repeatedly expressed solidarity with Harare. 13 
The 2002 Summit communique was a perfect illustration of SADC's failure to deal 
squarely with human rights abuses in a member state. The communique "welcomed the 
foHowing actions to be undertaken by Zimbabwe": full respect for human rights, 
including the right to freedom of opinion, expression, association and peaceful assembly 
for all individuals; a commitment to investigate fully and impartially all cases of alleged 
political violence in 2001; ensuring that the electoral supervisory commission was 
adequately resourced and able to operate independently; a commitment by the 
government to the independence of the judiciary and to the rule of law; and the transfer of 
the occupiers of non-designated farms to legally acquired land. 14 These provisions were 
implicit criticisms of the Zimbabwe government - it was necessary to raise them only 
because of the government's abuses - but they were formulated as an expression of 
support for Harare. The communique also welcomed Mugabe's assurances that the 
forthcoming presidential election would be free and fair and noted with appreciation the 
government's decision to launch a peace campaign that would include the opposition and 
other stakeholders. The only explicit concerns raised publicly by the Summit were 
directed at the Zimbabwe army, whose chief had warned that the military would not 
10 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2001, 'Political Violence Report December 2001', monthly 
report, retrieved on 8 February 2009 from the Forum website at 
www.hrforumzim.comlframes/insideframemonthly.htm. 
II ISDSC, 2002, 'Final Communique. 23m Session of the Inter State Defence and Security Committee 
(ISDSC) of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security Co-operation', Luanda, 9 August. 
12 SADC Organ, 2003, 'Communique of the Third Session ofthe Committee of Ministers of the Organ on 
Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation', Harare, 3 April, para 12. 
13 SADC, 2002, 'Final Communique. January 2002 SADC Extra-Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and 
Government', Blantyre, 14 January, para 19; and SADC, 2003, '2003 SADC Summit Final Communique', 
Dar es Salaam, 26 August, paras 24 and 25. 
14 SADC, 'Final Communique. January 2002 SADC Extra-Ordinary Summit', op cit. 
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recognise an MDC victory at the pOllS,15 and sections of the media that were accused of 
negative reporting. 
The SADC leaders might have believed that their cautious diplomatic approach was more 
likely to succeed than castigating Mugabe and they would probably have been applauded 
had Mugabe restored the rule of law and allowed free and fair elections. Instead, he 
blithely ignored the Summit, making it look foolish, and SADC's tolerance of his 
intransigence and transgressions severely damaged its credibility.16 In order to protect the 
organisation from growing international censure and donor pressure, the Summit replaced 
Mugabe as the Deputy Chair of SADC in 2002, preventing him from assuming the Chair 
the following year. Yet in 2003 he received standing ovations from his feHow heads of 
state at the Summit meeting in Dar es Salaam and they elected him to represent Southern 
Africa as one of the AU's five regional vice-chairpersons. 17 
SADC's position on Zimbabwe revealed the potency of the anti-imperialist sentiment in 
Southern Africa, a product of the bitter struggles against colonialism and the continued 
political and economic domination of the South by the North. It gives rise to the 
imperative of closing ranks when an African country is taking flak from foreign powers. 
Given this tendency and the undemocratic nature of many Southern African countries, 
SADC's support for the Zimbabwe government was not surprising. In an article entitled 
"Mugabe Will Not Be Swayed by the Polite Coaxing of Despotic Peers", Mondli 
Makhanya captured vividly the fatal impediment to a more critical response from SADC: 
SADC's main problem is that it has not established its own platform of good 
governance on which to base peer judgements. In most countries in the region, 
15 Africa Action, 2002, 'Army General Warns Independent Media and Foreign Journalists', African Policy 
E-Journal, 10 January, retrieved on 15 February 2009 from the website of Africa Action at 
http://www.africaaction.orgidocs02Jzim0201.htm. 
16 See, for example, 'Sycophantic SADC Backs Mugabe on Land', Southern African Report, vol. 19, no. 
50, 14 December 2001, pp. 7-8; 'Old Farts' Club Damages Us All' (editorial), Mail and Guardian, 11-17 
August 2000; 'Black Opinion-Makers Reject 'Quiet Diplomacy", Southern African Report, vol. 20, no. 3, 
18 January 2002, pp. 3-4; and 'Crossing the Limpopo: Zimbabwe Threatens the Grand African Plans of 
Presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo', Africa Confidential, vol. 43, no. 2, 25 January 2002, pp. 1-2. 
17 B. Tromp, 2003, 'SADC Welcomes Mugabe as an African Hero', Mercury, 26 August. 
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democracy and respect for human rights play second fiddle to the comfort and 
power cravings of leaders. Angola's Eduardo dos Santos is a ruthless despot 
presiding over a ruling elite of kleptocrats. Namibia's Sam Nujoma 
manipulated the constitution to ensure he secured a third term of office and has 
strong-armed opponents and the media. Swaziland's King Mswati dislikes 
democracy even more than Mugabe does and comes close to the Zimbabwean 
leader in his lack of tolerance for dissent. Many other leaders in the region are 
either unelected or treat elections and the countries' democratic institutions as 
necessary irritations. With democrats like these, how could the world and 
Zimbabwe's people expect the regional body to take the lead in disciplining 
Mugabe?18 
Whereas there were low expectations of SADC, the expectations of South Africa were 
high. The country was not only a vibrant democracy and one of the leading proponents of 
democratic governance in the construction of the AU, it was also the regional power in 
Southern Africa and its own economic growth was being jeopardised by international 
investor concerns extrapolated from Zimbabwe. For these reasons, South Africa was 
widely expected to apply pressure on its less powerful neighbour. Instead, Pretoria 
adopted an approach of 'quiet diplomacy', generating a great deal of local and 
international surprise and disapproval. 19 The critics were not confined to Western 
countries and liberal and cons rvative organisations but included the ANC's left-wing 
allies, the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions.2o 
18 M. Makhanya, 2002, 'Mugabe Will Not Be Swayed by the Polite Coaxing of Despotic Peers', Sunday 
Times (South Africa), 20 January. 
19 See, for example, 'Condoning Mr Mugabe' (editorial), The Washington Post, 12 March 2001; and C. 
Alden and G. Ie Pere, 2003, South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: From Reconciliation to 
Revival?, Adelphi Paper, no. 362, London: Oxford University Press and International Institute for Strategic 
Studies. 
20 J. Kindra, 2002, 'SACP Klaps [smacks] Mbeki and His Africanists', Mail and Guardian, 28 June; 'South 
Africa's Odd President: Thabo Mbeki's Odd Views Irk His Allies, The Economist, 18 December 2003; K. 
Brown, 2004, 'Zimbabwe Makes It on to Alliance Agenda', Cape Times, 16 December; and N. Dawes, 
2005, 'Zim: ANC Concern Mounts', Mail and Guardian, 18 March. 
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Pretoria's contrary stance was due to four sets of factors, some of them specific to 
Zimbabwe and others reflecting general strands of foreign policy. First, President Mbeki 
had little sympathy for the MDC and was apparently convinced that its leader, Morgan 
Tsvangirai, would not make a competent head of state. In addition, it seemed certain that 
Zanu-PF would never concede power to the MDC through the electoral process and 
Mbeki was worried about the possibility of the military staging a coup in order to 
prevent, or in response to, an MDC victory at the polls. Given these considerations, he 
defined the goal of his peacemaking efforts as stability rather than democracy and he 
believed that this goal would be achieved not through free and fair elections but through 
either a reformed Zanu-PF (without Mugabe) or a negotiated settlement leading to the 
formation ofa government of national unity.21 
Second, Pretoria was concerned that taking a strong stand against human rights abuses in 
African states would breach the norm of solidarity and weaken the country's influence on 
the continent. In 1995 President Mandela had been soundly rebuffed by other African 
leaders when he called for sanctions to be imposed on the dictatorial regime in Nigeria. 
Foreign affairs officials in South Africa were chastened by this experience, which 
subsequently informed Mbeki's strategy of 'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe. In 
2001 the head of the ANC's department of international affairs justified the Zimbabwe 
strategy on the grounds that the government would not repeat Mandela's "terrible 
mistake" when he acted as a "bully" against the Nigerian dictatorship, failed to consult 
SADC and the GAU and "everyone stood aside and we were isolated".22 Pretoria was 
also extremely sensitive to regional fears of South African domination and to the regional 
memory of apartheid destabilisation. The legacy of apartheid and liberation politics had 
created a balance of power based more on history and ideology than on formal power, 
inhibiting Pretoria from playing the role of a local hegemon and enabling Zimbabwe to 
pose a rival source of influence.23 
21 This paragraph is based on the author's discussions with colleagues in the South African Presidency and 
other government departments, 2001-2004. 
22 Quoted in J. Kindra, 2001, 'We Won't Make the Same Mistake with Zim', Mail and Guardian, 2 March. 
23 See P. Bischoff, 2003, 'External and Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy Ambiguity: South African 
Foreign Policy and the Projection of Pluralist Middle Power', Politikon, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 183-201; and M. 
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The third explanatory factor was Pretoria's conviction, as a matter of strategy rather than 
principle, that the international community was much more likely to induce positive 
change in problematic regimes through diplomatic engagement than through 
condemnation and coercive measures; coercion and isolation, it was felt, only heightened 
the regime's intransigence.24 As a non-permanent member ofthe UN Security Council in 
2007/8, South Africa thus sought to block criticism of Zimbabwe, Burma, Iran and 
Sudan.25 Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma defended Pretoria's voting record 
on the Council as follows: "Our own national experience has taught us the value of 
seeking negotiated solutions to problems, no matter how intractable they may at first 
seem, and of engaging all the relevant role players in a dialogue".26 Numerous analysts 
and activists pointed out that this was a false depiction of South Africa's negotiated 
settlement, which was the outcome of a liberation struggle, global solidarity and 
international sanctions against the apartheid regime. Nevertheless, government officials 
were adamant that "shouting from the rooftops" would accomplish nothing in the case of 
Zimbabwe.27 
Mbeki insisted that the only viable solution was one that was determined by the people of 
Zimbabwe themselves. In a vitriolic broadside against his critics, he presented the 
necessity for a domestic solution and the strategy of external pressure as mutually 
exclusive: 
These same detractors, who have their own partisan agendas, which they dress 
in the language of high-sounding principles, are firm in their conviction that 
Schoeman and C. Alden, 2003, 'The Hegemon That Wasn't: South Africa's Foreign Policy towards 
Zimbabwe', Strategic Review for Southern Africa, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 1-28. 
24 L. Nathan, 2008, 'Anti-Imperialism Trumps Human Rights: South Africa's Approach to the Darfur 
Conflict', Working Papers, series 2, no. 31, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics. 
25 A. van Nieuwkerk, 2007, 'A Critique of South Africa's Role on the UN Security Council', South African 
Journal of International Affairs, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 61-77. 
26 N. Dlamini-Zuma, 2007, 'Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, to 
the National Assembly on the Occasion of the Budget Vote of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Cape 
Town', 29 May, pg. 6, retrieved on 5 August 2008 from the website ofthe Department of Foreign Affairs at 
http://www.dfa.gov.zaldocs/speeches/2007/dzum0529.htm. 
27 See, for example, R. Munusamy, 2002, 'SA Battles UK over Zimbabwe: Screaming from the Rooftops 
Has Not Helped, Says Pahad', Sunday Times (South Africa), 29 September. 
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we have some divine right to dictate to the people of Zimbabwe what they 
should do about their country. They seem to believe that if we issued some 
instructions to the political leaders of Zimbabwe, as determined by themselves, 
this leadership would meekly obey what the baas across the Limpopo would 
have told them. 28 
At the time at which the SADC task force criticised Mugabe's policies in 2001, Mbeki 
issued his own criticism, observing that the Zimbabwe crisis was deepening as the 
government denied voters their rights, beat people up and suppressed the press; he called 
on SADC to intervene urgently to stop the descent into chaos and appeared to have 
abandoned his policy of quiet diplomacy.29 The state-owned newspaper in Harare, the 
Herald, responded by claiming that Mbeki had betrayed Zanu-PF and joined the "neo-
colonialist plot" to overthrow it.3o When Mbeki raised concern about the arrangements 
for the forthcoming presidential election, the Herald accused him of "removing his 
gloves for a bare-knuckled fight with Zimbabwe" and of mobilising SADC states to 
"justify a regional and international onslaught" against the country.31 Just as the SADC 
task force retreated quickly from its critical stance, so did Mbeki. In 2002 South Africa's 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs justified the resumption of quiet diplomacy on the 
grounds that the only alternative was a war with Zimbabwe. 32 
The fourth factor that explains South Africa's posture on Zimbabwe was the anti-
imperialist character of Pretoria's foreign policy. I have argued elsewhere that Mbeki's 
approach to international affairs was based on three paradigms: democratic, Africanist 
and anti-imperialist. Whereas the Africanist and anti-imperialist paradigms were seldom 
28 T. Mbeki, 2003, 'The People of Zimbabwe Must Decide Their Own Future', Letter from the President, 
ANC Today, vol. 3, no. 18,9-15 May, retrieved on 2 August 2005 from 
www.anc.org.zalancdocs!anctoday/2003/atI8.htm . 
29 'President Thabo Mbeki Given a Lashing by Zimbabwe as He Gets Tough with Mugabe', Southern 
Atican Report, vol. 19, no. 49, 7 December 2001, pp. 1-2. 
3 P. Molebeledi, 2001, 'Harare's Herald Swipes at Mbeki', Business Day, 4 December. 
31 'President Thabo Mbeki Given a Lashing', op cit. 
32 Munusamy, 'SA Battles UK over Zimbabwe', op cit. 
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if ever in conflict with each other, both were occasionally in conflict with the democratic 
paradigm. In these instances it was the democratic position that gave way.33 
The anti-imperialist thrust revolved around the following themes: the political and 
economic power imbalance between the North and the South, to the great detriment of the 
poor; the need to transform the UN and other international bodies in order to address 
global inequities; the domineering, hypocritical and self-serving approach of Western 
countries that chide and bully developing states; South-South co-operation and solidarity; 
and multilateralism and respect for international law in the conduct of international 
affairs.34 
In this context, Pretoria regarded the international human rights arena as one of the sites 
of struggle between the North and the South. According to Dumisani Kumalo, South 
Africa's Permanent Representative to the UN during the Mbeki presidency, the 
developed and developing countries were "locked in a 'cold war' on the correct approach 
to human rights". 35 Among other things, there was a tendency for the developed countries 
to sit in judgement of the governance and human rights performance of selected 
developing countries. This gave rise to "double standards, hypocrisy, and the abuse of the 
UN's human rights machinery [by the developed countries] to serve national political 
agendas"; it also "leads to a situation where developing countries are forced to rally to the 
support of the targeted country, irrespective of its actual human rights performance".36 
Whatever judgements might be made about this statement, it goes a long way to 
explaining South Africa's stand on Zimbabwe. 
Pretoria had similar concerns about the UN Security Council. The critique ran as follows: 
whereas the UN General Assembly is a representative and democratic forum in which the 
balance of forces does not favour any single state, the Council's arrangements privilege 
33 L. Nathan, 2005, 'Consistencies and Inconsistencies in South Africa's Foreign Policy in Africa', 
International Affairs, vol. 81, no. 2, pp. 361-372. 
34 These themes are drawn from a review of President Mbeki's foreign policy speeches on the website of 
the African National Congress, retrieved from www.anc.org.za on 2 August 2005. 
35 Quoted in Van Nieuwkerk, • A Critique of South Africa's Role', op cit, pg. 72. 
36 Ibid. 
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the five permanent members (P-5), which enjoy the right of veto; the P-5 therefore want 
the issues they deem important to be dealt with in the Council, even if this entails 
encroaching on the mandates of other organs, such as the Human Rights Council, that fall 
under the General Assembly.37 Moreover, the P-5 control the process of defining 
international security and identifying the existence of international threats. Developing 
countries have watched powerlessly as the Security Council has become increasingly 
intrusive in this regard, assuming quasi-judicial authority and directing states to amend 
their national laws.38 Pretoria raised this critique to justify its opposition to Security 
Council resolutions on human rights abuses in Burma and Zimbabwe in 2007. It argued 
that these issues lay outside the Security Council's mandate on international threats to 
peace and security and should be tackled instead by the Human Rights Counci1.39 
The anti-imperialist position constituted an ideology in the sense of comprising a set of 
fixed ideas and doctrines that laid the basis for political thought and action. It provided 
the lens through which human rights and other democratic tenets were viewed, it shaped 
the determination of priorities when government was confronted by competing principles 
and pressures and it elevated the importance of South-South solidarity. A further 
consequence was that political crises like Zimbabwe, Darfur and Burma were addressed 
not on their own merits but in terms of the power dynamics between the North and the 
South. Pretoria's commitment to human rights was thus subordinated to the struggle 
against the North's domination and perceived abuse of international forums. In short, 
South Africa's foreign policy was overly determined by its anti-imperialist paradigm. 
The privileging of anti-imperialism over human rights was strongly evident in Mbeki's 
perspective on Zimbabwe. While critical of Mugabe and the "forcible process of land 
redistribution", he was much more agitated by the historical role of Western countries as 
colonial powers, their recent contributions to the land crisis and their contemporary 
37 See Dlamini-Zuma, 'Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs', op cit. 
38 Dumisani Kumalo, quoted in Van Nieuwkerk, 'A Critique of South Africa's Role', pg. 64. 
39 Van Nieuwkerk, 'A Critique of South Africa's Role'. 
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condescension in telling Africans how to behave.4o From this perspective flowed the fatal 
flaw in his analysis, shared by most of the other SADC heads of state, which was to view 
the land crisis as being vastly more important than the human rights crisis and to regard 
the latter as a misplaced concern of the West rather than a legitimate concern of the 
people of Zimbabwe. Writing in the ANC newsletter in 2003, Mbeki bemoaned the fact 
that the core issue of land had "disappeared from public view [and] its place had been 
taken by the issue of human rights". 41 He cited Henry Kissinger as having said that 
President Regan and his advisers had treated human rights as a tool for overthrowing 
communism and democratising the Soviet Union. Mbeki continued as follows: 
It is clear that some within Zimbabwe and elsewhere in the world, including 
our own country, are following the example set by 'Regan and his advisers', to 
'treat human rights as a tool' for overthrowing the government of Zimbabwe 
and rebuilding Zimbabwe as they wish. In modern parlance, this is called 
regime change.42 
It is hard to find fault with the analysis of inequitable global relations that underpinned 
Pretoria's anti-imperialist paradigm but it is equally hard to see any productive results 
emanating from the ensuing strategy. Blocking international action against dictatorial 
regimes did nothing to alter the inequities of the international system and yielded no 
benefits to South Africa or the South. In Zimbabwe and elsewhere, the only winners were 
the dictatorial regimes and the clear losers were their victims. The poor, who were the 
intended beneficiaries of the anti-imperialist agenda, ended up sacrificed on its alter. This 
outcome was not emancipatory or in any way trans formative. In so far as it helped to 
retain repressive governments in power, the strategy was reactionary. 
40 T. Mbeki, 2003, 'We Will Resist the Upside-Down View of Africa', Letter from the President, ANC 
Today, vol. 3, no. 49, 12-18 December, retrieved on 2 August 2005 from 
www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2003/textlat49.txt. In this five-page article, the discussion on the 
"forcible process ofland redistribution" is confined to two paragraphs (pg. 4). 
41 Ibid, pg. 5. 
42 Ibid, pg. 5. 
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Developments after 2003 lie beyond the focus of this dissertation but for the sake of 
completeness it should be noted that in 2007, seven years after the onset of the Zimbabwe 
crisis, SADC mandated Mbeki to mediate between the government and the MDC. The 
mediation was controversial, with Mbeki repeatedly accused of being biased in favour of 
Zanu-PF.43 In March 2008 the MDC won parliamentary elections and Tsvangirai won 
47.9% to Mugabe's 43.2% in the presidential elections, leading to a run-off that was 
boycotted by the MDC because of the high level of repression. In September 2008 the 
Mbeki mediation resulted in the signing of the Global Political Agreement and the 
formation of a government of national unity, with Mugabe retaining the presidency, 
Tsvangirai becoming Prime Minister and cabinet posts being shared between the two 
parties.44 The coalition remains fragile at the time of writing (August 2009). 
4.3 The Lesotho intervention, 1998 
Lesotho, a small mountainous country entirely surrounded by South Africa, has had a 
turbulent political history since it gained independence in 1965. Tormented by the 
apartheid regime in the 1980s because its leader, Chief Leabua Jonathan, was willing to 
provide sanctuary to ANC guerrillas, the country was subsequently wracked by tension 
between political parties and the monarchy. In early 1994 conflict between King Letsie 
III and the Prime Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle, began to escalate. Botswana, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe formed a task force to playa mediating role. This initiative emanated 
from the Frontline States, with Pretoria a partner in the exercise. When the King 
suspended the constitution and dissolved Mokhehle's administration, the task force 
condemned the 'royal coup' and set a deadline for the restoration of constitutional rule. In 
September 1994, in response to the King's intransigence, Pretoria deployed combat 
aircraft and mounted a mass drop of paratroopers near the Lesotho border. The show of 
force had the intended effect. Letsie reinstated the government and abdicated in favour of 
43 See, for example, M. Hartnack, 2005, 'Zim Opposition Rejects South Africa as Neutral Broker', Mail 
and Guardian, 21 April. 
44 International Crisis Group, 2009, 'Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive Government', Africa Briefing, no. 
59, 20 April. 
114 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
his father, Moshoeshoe II. The Basotho protagonists agreed that Botswana, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe would serve as the guarantors of their agreement.45 
Four years later Lesotho was once more confronted by a political crisis. Against the 
backdrop of growing dissent over the results of a national election, there were fears of an 
imminent coup when a group of junior officers 'deposed' and imprisoned the commander 
and other senior officers of the Royal Lesotho Defence Force, seized control of the 
national broadcasting station and forced the closure of government offices. On 16 
September 1998 the newly elected Prime Minister, Pakalitha Mosisili, wrote to SADC 
warning that "we have a coup on our hands. The only intervention I can and do request 
urgently is of a military nature"; three days later he wrote again to SADC, exclaiming 
that "the situation is so tense that some of us may not see the planned [SADC] meeting of 
Sunday the 20th".46 
In consultation with the governments of Mozambique and Zimbabwe, South Africa and 
Botswana decided to launch a joint operation. The South African contingent of 500 
troops with air and medical support entered Lesotho on 22 September and the smaller 
contingent from Botswana arrived the next day. Operation Boleas, as it was named, met 
with unanticipated resistance from sections of the Lesotho army. Eight South African 
soldiers and an estimated 58 Basotho soldiers were killed in battles over several days.47 A 
state of anarchy ensued. Public demonstrations against the intervention led to the virtual 
sacking of the capital city, Maseru, and thousands of people were displaced. Operation 
Boleas was riddled with strategic and tactical errors and was viewed by many as a 
military and political disaster.48 The critics included outspoken South African military 
45 See B. Seery, 1995, 'Africa's Reluctant New Policeman Twirls His Truncheon: The Lesotho Experience 
and South Africa's Role in Peacekeeping', in M. Shaw and J. Cilliers (eds), South Africa and Peacekeeping 
in Africa, Halfway House: Institute for Defence Policy, pp. 87-97; and L.H. Evans, 1996, 'Preventive 
Diplomacy in Lesotho and Mozambique', in J. Cilliers and G. Mills (eds), Peacekeeping in Africa, Halfway 
House: Institute for Defence Policy, pp. 187-198. 
46 Quoted in 'More Questions Than Answers as Smoke Clears around Maseru', SouthScan, vol. 13, no. 20, 
2 October 1998, pp. 153-154 at pg. 154. 
47 E.G. Berman and KoS. Sams, 2000, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities, Geneva: 
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, pg. 188. 
48 See, for example, Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa, op cit, pp. 184-190; F. Makoa, 1999, 
'Foreign Military Intervention in Lesotho's Elections Dispute: Whose Project?', Strategic Review for 
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officers and defence officials.49 SouthScan claimed that the operation had done lasting 
damage to South Africa's reputation and Lesotho's sovereignty; it had also raised the 
prospect of heightened and more protracted instability in Southern and Central Africa by 
firmly establishing the legitimacy of external military action in volatile situations.5o 
In response to the criticism, Pretoria insisted that the deployment had been requested by 
the head of a legitimate government facing a potential coup and had been authorised only 
after efforts to end the mutiny through negotiations had failed. sl South African officials 
sought variously to justify the legality ofthe intervention on one or more of the following 
grounds: it had taken place under SADC auspices; it flowed from a SADC decision to not 
permit coups d'etat and other unconstitutional changes of government in Southern Africa; 
and it was based on the 1994 agreement that South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana 
would be guarantors of stability in Lesotho.52 No reference was made to international law 
on the use of force. The South African ministers and state law advisers with whom I 
spoke at the time of the operation had not considered the relevant provisions of the UN 
Charter and were unfamiliar with them.53 
In an article published two years after the intervention, Rocky Williams, a senior member 
of South Africa's Department of Defence, pointed out the flaws in Pretoria's arguments 
regarding the legality of the deployment: the 'SADC decision' to not allow coups in the 
region had in fact been a proposal from the ISDSC to the SADC Summit; the proposal 
Southern Africa, vol. 21, no. 1, Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, June, pp. 66-87; W. 
Hartley, 1998, 'Lesotho Incursion Tarnishes SA's Peacemaker Image', Business Day, 25 September; and 
K. 0' Grady, 1998, 'A City Ruined by Bungled Intervention', Business Day, 25 September. 
49 See R. Williams, 2000, 'From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding? South African Policy and Practice in 
Peace Missions', International Peacekeeping, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 97-101; 'Army Top Brass Slam Incursion 
into Lesotho', Star, 1 October 1998; and 'SANDF Slams Government in Wake of Lesotho Foray', Star, 3 
November 1998. 
50 'More Questions Than Answers', SouthScan, op cit. 
51 See R. Mamoepa, 1998, 'Stalemate in Peace Process Led to SADC Intervention', Sunday Independent, 
27 September. 
52 See, for example, Mamoepa, 'Stalemate in Peace Process' , op cit; R. Kasrils, 1998, 'Lesotho Proves 
Transformation of Armed Forces Has Worked', Star, 23 October; F. Haysom, 1998, 'Defending Regional 
Democracy', Star, 14 October; and Directorate Corporate Communication, South African National Defence 
Force, 1999, 'The SADC Intervention in Lesotho: A Military Perspective', Salut, South African National 
Defence Force, July, pp. 22-29. 
53 Author's discussions with officials in the South African Presidency and Department of Defence, 
September and October 1998. 
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had included the proviso that UN, OAU and SADC approval be obtained prior to any 
military intervention by SADC; the Summit had neither endorsed the ISDSC's proposal 
nor authorised military action in Lesotho; and, in the absence of Summit approval, the 
decision by the neighbouring states to launch the operation was in breach of SADC's 
decision-making rules.54 Williams observed further that "considerable uncertainty 
prevailed at the time of the intervention as to the scope, content and wording of the 
SADC mandate (and, indeed, whether a written mandate existed at all!)".55 
There is no mystery regarding South Africa's motivation and goals. According to the 
South African National Defence Force (SAND F), the political aim of the operation was 
to create a stable environment for the restoration of law and order and the commencement 
of negotiations among the Basotho political parties, and the military objectives were to 
establish control of the border between South Africa and Lesotho, protect South African 
assets in the mountain kingdom and stabilise Maseru.56 The actions on the ground were in 
keeping with this formulation of aims and objectives. South African assets were 
perceived to include the joint Lesotho/South African Highlands Water Project at the 
Katse Dam, which supplied water to South African agriculture and industry. The 
mutineers had threatened to destroy the dam if Pretoria sent troops into Lesotho, and 
South African officials stated explicitly that securing the dam was one of the objectives 
of the mission. 57 
Nor is it difficult to understand the political and military ineptness of the South African 
intervention. A mere four years after the formation of the Government of National Unity, 
there was still a general lack of policy and strategic coherence within and between state 
departments. Decision-making procedures on military operations were ad hoc and 
rudimentary, and the government had not yet come to terms with the doctrinal and 
54 Williams, 'From Peacekeeping to PeacebuildingT, op cit, pp. 99-101. See also Makoa, 'Foreign Military 
Intervention', op cit; and Malan, 'Regional Power Politics under the Cover of SADC', op cit, pp. 7-8. 
55 Williams, 'From Peacekeeping to PeacebuildingT, op cit, pg. 101. 
56 Directorate Corporate Communication, 'The SADC Intervention in Lesotho', op cit; and V. Kent and M. 
Malan, 2003, 'Decisions, Decisions: South Africa's Foray into Regional Peace Operations, Occasional 
Paper, no. 72, Institute for Security Studies. 
57 F. Likoti, 2007, 'The 1998 Military Intervention in Lesotho: SADC Peace Mission or Resource WarT, 
International Peacekeeping, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 251-263. 
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operational implications of the radical policy shift from aggressive military engagements 
to peacekeeping operations that were consistent with international law and South Africa's 
membership of SADC. The lack of proper attention to the political and legal dimensions 
of Operation Boleas was also due to the absence of thorough deliberation within 
government. The Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Chief of 
the Defence Force were in the decision-making loop but foreign affairs personnel, the 
Secretary of Defence and his policy and planning staff were not.58 
The puzzle concerning the operation was the rash employment of the SANDF, which ran 
counter to the ANC government's policy aversion to the use of force in international 
affairs (Section 3.4); only one month earlier, in August 1998, Mandela had opposed a 
SADC military engagement in the DRC (Section 4.4). It might be relevant that both 
President Mandela and Deputy President Mbeki were travelling abroad when the Lesotho 
operation occurred. The decision to deploy was taken by Acting President Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi, in consultation with Mandela and Mbeki according to a government officia1.59 
There is no way of telling whether a different course of action would have been followed 
had Mandela or Mbeki been in the country. Nevertheless, it seems clear with hindsight 
that the intervention was an anomaly. Over the past fifteen years South Africa has 
adhered to its anti-militarist posture. It is therefore plausible to interpret the military 
action in Lesotho as a reflection of the transitional nature of the South African state, a 
product of the residual apartheid paradigm rather than a manifestation of the new 
government's foreign policy. 
The South African Deputy Minister of Defence, Ronnie Kasrils, attributed the public 
criticism of Operation Boleas to perceptions clouded by the fog of war.60 Equally serious 
was the fog of politics arising from the disputes within SADC over the Organ and the 
DRC crisis. Prior to the operation, the Lesotho government was reported to have engaged 
in behind-the-scenes efforts to get Zimbabwe to intervene in Lesotho "in return for 
58 Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa, op cit, pp. 186-187; and author's discussions with defence 
officials at the time of the intervention. 
59 'More Questions Than Answers', SouthScan, op cit, pg. 154. 
60 Kasrils, 'Lesotho Proves Transformation', op cit. 
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supporting Robert Mugabe in [his] battle with South Africa for regional political 
dominance".61 After the operation, the King of Lesotho claimed that his country had been 
sacrificed in the interests of healing the rift between South Africa and Zimbabwe.62 
Whatever the validity of these claims, Operation Boleas highlighted the legal, military 
and political complications that can arise when collective enforcement action is 
undertaken in the absence of agreed mandates, rules and procedures. 
In the aftermath of the operation, South Africa facilitated negotiations between the 
Basotho political parties with the aims of restoring constitutional rule, forging an 
agreement on the disputed election and embarking on a process of much needed electoral 
reform. In November 1998 the parties agreed to recognise the elected government and set 
up the representative Independent Political Authority to restructure the first-past-the-post 
electoral system. The South African and Botswana military contingents remained in 
Lesotho and were joined by troops from Zimbabwe when Operation Boleas was replaced 
with Operation Maluti, designed to reorient and retrain the Lesotho Defence Force. The 
foreign forces withdrew in May 1999, a new electoral system was adopted and elections 
were held successfully in 2002. In 2003 Roger Southall concluded that four years after 
the bungled military operation of 1998, the South African government could claim that its 
multi-faceted intervention had been immensely beneficial.63 
4.4 The DRC rebellion, 1998 
In September 1996 the Banyamulenge, a minority Tutsi community in eastern Zaire, 
mounted an uprising under the leadership of Laurent Kabila that culminated in the 
overthrow of President Mobutu Sese Seko. The rebellion of the Alliance des Forces 
Democratiques pour fa Liberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) had two proximate causes, 
both linked to the virulent anti-Tutsi sentiment in the Great Lakes Region. The first was 
6J Quoted in Star, 9 September 1998 as cited in Makoa, 'Foreign Military Intervention', op cit, pg. 73. 
62 W. Boot, 1998, 'SA's Crippling Arrogance', Mail and Guardian, 9-15 October. 
63 The information in this paragraph is drawn from R. Southall, 2003, 'An Unlikely Success: South Africa 
and Lesotho's Election of2002', Journal o/Modern African Studies, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 269-296. 
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the decision by a provincial governor to expel the Banyamulenge from Zaire, where they 
had lived for over two hundred years. The second was the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, 
which had been stopped by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), forcing 
the flight of the Interahamwe and other genocidal groups into neighbouring Zaire. For the 
newly installed RPF government in Rwanda, which orchestrated and drove the Zairean 
insurrection, the abiding threat was Mobutu's support for the Interahamwe and the 
presence of these Hutu militia in refugee camps in eastern Zaire. 
More broadly, the structural and historical causes of the rebellion and the subsequent 
uprising in 1998 related to the chronic regional instability in Central Africa, the brutality, 
divisiveness and neglect of colonial rule and three decades of authoritarianism under 
Mobutu.64 In addition to Mobutu's legendary corruption, organised chaos and harsh 
repression, the economic and humanitarian situation was disastrous. In the mid-1990s 
state hospitals and health facilities were virtually non-existent, preventable and curable 
diseases accounted for at least 50% of all deaths, child and maternal mortality rates were 
among the highest in the world and inflation had reached 24,000%.65 
As the AFDL moved rapidly towards the capital, Kinshasa, the international community 
was seized with a sense of impending catastrophe in anticipation of a bloody last-ditch 
stand by Mobutu's army. The UN Secretary-General and a number of Western countries 
and relief agencies called for the urgent deployment of an international peacekeeping 
force. President Mandela intervened diplomatically, famously travelling to the hotspot on 
the naval warship SAS Outeniqua. He was able to convene a meeting between Mobutu 
and Kabila on board the ship, stationed off the coast of Congo-Brazzaville, but the 
initiative had a slightly quixotic flavour. Whether Mandela's aim was to broker some 
kind of government of national unity or simply enable Mobutu to step down gracefully 
without a fight, the timing and the balance of power were not conducive to a mediated 
solution. Poised to take the capital, Kabila had no need to do a deal with Mobutu. 
64 G. Evans, 1997, Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes, Adelphi Paper, no. 311, London: 
Oxford University Press and International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
65 D. Shearer, 1999, 'Africa's Great War', Survival, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 89-106. 
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In 1997 Kabila became the President of Zaire, which was renamed the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and became a member of SADC.66 In July 1998 he accused his 
Rwandan allies of plotting against him and expelled them from the DRC. With the 
support of Rwanda and Uganda, the Rassemblement Congoiais pour fa Democratie 
(RCD) launched a rebellion against him. Kabila appealed to SADC for military and 
political assistance. On 7 August, in his capacity as the Chair of the Organ, Mugabe 
convened a meeting in Victoria Falls of the heads of state and government from Angola, 
the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.67 At this meeting a task 
group was set up to consider an appropriate response. Although South Africa held the 
chair of SADC at the time, it was not invited to the indaba because of the friction 
between Mandela and Mugabe over the Organ.68 At a Summit meeting the previous 
month Mandela had threatened to resign as the SADC Chair if the Organ were not made 
accountable to the Summit (Section 3.2); Mugabe had not relented, continuing to insist 
that the Organ should be independent from the Chair of SADC.69 On 18 August 1998 
Mugabe referred the recommendations of the Victoria Falls task group to an ISDSC 
meeting in Harare, at the conclusion of which he declared that SADC had decided 
unanimously to meet Kabila's appeal. The next day Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia 
announced that they would deploy troops in the DRC on behalf of SADC.7o They 
subsequently referred to themselves as the SADC Allied Forces in the DRC. 
The intervening states justified the deployment as an act of collective defence against the 
'invasion' of the DRC by Rwanda and Uganda. Zimbabwe presented the following 
motivation to the UN Security Council: the decision to deploy was based on a formal 
request from an internationally recognised government; it was permitted in terms of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, which allows a state to request military assistance when its 
66 SADC's motivation for accepting the DRC's application for membership, despite the country being 
located in central and not southern Africa, is discussed briefly in Chapter 5. 
67 United Nations Security Council, 1998, 'Letter Dated 23 September 1998 from the Permanent 
Representative of Zimbabwe to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council', UN 
document S/1998/891, 25 September, pg. 2, retrieved on 12 March 2009 from the website of the UN at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GENIN98/282121 /PDF IN9828221.pdf?OpenElement. 
68 'Foreign Affairs Tries to Deny Mugabe's Snub', Southern Africa Report, op cit. 
69 'On Brink of 'Unprecedented Conflict' Hardliners Split SADC', SouthScan, vol. 13, no. 17,21 August 
1998, pg. 129. 
70 Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa, op cit, pp. J 76-177. 
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security, sovereignty and territorial integrity are threatened; the decision was consistent 
with a 1997 resolution of the OAU condemning changes of legitimate government by 
military means; and it was in line with a 1995 resolution of the ISDSC whereby SADC 
countries would take collective action in the event of an attempted coup against a 
member state. 71 
The intervening countries also claimed that the deployment had been authorised by the 
Organ and the ISDSC.72 However, the Organ was not operational as a multi-national 
regional body, the ISDSC had no mandate to initiate military action and only a handful of 
SADC countries were present at the meetings in Harare and Victoria Falls. Mandela's 
spokesperson stated emphatically that "there is no way that the people who met at 
Victoria Falls and Harare can have met under the auspices of SADC".73 When Mandela 
challenged Mugabe's authority to send troops on behalf of SADC, the latter responded 
with a thinly veiled insult: "No one is compelled within SADC to go into a campaign of 
assisting a country beset by conflict. Those who want to keep out, fine. Let them keep 
out, but let them be silent about those who want to help".74 Kabila accused Pretoria of 
being "puppets of the aggressors" in his country.75 
Supported by Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, South Africa argued that the DRC 
crisis had to be tackled diplomatically. To this end, and with the additional aim of 
asserting SADC's authority over the Organ, on 23 August Mandela convened an 
emergency Summit meeting in Pretoria. Mugabe failed to attend the meeting and a pre-
Summit consultation arranged by Mandela, saying that "we must now enlist the OAU 
which has an organ for conflict resolution. It is not possible for us to resolve [the crisis] 
71 United Nations Security Council, 'Letter Dated 23 September', op cit, pg. 3. Article 51 of the UN Charter 
deals with "the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations". 
72 Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa, op cit, pp. 177-178. 
73 Quoted in 'The Last Days of Laurent Kabila?', Mail and Guardian, 21-27 August 1998. 
74 Quoted in 'DRC: Zimbabwean, Angolan Troops Arrive to Back Kabila', Integrated Regional Information 
Network bulletin, UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 21 August 1998. 
75 Quoted in 'Democratic Republic of Congo: Kabila Lambastes Pretoria', Integrated Regional Information 
Network for Central and Eastern Africa, Weekly Round-Up, no. 50-98, UN Office for the Co-ordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, 4-10 December 1998. 
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as SADC because we are divided".76 Angola and the DRC were also absent from the 
meeting, and Uganda and Kenya were present as invited guests. The Summit declared 
that military action was an unacceptable way of addressing the problems that had given 
rise to the war and called for an immediate ceasefire and a peaceful process of political 
dialogue to solve the problems.77 The Summit mandated Mandela to pursue these goals in 
consultation with the OAU Secretary-General and to harmonise the Pretoria agenda with 
the Victoria Falls initiative.78 On 31 August the UN Security Council called similarly for 
"a peaceful solution to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, including an 
immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the initiation of a peaceful 
process of political dialogue with a view to national reconciliation". 79 Tanzanian military 
instructors in the DRC were evacuated and Mozambique's Prime Minister, Pascoal 
Mocumbi, said that his country would not send troops to the DRC without the backing of 
SADC and the OAU.8o 
At the Non-Aligned Movement Summit hosted by South Africa at the beginning of 
September, Mandela declared unexpectedly that SADC unanimously supported the 
military intervention by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. According to South African 
officials, the apparent turnabout was not a shift in policy but was intended to ease the 
tension with Mugabe and restore a semblance of unity to SADC.81 For many months 
thereafter, South African cabinet ministers reiterated that Pretoria would only deploy 
troops in the DRC under the direction of the UN. 82 The government was reported to have 
mobilised troops in anticipation of the establishment of an internationally sanctioned 
76 Quoted in Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in A/rica, pg. 178. 
77 SADC, 1998, 'Communique of the Summit Meeting of the SADC on the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo', Pretoria, 23 August. 
78 Ibid. 
79 United Nations Security Council, 1998, 'Statement by the President of the Security Council', UN 
document SIPRST/1998/26, 31 August, pg. 1, retrieved on 6 March 2009 from the website of the UN at 
http://daccessdds.un.orgidocIUNDOC/GENIN98/254/04/PDFIN9825404.pdf?OpenElement. 
80 'SADC Calls for Immediate Ceasefire', Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and 
Eastern Africa, IRlN Update no. 486 for Central and Eastern Africa, United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 24 August 1998. 
81 Author's discussion with officials in the South African government, October 1998. See also Berman and 
Sams, Peacekeeping in A/rica, op cit, pg. 179; and 'SA Seeks to Recoup Its Diplomatic Losses on Congo 
Intervention at Peace Summit', SouthScan, vol. 13, no. 18,4 September 1998, pp. 137-138. 
82 See, for example, South African Press Association, 1999, 'Briefing ofMPs - Safety and Security', 12 
August. 
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peacekeeping force.83 South Africa maintained its view that a military standstill, a 
cease fire and elections were necessary to resolve the conflict and Mandela continued to 
champion a negotiated settlement.84 In October 1998 he offered his good offices to the 
warring parties but the DRC government spumed the offer.85 
On 13-14 September the SADC Summit met in Mauritius and mandated President 
Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, the incoming chair of SADC, to facilitate a peace process 
for the DRC.86 By this stage the international dimensions of the conflict had become even 
more prominent and complicated. The DRC's neighbours in the north, Sudan and Chad, 
had also come to Kabila's defence, while Burundi had lined up with Rwanda and Uganda 
against him, making a total of nine state belligerents in what became known as 'Africa's 
biggest war' .87 
Although the war created a deep and lasting rift in SADC, the communique issued after 
the Mauritius Summit sought to present a unified front by endorsing the positions 
represented by both South Africa and Zimbabwe: 
The Summit expressed deep regret at the outbreak of war in DRC, as a result 
of attempts by rebels and their allies to forcefully remove the Government of 
President Kabila from power. The Summit welcomed the initiatives by SADC 
and its Member States intended to assist in the restoration of peace, security 
and stability in DRC, particularly the Victoria Falls and Pretoria initiatives. In 
that regard, the Summit reaffirmed its call for an immediate cessation of 
hostilities and commended the Governments of Angola, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe for timorously [presumably, "timeously"] providing troops to assist 
83 A. Eveleth and K. Pech, 1998, 'SA Troops on Standby for Congo', Mail and Guardian, 4-10 September. 
84 Berman and Sams, , Peacekeeping in Africa, op cit, pg. 179. 
85 S. Koko, 2007, 'The 'One-Plus-Four' Formula and Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo' , 
African Security Review, vol. 16, no. 1, retrieved on 1 March 2009 from 
www.iss.co.zalstatic/templates/tmpl html.php?node id=2599&slink id=494I &slink type= 12&link id=29. 
86 SADC, 1998, 'Communique. Mauritius - Grand Bay: 13_14th September, 1998'. 
S7 International Crisis Group, 1998, 'Congo at War: A Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the 
Central African Conflict', ICG Congo Report, no. 2, 17 November; International Crisis Group, 'Scramble 
for the Congo', op cit; and Shearer, 'Africa's Great War', op cit. 
124 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
the Government and people of the DRC defeat the illegal attempt by rebels and 
their allies to capture the capital city, Kinshasa, and other strategic areas. The 
Summit emphasized the need for all political actors in the DRC to commit 
themselves to an orderly and peaceful transition to multi-party democracy, 
primarily through constructive consultations and negotiations involving all 
stakeholders.88 
On the battlefield, the combined Namibian, Angolan and Zimbabwean forces quickly 
reversed the RCD's gains in western DRC, reclaiming captured territory and repulsing 
the rebel offensive on the capital. Elsewhere in the country, however, the RCD and its 
allies gained territory. By late 1998 an effective stalemate had been achieved, with the 
country effectively split in twO.89 There were more than twenty attempts to broker peace 
but it was only the Lusaka accord, signed by the state belligerents and main rebel 
movements in July and August 1999, that provided a potentially viable basis for a lasting 
cessation of hostilities.90 Nevertheless, the war continued to simmer and flare, further 
complicated by fighting between Uganda and Rwanda on Congolese territory.91 It was 
another three years before these countries left the DRC. 
The Lusaka accord, brokered by Zambia, South Africa and Tanzania, sought to address 
both the internal political dynamics of Congo and the regional security concerns of 
Angola, Rwanda and Uganda.92 It provided for an immediate cessation of hostilities and 
the establishment of a Joint Military Commission (JMC) comprising the belligerent 
parties. The JMC was mandated to investigate ceasefire violations, design mechanisms to 
disarm the genocidal forces and other armed groups and monitor the withdrawal of all 
foreign troops according to specified deadlines. The agreement also covered the initiation 
88 SADC, 'Communique. Mauritius', op cit. 
89 For details on the fighting, see Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa, op cit, pp. 180-183. 
90 'Complex War, Ambitious Peace', Africa Confidential, vol. 40, no. 18, 10 September 1999, pp. 1-2. 
91 International Crisis Group, 2001, 'RwandalUganda: A Dangerous War of Nerves' , Africa Briefing, no. 7, 
21 December. 
92 International Crisis Group, 1999, 'The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: 
An Analysis ofthe Agreement and Prospects for Peace', ICG Democratic Republic of Congo Report, no. 5, 
20 August. The Agreement can be viewed on the website of the Institute for Security Studies at 
http://www.iss.co.zalaf/profiies/drcongo/cdreaderibin/2Iusaka.pdf 
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the Government and people of the DRC defeat the illegal attempt by rebels and 
their allies to capture the capital city, Kinshasa, and other strategic areas. The 
Summit emphasized the need for all political actors in the DRC to commit 
themselves to an orderly and peaceful transition to multi-party democracy, 
primarily through constructive consultations and negotiations involving all 
stakeho lders. 88 
On the battlefield, the combined Namibian, Angolan and Zimbabwean forces quickly 
reversed the RCD's gains in western DRC, reclaiming captured territory and repulsing 
the rebel offensive on the capital. Elsewhere in the country, however, the RCD and its 
allies gained territory. By late 1998 an effective stalemate had been achieved, with the 
country effectively split in twO.89 There were more than twenty attempts to broker peace 
but it was only the Lusaka accord, signed by the state belligerents and main rebel 
movements in July and August 1999, that provided a potentially viable basis for a lasting 
cessation of hostilities.90 Nevertheless, the war continued to simmer and flare, further 
complicated by fighting between Uganda and Rwanda on Congolese territory.91 It was 
another three years before these countries left the DRC. 
The Lusaka accord, brokered by Zambia, South Africa and Taniania, sought to address 
both the internal political dynamics of Congo and the regional security concerns of 
Angola, Rwanda and Uganda.92 It provided for an immediate cessation of hostilities and 
the establishment of a Joint Military Commission (JMC) comprising the belligerent 
parties. The JMC was mandated to investigate ceasefire violations, design mechanisms to 
disarm the genocidal forces and other armed groups and monitor the withdrawal of all 
foreign troops according to specified deadlines. The agreement also covered the initiation 
88 SADC, 'Communique. Mauritius', op cit. 
89 For details on the fighting, see Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa, op cit, pp. 180-183. 
90 'Complex War, Ambitious Peace', Africa Confidential, vol. 40, no. 18, 10 September 1999, pp. 1-2. 
91 International Crisis Group, 2001, 'RwandalUganda: A Dangerous War of Nerves', Africa Briefing, no. 7, 
21 December. 
92 International Crisis Group, 1999, 'The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: 
An Analysis ofthe Agreement and Prospects for Peace', lCG Democratic Republic of Congo Report, no. 5, 
20 August. The Agreement can be viewed on the website ofthe Institute for Security Studies at 
http://www.iss.co.zalaf/profiies/drcongo/cdreaderibin12lusaka.pdf 
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of a Congolese national dialogue, under the authority of a neutral facilitator, which would 
lead to a new political dispensation in the DRC. 
The accord shifted the locus of international support and facilitation from SADC to the 
UN and the OAU. It provided for the formation of an OAU/UN Observer Group to assist 
the JMC and for the OAU to help organise the inter-Congolese dialogue (ICD). The 
accord also called for the deployment of a UN military force to ensure the 
implementation of the agreement. The force would have both peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement functions and would be responsible for disarming the armed groups, 
collecting weapons from civilians and providing humanitarian assistance and protection 
to refugees and displaced people. In February 2000 the UN Security Council authorised 
the establishment of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, known by its 
French acronym MONUC (Mission de I 'Organisation des Nations Unies en RD Congo), 
with an authorised strength of 5,537 military personnel; by 2008 the authorised force 
level had risen to 19,815 military personnel. 93 
In 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated and replaced by his son Joseph. This contributed 
to creating propitious conditions for the lCD, which the OAU had mandated former 
President Ketumile Masire of Botswana to facilitate. The I CD kicked off in Addis Ababa 
in late 2001 and then relocated to Sun City in South Africa in February 2002. The 
participants included the government and various rebel groups, militia, political parties 
and civil society formations. The talks broke down when Kabila and one of the rebel 
movements struck a deal on the sidelines of the negotiations. By now President Mbeki 
had become the central mediator and in the course of 2002 he facilitated agreements 
between the DRC and Rwanda and between the DRC and Uganda, leading to the exit of 
their armies from the Congo. In December 2002 the parties to the ICD met in Pretoria and 
Mbeki facilitated the conclusion of the Accord Global et Inclusif, ushering in a 
transitional government of national unity and paving the way for the DRC's first 
democratic election in 2006.94 Following the Pretoria accord, Mbeki remained involved 
93 See the website of MONUC at http://monuc.unmissions.org/. 
94 For details on the lCD, see Koko, 'The 'One-Plus-Four' Formula', op cit. 
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in peacemaking efforts and the South African government assisted with security sector 
reform, preparations for the elections and other aspects of the transition.95 
The war was a drain on the intervening states' economies but appears to have been highly 
profitable for the members of their ruling elites who secured lucrative mining and other 
commercial contracts in the Congo. Accusations of profiteering and illegal exploitation of 
natural resources, regarded as motives for the continuation of the war, were levelled 
chiefly at Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe.96 A UN report attributed Zimbabwe's 
military involvement to a number of factors, including its desire to assert its role within 
SADC and rally domestic support for its leaders in a context of falling standards of living 
and "gross mismanagement of the economy, unchecked public expenditure, corruption 
and one-party rule".97 The Zimbabwean Minister of Foreign Affairs dismissed the report 
as a "pack oflies".98 
The war had a devastating impact on the people of the DRC. Between August 1998 and 
2002 the number of deaths in the eastern part ofthe country was estimated at 3.5 million, 
of which 350,000 were a direct consequence of the violence and the others a result of 
malnutrition and disease; there were two million internally displaced Congolese and some 
330,000 refugees in neighbouring states; and approximately eighteen million people were 
in need of humanitarian assistance.99 Violence has continued to wrack the Ituri, South 
Kivu, North Kivu and Katanga provinces and in 2009 the UN regarded eastern DRC as 
the site of the world's worst humanitarian crisis. loo 
95 Ibid. 
96 See Shearer, 'Africa's Great War', op cit, pp. 97-98; R. Block, 1998, 'General Partners: Zimbabwe's 
Elite Tum Strife in Nearby Congo into a Quest for Riches', Wall Street Journal, 9 October; United 
Nations, 2001, 'Report ofthe Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of National Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo' , Security Council document S/2001l357, 12 April; 
and United Nations, 2001, 'Addendum to the Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of 
National Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo', Security Council 
document S/200111072, 13 November. 
91 United Nations, 'Addendum to the Report of the Panel of Experts' , para 76. 
98 'DRC-Zimbabwe: Harare Rejects UN Panel Report', Integrated Regional Information Network, United 
Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 29 November 2001. 
99 'UNICEF Alert! United States Fund for UNICEF: Democratic Republic of Congo' ,2002, retrieved from 
http://www.unicefusa.org/alertiemergency/congo/congo.html on 31 May 2002. 
100 'Eastern Congo Now "World's Worst Humanitarian Crisis"', afrol News, retrieved on 22 July 2009 
from the website of afro I News at http://www.afrol.com/artic1es/15918. 
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In conclusion, it should be stressed that the resolution of complex intra-state conflicts is 
an immensely challenging endeavour. There is no international organisation, including 
the UN, the EU and the AU, that is able to end these conflicts quickly and easily. In the 
case of SADC, the inherent difficulties of peacemaking and pre-conflict peacebuilding 
were greatly compounded by the two major divisions that wracked the organisation -
democratic versus authoritarian tendencies and militarist versus pacific foreign postures. 
These divisions inhibited unified action in crisis situations and impaired the functioning 
of the regional security body mandated to playa peacemaking role. 
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CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE FAILURE OF THE ORGAN 
5.1 Introduction 
This Chapter seeks to explain the reasons for SADC's inability to establish a viable 
security regime and engage in effective peacemaking. Three major problems are 
discussed. First, there is an absence of common values among member states, which has 
inhibited the development of common policies on security, politics and foreign affairs 
and frustrated the organisation's ability to contribute to the resolution of conflict. In this 
regard I distinguish between the internal logic of a regional organisation, which is based 
on common values and trust, and its external logic, which is based on state interests. This 
distinction is explored by comparing SADC with the EU. I consider whether there is a 
particular set of common values that would ensure the success of a security regime, 
whether common values might emerge over time and whether the principles of solidarity 
and anti-imperialism have had a positive or negative effect in Southern Africa. 
The second major problem is that states have been reluctant to surrender a measure of 
sovereignty to a security regime with binding rules and principles, partly because of their 
tenuous hold on sovereignty and partly because of their normative differences on the 
character and strategies of the regime. Third, the economic and administrative weakness 
of states has undermined the effectiveness of all SADC's forums and programmes. The 
Chapter concludes by examining the role of South Africa as the major power in the 
region. 
5.2 The absence of common values 
As noted in the Introduction, the UN encourages regional organisations to take 
responsibility for maintaining peace within their geographical domains. The rationale is 
based on proximity and relates to interests, trust and norms. Regional bodies are assumed 
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to have a strong interest in resolving conflicts within their neighbourhood. When the UN 
was being designed at the end of World War II, for example, Winston Churchill proposed 
the formation of regional councils in addition to a Supreme World Council on the 
grounds that only those countries directly affected by a dispute "could be expected to 
apply themselves with sufficient vigour to secure a settlement". 1 Regional organisations 
are also assumed to be well-equipped for peacemaking because of their familiarity with 
the actors and issues involved in a local crisis? According to former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, they can contribute to conflict prevention because they build trust 
through the frequency of interaction among states, have a good grasp of the historical 
background of a conflict and can "provide a local forum for efforts to decrease tensions 
and promote and facilitate a comprehensive regional approach to cross-border issues". 3 
Additionally, the UN maintains that regional organisations can contribute to peace and 
stability by setting and upholding appropriate norms. In a major report on conflict 
prevention, Annan noted that "often regional agencies have credibility as local actors to 
encourage their members to adhere to accepted international and regional norms".4 In 
2008 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon observed that conflict prevention centres and 
early warning systems had been established by the ED, the OSCE, the Organisation of 
American States, the AD and several regional organisations in Africa; of fundamental 
importance in the formation of these structures was the "development of agreed regional 
norms and principles on governance and prevention".5 
In the UN material cited here and in the Introduction, there is only one brief 
acknowledgement that proximity might be an impediment to local peacemaking by 
1 A.K. Henrikson, 1995, 'The Growth of Regional Organizations and the Role of the United Nations', in L. 
Fawcett and A. Hurrell (eds), Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International 
Order, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 122-168, note 2. 
2 United Nations, 2008, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Relationship between the United Nations 
and Regional Organizations, in particular the African Union, in the Maintenance ofIntemational Peace and 
Security', UN document S/2008/186, 7 April, para 9. 
3 United Nations, 2001, 'Prevention of Armed Conflict. Report of the Secretary-Genera!', UN document 
Al55/985-S/2001l574, 7 June, para l37. 
4 United Nations, 2006, 'A Regional-Global Security Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities. Report of 
the Secretary-Genera!', UN document Al611204-S/2006/590, 28 July, para 20. 
5 United Nations, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Relationship between the United Nations and 
Regional Organizations', op cit, para 45. 
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regional bodies: Ban Ki-moon observes that although these bodies have a keen interest in 
resolving crises that erupt in their backyard, they "may be caught up in and made less 
effective because of the complex dynamics of regional conflicts".6 This problem is only 
to be expected since regional organisations are not independent of local states involved in 
conflict but comprise these states. In some instances, such as with IGAD and SAARC, 
the conflict between member states has been so intense as to render the organisation 
inoperable as a conflict resolution forum (Section 1.1). The disputes in SADC have been 
less severe than those in IGAD and SAARC but have nevertheless precluded effective 
conflict resolution and the construction of a useful security regime. 
The disputes that bedevilled the development of the SADC Organ and the Mutual 
Defence Pact related to norms, values and trust rather than interests. In order to explore 
this assertion further it is helpful to distinguish between the internal and external logic of 
a regional organisation as necessary but separate requirements for cohesion and 
effectiveness. The external logic refers to the interests and objective conditions that make 
the organisation a beneficial venture in the judgment of member states. These states must 
believe that their interests will be served through institutionalised co-operation and co-
ordination in respect of one or more political, economic or security problems and goals.7 
Indeed, it would be illogical for states to pursue co-operation, let alone integration, ifthey 
were not convinced that the likely gains outweighed the costs. 
The external logic of SADC has been articulated clearly in official documents and 
encompasses the following concerns and incentives: regionalism and integration as a 
response to globalisation and Africa's marginalisation in international trade and politics; 
the promotion of development and economic growth through regional projects and trade; 
the many socio-economic problems that transcend national borders and require a co-
ordinated response; the synergistic benefits of co-operation in sectors like water, energy, 
policing, health and transport; the necessity for a regional forum for conflict resolution; 
and the peacekeeping and confidence-building benefits of multilateral defence 
6 Ibid, para 9. 
7 On the various ways in which state interests are served by participating in regional organisations, see 
Fawcett and Hurrell, Regionalism in World Politics, op cit. 
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collaboration (Chapter 2).8 More specifically in relation to security, the logic is that 
integration and development require political stability, which in tum requires a security 
regime with a peacemaking mandate. 
Some scholars in the realist school ofInternational Relations are wholly pessimistic about 
the utility of international security regimes. John Mearsheimer exemplifies this position 
when he argues that institutions cannot enhance stability in an international system 
defined by anarchy and a relentless competition for power and security among states; 
there is no evidence that regimes have an independent effect on state behaviour and 
constitute an important cause of peace.9 Mearsheimer does not explain why, if this were 
true, many states in many parts of the world put a great deal of effort into building and 
maintaining regional institutions whose goals include peace and stability. 10 One of the 
striking features of the Southern African case is that states persisted in their mission to 
create a security regime when there were good reasons to abandon it. They not only 
devoted scarce funds and much time to the Organ with little positive result, but their 
disputes over· its status and orientation damaged their relations. Their perseverance 
signified their conviction that their interests would be served by a collective security 
mechanism. They agreed on the need for the mechanism but disagreed bitterly on its 
character. 
The assertion that the disputes around the Organ and the Mutual Defence Pact were 
primarily normative, relating to values and ideas embedded in the political and strategic 
culture of states, does not imply that state interests were unimportant. The positions taken 
by member states were necessarily informed by their interests regarding national security, 
regional security and alliances with other Southern African countries. Yet these interests 
8 SADCC, 1992, 'Theme Document', Maputo, 29-31 January; SADC, ] 992, Towards the Southern African 
Development Community: A Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of Southern African States, 
Windhoek; and SADC, 1993, Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy for Building the Community, 
Harare, January. 
9 J. Mearsheimer, 1994/5, 'The False Promise ofInternational Institutions', International Security, vol. 19, 
no. 3, pp. 5-49. For opposing perspectives, see the responses to Mearsheimer in International Security, 
1995, vol. 20, no. 1. 
10 Mearsheimer addresses this issue only with respect to the US, arguing that realism's pessimistic outlook 
runs counter to American idealism and core beliefs. See Mearsheimer, 'False Promise', op cit, pp. 47-49. 
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do not account for the pacific-militarist divide. Neither camp had a set of interests that 
was common to its members and different from that of its rivals. SADC countries differ 
markedly in terms of resource, geographic, demographic, economic and security factors, 
giving rise to varying interests, but the variations were much greater within the camps 
than between them. 
The internal logic of a regional organisation, on the other hand, refers to the normative 
congruence in the domestic and foreign policies of member states that makes these states 
willing and able to engage in close political and security co-operation. A high level of 
congruence engenders the affinity and trust that are prerequisites for states to develop 
common policies on a range of sensitive issues, adopt a set of binding principles and rules 
and accept the resultant constraints on their decision-making and behaviour. The internal 
logic holds the organisation together as the external logic drives it forward. 
At the time of its formation in 1992, SADC recognised the importance of common values 
as the glue that would bind the organisation (Section 2.5).11 With the dawning of the post-
apartheid era, it was apparent that the unity forged during the struggles against minority 
rule and colonialism required a new foundation. According to the SADC Declaration, the 
"abiding basis for continuing political solidarity and co-operation in order to guarantee 
mutual peace and security in the region" would be provided by economic co-operation 
and integration and by common economic, political and social values and systems. 12 It 
will be recalled that SADC's objectives include the "evolution of common political 
values, systems and institutions" and that its core principles are sovereign equality of 
states; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy and the rule of law; 
equity, balance and mutual benefit; and peaceful settlement of disputes (Section 2.4). 
In the decade following SADC's establishment, the principles that were adhered to most 
firmly and consistently were those of solidarity and anti-imperialism. In the sphere of 
domestic policy there was no consensus among member states on the basic tenets of 
11 SADC, Towards the Southern African Development Community, op cit. 
12 Ibid, pg. 5. 
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governance. In addition to Swaziland and the DRC that were not democratic, there were 
many de jure democracies whose governments were intolerant of dissent, hardly 
accountable to parliament and insufficiently committed to respect for human rights and 
the rule of law. The 2004 Freedom House survey of political rights and civil liberties 
classified Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa as 'free'; 
Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia as 'partly free'; and Angola, the DRC, 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe as 'not free'. 13 Although some of these classifications are 
debatable, they indicate the extent to which Southern African countries spanned the 
political spectrum. 
One of the distinguishing features of the political landscape in Southern Africa has been 
the disjuncture between the rhetoric and trappings of democracy on the one hand, and the 
determination of ruling elites to maintain power on the other. The SADC Parliamentary 
Forum, an independent body of parliamentarians from the SADC states, has observed that 
politicians in the region "talk democracy but use undemocratic means to stay in power".14 
Jonathan Moyo, an outspoken academic before becoming Zimbabwe's Minister of 
Information in 2000, made the same point in a 1998 article on the African Renaissance: 
The assertion that the majority of African governments are now democratic ... 
has no empirical basis. It is true that mUltiparty elections are now common in 
Africa but this truth does not describe a fundamental development. The change 
is strategic, not substantive .... Just look at Zambia and Malawi since the fall of 
Kenneth Kaunda and the late Kamuzu Banda. Zimbabwe is following suit with 
reckless abandon. IS 
In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that SADC failed to express concern and 
disapproval when member states deviated from its official norms regarding democracy. 
Nor is it surprising that the organisation was unable to deal effectively with the conflict 
13 A. Piano and A. Puddington (eds), 2004, Freedom in the World 2004; The Annual Survey of Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. 
14 Quoted in 'Leaders Should Practice Democracy', South African Press Association, 15 October 2000. 
15 J. Moyo, 1998, 'The African Renaissance: A Critical Assessment', Southern African Political and 
Economic Monthly, vol. 11, no. 7, pp. 9-12 at pg. 11. 
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and repression that commenced in Zimbabwe in 2000, the reason summed up neatly in 
the title of Mondli Makhanya's opinion piece, "Mugabe will not Be Swayed by the Polite 
Coaxing of Despotic Peers" (Section 4.2).16 
In the sphere of foreign policy SADC was tom between two approaches to regional 
security and conflict resolution. One group of countries, led by Zimbabwe, emphasised 
defence co-operation and collective security through a defence treaty that would evolve 
over time into a NATO-type organisation. The other camp, led by South Africa, 
prioritised political co-operation and diplomatic means of peacemaking through a 
common security regime (Chapter 3). This normative and strategic cleavage lay at the 
heart of the decade-long disagreements over the nature of the Organ (Section 3.4) and the 
content of the Mutual Defence Pact (Section 3.8). The disagreements immobilised the 
Organ, prevented the Summit from performing its conflict resolution functions and, as 
noted previously, gave rise to the impression of "two SADCs" .17 
The security models that were under consideration were not inherently incompatible. 
Many European countries belong to several political and security organisations, chiefly 
the EU, NATO and the OSCE, which have different orientations. In Southern Africa, 
however, the debates on security arrangements revolved around competing priorities and 
there was no common ground to be found between prioritising a military response to 
conflict and prioritising a political response to conflict. These priorities were 
irreconcilable and the protagonists were unwilling to compromise positions that derived 
from core national policies and values. The animosity that wracked the debates was partly 
due to the fact that regional security arrangements became the fulcrum of the struggle 
between South Africa and Zimbabwe for regional leadership. But the deep significance 
and intensity of the debates was due to the fact that they covered the most sensitive areas 
of statehood, namely sovereignty, security and use of force. 
16 M. Makhanya, 2002, 'Mugabe Will Not Be Swayed by the Polite Coaxing of Despotic Peers', Sunday 
Times (South Africa), 20 January. 
17 R. Williams, 2000, 'From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding? South African Policy and Practice in Peace 
Missions', International Peacekeeping, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 84-104 at pg. 97. 
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The members of the pacific camp were deeply opposed to an agreement that entailed a 
collective defence obligation. They believed that entry into war should be determined on 
a case-by-case basis rather than triggered by a treaty (Section 3.8). It was relevant in this 
regard that an attack on a SADC country seemed just as likely to emanate from another 
member state as from a country outside the region: in 1992 Namibia and Botswana had 
mobilised troops in their dispute over the ownership of a riverine island on their common 
border, and in 1998 Angola threatened to invade Zambia on the grounds that the latter 
was supporting the rebel movement Unita. In circumstances such as these, the pacific 
camp wanted to engage in diplomatic peacemaking rather than be bound to deploy troops. 
When the pacific-militarist schism was played out during the DRC war in 1998, with the 
pacific group promoting negotiations and a ceasefire while Namibia, Zimbabwe and 
Angola engaged in hostilities in support of the DRC government, SADC was rent 
asunder. President Mugabe excluded South Africa from deliberations of the Organ, 
refused to attend a Summit meeting called by President Mandela and declared that SADC 
was too divided to playa peacemaking role in the DRC (Section 4.4). In 1999 Walter 
Tapfumaneyi wrote that "the two camps have clearly worked at cross-purposes resulting 
in either divergent action or no action at all in the face of an increasing number of 
crises".18 According to Naison Ngoma, the Congo deployment and the defence treaty 
signed by the military bloc in 1999 almost destroyed SADC. 19 
The story of the two defence pacts in Southern Africa underlines the salience of the 
internal logic of a regional institution. On the one hand, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe 
were able to conclude a defence treaty because they enjoyed a high level of normative 
congruence and trust as a result of their long-standing alliance in the Frontline States and 
their similar post-liberation political dispensations. On the other hand, the members of 
SADC as a whole lacked such congruence and affinity and the organisation's Mutual 
18 A.W. Tapfumaneyi, 1999, 'Regional Security Cooperation in Southern Africa: A View from Zimbabwe', 
Global Dialogue, vol. 4, no. 2, Institute for Global Dialogue, August, pp. 23-26 at pg. 23. 
19 N. Ngoma, 2005, Prospects for a Security Community in Southern Africa: An Analysis of Regional 
Security in the Southern African Development Community, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, pg. 157. 
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Defence Pact was therefore watered down so that it did not create a collective defence 
commitment (Section 3.8). 
The internal logic is a relative rather than an absolute imperative. Even when the 
members of a regional organisation are prepared to accept a set of rules based on shared 
values, they do not surrender sovereign decision-making lightly and completely. They 
invariably encounter serious differences of opinion and experience difficulty in collective 
decision-making on policy matters and in crisis situations, leading at times to independent 
and divergent courses of action. Some member states might also deviate occasionally 
from the agreed rules and policies. For the organisation to withstand these differences and 
deviations, there must be sufficient political commonality and trust among its members. 
In other words, there is a minimum threshold of normative congruence for a successful 
regional organisation, below which the organisation lacks cohesion and its members are 
unable to develop and abide by common policies. 
The internal logic is also relative in the sense that the degree of congruence required for 
success varies according to the focus, type and form of multilateral engagement. The 
Southern African experience confirms what might be expected intuitively in this regard: 
the threshold is lower in non-sensitive areas than in the realm of high politics; it rises in 
the progression from co-operation to co-ordination to integration; and it is higher in a 
formal regime than in an informal association. Notwithstanding their disputes around the 
Organ, SADC states have sufficient affinity and trust to co-operate in a range of 
functional sectors, such as water and energy?O They have also been able to co-operate in 
sectors that have political and security dimensions but are relatively uncontroversial, a 
good example being their technical co-operation on military and police matters through 
the ISDSC and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation.21 
20 G. Oosthuizen, 2006, The Southern African Development Community: The Organisation, Its Policies and 
Prospects, Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue. 
21 E.G. Berman and K.S. Sams, 2000, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Cu/pabilities, Geneva: 
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, pp. 167-
172. 
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In the 1980s the Frontline States coalition achieved cohesion on the basis of its members' 
common opposition to apartheid and colonialism but it did not seek to regulate their 
conduct through binding rules. The requisite threshold of political congruence is much 
higher in the case of a security regime like the Organ, which encompasses principles and 
rules that are intended to constrain state behaviour and decision-making. If the domestic 
and/or foreign policies of member states are incompatible, the regime is unlikely to be 
effective for a host of reasons: there are no common values on which to base the rules, 
develop common policies and achieve cohesion; the organisation will instead be wracked 
by divisions that inhibit collective decision-making and action; its members will often 
breach the declared norms that are inconsistent with their national policies; and member 
states that are authoritarian will not fulfil a mandate to respect human rights and the rule 
oflaw. These problems lie at the heart of the Organ failure and SADC's dismal record in 
relation to peacemaking and democratic governance. Frequent interaction between states 
will not in itself overcome the divisions and mistrust that derive from incompatible 
national policies. Common values are thus the foundation rather than the outcome of 
close political and security co-operation. 
Four questions emerge from the preceding discussion: Is there a particular set of common 
values - say, those of democracy - that ought to be present for a security regime to be 
effective? Do common values emerge over time? How is the normative threshold for 
success determined? And what has been the impact of the values that SADC states do 
have in common, namely solidarity and anti-imperialism? These questions are addressed 
in the foHowing Section. 
5.3 Comparing SADC and the EU 
In this Section I discuss a number of similarities and differences between the EU and 
SADC in terms of the internal/external logic framework. The thesis that the internal and 
external logic of a regional organisation are necessary but separate requirements for 
cohesion and effectiveness, especially in the political and security fields, is strengthened 
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if it can be shown to apply both to a weak organisation in a developing and impoverished 
region and to a strong organisation in a highly industrialised and prosperous region. 
Unlike SADC, the EU was constituted on the basis of common political values. Article 
6(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1992 declares that "the Union is founded 
on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States". 
Precisely because these assertions are true, the EU has been able to achieve a high level 
of integration, develop communal policy on many issues and establish bodies with 
supranational authority. In addition to its customs, economic and monetary unions, it has 
produced a plethora of laws, rules and standards in various sectors that are binding on 
states and justiciable before the European Court of Justice. Highlighting the significance 
of the internal logic, the EU distinguishes between the negotiability of common policies 
and the non-negotiability of the common values that underlie them.22 
The EU's admission criteria illustrate the idea that shared values are the foundation rather 
than the outcome of close political co-operation in a regional organisation. Article 49(1) 
of the TEU provides that admission is only open to European countries that respect the 
principles set out in Article 6(1). Central and east European states would consequently 
not gain membership on the grounds that they might thereby come to accept democratic 
norms; they would only be admitted if they already adhered to these norms.23 By contrast, 
in 1997 the SADC Summit decided that the DRC satisfied the requirements for entry into 
its ranks?4 These requirements had nothing to do with the democratic values that were 
espoused in the SADC Treaty and absent in the DRC. They related instead to the external 
logic of regional stability, the DRC's mineral, water and other natural resources and its 
potential hydroelectric power and infrastructural projects.25 
22 M. Cremona, 2001, 'Variable Geometry and Setting Membership Conditionalities: A Viable Strategy?" 
in C. Clapham, G. Mills, A. Morner and E. Sidiropou!os (eds), Regional Integration in Southern Africa: 
Comparative International Perspectives, Johannesburg: South African Institute for International Affairs, 
pp. 193-222. 
23 Ibid. 
24 SADC, 1997, '1997 SADC Summit Communique', Blantyre, 8 September. 
25 Ibid; and 'Congo Wins Membership in Sudden Expansion of SA DC', SouthScan, vol. 12, no. 33, 12 
September 1997. 
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I suggested in the previous Section that the internal logic is a relative condition in the 
sense that the degree of normative congruence required for success varies according to 
the focus of multilateral engagement and is highest in the realm of high politics. There 
are striking similarities between the EU and SADC in this regard. Just as the DRC war in 
1998 created a political crisis for SADC, so the Iraq war in 2003 provoked a crisis for the 
EU. Both crises revolved around the appropriateness of using military force and reflected 
a broader, unresolved debate on the foreign policy of the organisation. Like SADC, the 
EU has struggled to agree on a unified security and foreign policy. In 1998 Philip Gordon 
argued that the EU had failed to achieve security and foreign policy integration for the 
foHowing reasons: its members did not have sufficiently similar interests; they believed 
that the costs of lost sovereignty outweighed the potential gains; and they had too great a 
diversity of historical relationships, foreign policy traditions, strategic cultures, values, 
and attitudes towards the use of force. 26 
Further similarities are evident with respect to the origins of regional co-operation in 
Southern Africa and Western Europe. In both contexts the initial impetus for co-operation 
was intimately linked to the need to enhance security in the face of a common threat - an 
aggressive South Africa in the case of SADCC in the early 1980s, and an aggressive 
Soviet Union and historically aggressive Germany in the case of Europe after World War 
n. Yet the presence of an external threat is not an enduring substitute for common values. 
Rather, it has to be substituted by shared values if the organisation is to maintain 
cohesion after the demise of the common enemy. SADC appreciated this critical point in 
the early 1990s and defined the challenge in a fashion not unlike the EU. The SADC 
Declaration argued that in the post-apartheid era it was essential to find an enduring basis 
for political solidarity and co-operation through "the establishment of common political, 
26 P.H. Gordon, 1997/8, 'Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy', International Security, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 
74-100. For a more positive view, see S. Rynning, 2001, 'Providing Relief or Promoting Democracy? The 
European Union and Crisis Management', Security Dialogue, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 87-101. For a recent 
discussion on the EU's foreign policy and the European Security and Defence Policy, see T. Forsberg, T. 
Kivimaki and L. Laakso, 2007, Europe in Context: Insights to the Foreign Policy o/the EU, Helsinki: 
Finnish International Studies Association and the Foundation for Foreign Policy Research. 
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social and other values, such as democracy, respect for human rights [and] respect for the 
rule oflaw,,?7 Whereas SADC failed to meet this challenge, the EU succeeded. 
The EU's difficulty in forging a collective security and foreign policy is overshadowed 
by the fact that European integration has been a remarkably successful security project in 
its own right. As Bj0l11 M011er puts it, the EU's main contribution to European security 
lies not so much in doing something as in being something, namely an immensely 
attractive market and community of nations, which induces democratisation among non-
member states wishing to join it.28 In a region wracked by violence for over two 
centuries, moreover, institutionalised political and economic co-operation since World 
War II has achieved the primary aim of preventing another war among member states. In 
contrast to SADC, the EU has acquired the status of a security community, defined by 
Karl Deutsch and his colleagues as a level of integration, common identity, loyalty, trust 
and sense of community such that its members enjoy the assurance of dependable 
expectations of peaceful change (Chapter 6),z9 
In the 1950s Deutsch and his collaborators conducted an extensive inquiry into the means 
by which war had been eliminated in certain geographic areas and historical periods 
through the formation of security communities. They distinguished between pluralistic 
security communities, comprising states that retained their sovereignty, and amalgamated 
security communities, where there was a merger of political units such as when 
independent provinces or countries became a unitary state. The amalgamated 
communities they studied included the US, Italy, Canada, The Netherlands and 
Switzerland, and the pluralistic security communities included Norway and Sweden, the 
US and Canada, and France and Belgium.3o The researchers found that "compatibility of 
27 SADC, Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy, op cit, pg. 24. 
28 B. M011er, 2004, 'NATO, the EU, and the OSCE: Role Models for Africa?', in S. Field (ed), Peace in 
Africa: Towards a Collaborative Security Regime, Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue, pp. 119-
162 at pg. 135. 
29 K.W Deutsch, S.A. Burrell, RA. Kann, M. Lee Jr., M. Lichterman, RE. Lindgren, F.L. Loewenheim and 
R.W. Van Wagenen, 1957, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization 
in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 5-6 and 36. On the EU as a 
security community, see B. Buzan and O. Waever, 2003, Regions and Powers: The Structure of 
International Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 11. 
30 Deutsch, Political Community, op cit, pp. 29-30. 
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major values relevant to political decision-making" was one of the necessary conditions 
for the emergence of these communities. 31 Yet they did not discern a set of values that 
applied equally to all successful cases. The key values differed from one instance to 
another and depended on historical factors and the domestic politics of the participating 
units. In some processes of integration leading to a security community, states had tacitly 
depoliticised certain incompatible values.32 
Although Deutsch focused on security communities and not regional organisations, his 
findings shed light on two questions that have so far gone begging in this Chapter: Which 
values are most relevant to the internal logic of a regional organisation, and how is the 
normative threshold for success determined? In the absence of a comparative study of 
regional organisations, these questions cannot be answered definitively but, following 
Deutsch, the answers are probably as foHows: the values that enable close political and 
security co-operation are a matter of choice by states in a given set of circumstances; 
states decide whether their normative commonalities and differences lie at the centre or 
the penumbra of their concerns; and they determine whether the threshold for co-
operation, co-ordination or integration has been met. In short, the internal logic of a 
regional organisation is a subjective condition that requires sufficient compatibility of 
values that member states deem cardinal. 
There is no reason to believe that the unity and cohesion of a security regime or regional 
organisation need be based on democratic values. The defence treaty concluded by 
Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe in 1999 illustrates this point. A collective defence 
commitment demands a high level of congruence, affinity and trust, which in this case 
were provided not by shared liberal norms but by an entirely different set of factors: 
historical solidarity during the liberation struggles; the retention by the ruling parties after 
independence of their ethos as liberation movements; their authoritarian tendencies in 
domestic politics; and their militarist approach to regional security and conflict 
resolution. 
31 Ibid, pp. 46-49, 66 and 123-129. 
32 Ibid., pg. 46. 
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ASEAN is another example of a regime whose unity is based on values other than those 
of substantive democracy.33 The organisation is credited with having contributed to the 
prevention of a war between member states, a hugely significant achievement given the 
intense conflicts in Southeast Asia prior to ASEAN's formation in 1967 and the on-going 
tensions between some of its members thereafter. 34 The maintenance of pacific relations 
is often attributed to the' ASEAN way', which comprises a set of norms and principles on 
inter-state relations and a strong preference for addressing disputes through informal 
procedures.35 The norms and principles include dialogue, consultation, decision-making 
by consensus and 'agreeing to disagree'; non-interference in domestic affairs; peaceful 
settlement of disputes; avoidance of the threat or use of force; and respect for the 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. While most of these norms 
can be found in international conventions and thus have a universal character, Amitav 
Acharya shows that they have a distinctly Asian nuance in their adoption and application 
by ASEAN.36 
The principles of solidarity and anti-imperialism are an exception to the absence of 
common values among SADC states. Forged during the liberation struggles against 
colonialism and minority rule, these principles have since been reinforced by the Western 
powers' global domination and prescriptive policies in Africa. Solidarity is the natural 
response of the weak against the powerful. It was consequently brought strongly into play 
during the Zimbabwe crisis (Section 4.2). Through the collective statements issued by the 
Summit and the Organ, even the democratic members of SADC condemned the UK, the 
33 In 2008 the members of ASEAN were Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
34 M. Leifer, 1989, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia, London: Routledge; and D.R. Dillon, 1997, 
'Contemporary Security Challenges in Southeast Asia', Parameters, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 119-133. 
35 A. Acharya, 1998, 'Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia', in E. Adler and M. 
Barnett (eds), Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 198-227; and M. 
Caballero-Anthony, 2003, 'The Regionalization of Peace in Asia', in M. Pugh and W.P.S. Sidhu (eds), The 
United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 195-
211. For a sceptical view of the 'ASEAN way', see N. Khoo, 2004, 'Constructing Southeast Asian 
Security: The Pitfalls of Imagining a Security Community and the Temptations of Orthodoxy', Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 137-153. 
36 A. Acharya, 2004, 'How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional 
Change in Asian Regionalism', International Organization, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 239-275. 
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US and Europe for pressurising Harare to respect human rights and restore the rule of 
law. The regional posture was captured succinctly by the Summit communique of 2003: 
in the midst of intense repression against MDC politicians,3? the heads of state reiterated 
their rejection of smart sanctions against Zimbabwean officials and "re-affirmed the 
indivisibility of SADC and solidarity with Zimbabwe".38 
SADC attributed the conflict in Zimbabwe to two main factors: the compromises on land 
ownership that Britain had forced on the Zimbabwean liberation movements during the 
Lancaster House negotiations for independence in 1979, and the UK's alleged failure 
subsequently to honour its promise to fund the redistribution of land to the black 
majority. Deviating from this line led to dramatic vilification. When Mbeki criticised the 
Zimbabwe government in 2001, he was lambasted by the state-owned media, which 
claimed that he had joined the 'neo-colonialist plot' to overthrow the ruling party 
(Section 4.2). In 2003 Botswana, the SADC country most openly critical of Harare, felt 
obliged to denounce media reports in the region that it was conspiring with the US and 
Britain to launch a military attack on Zimbabwe.39 
Although the principles of solidarity and anti-imperialism had a powerful effect in the 
case of Zimbabwe, they are a weak rather than a strong exception to the absence of 
common values. They bolster regime security at the expense of human security and 
regional security and they impede rather than contribute to the resolution of conflict. 
They are reactive and defensive rather than proactive and programmatic, they mask rather 
than transcend the substantive disputes between member states and they have therefore 
not provided an adequate normative platform for a common security regime. Invoked 
when foreign powers put pressure on a SADC state, the principles have no utility when 
SADC states are at loggerheads with each other. 
37 Human Rights Watch, 2003, 'Under a Shadow: Civil and Political Rights in Zimbabwe', Briefing Paper, 
6 June. 
38 SADC, 2003, '2003 SADC Summit Final Communique', Dar es Salaam, 26 August, para 24. 
39 Botswana Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003, untitled press release, Gaborone, 8 August. The press 
release states that it reproduces a statement made by the Botswana Foreign Minister at the meeting of the 
Ministerial Committee ofthe Organ in Maputo on 7 August 2003. 
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The final question concerning the internal logic of regional organisations is whether 
member states are likely to develop common values over time. Is there an inexorable 
process towards convergence? It will be recalled that one of SADC's objectives is 
precisely "to evolve common political values, systems and institutions".4o In the literature 
on regional security in Southern Africa one finds the view that this objective is indeed 
being achieved. Gavin Cawthra makes the case as foUOWS.41 Common democratic values 
in Europe never emerged overnight. They evolved over the past generation and were 
constructed through processes of interaction and political change. Accordingly, "it might 
be expected that the same will happen in SADC through the development of protocols, 
treaties and other arrangements such as the Regional Indicative Strategic Development 
Plan, which sets out goals and frameworks for trade [and other issues]".42 O  the security 
and political fronts, the relevant instruments include the Organ Protocol, SIPO and 
SADe's Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections.43 Cawthra 
anticipates the objection that these texts are merely rhetorical. He observes that "it might 
be argued that these are relatively empty vessels, but they do provide a framework for, 
and are giving rise to, practices based on shared democratic values".44 
The empirical weakness of Cawthra's argument is the lack of any supporting evidence. 
He provides no examples of SADC's legal instruments 'giving rise to practices based on 
shared democratic values'. There are significant counter-examples, though, the most 
glaring being the repression, defective elections and abrogation of the rule of law in 
Zimbabwe (Section 4.2).45 Cawthra's argument is theoretically flawed because it assumes 
that progress towards shared values is driven at the regional level. In truth, the values in 
question are shaped at the national level. They reflect and are embedded in a country's 
40 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, op cit, article 5(1). 
41 G. Cawthra, 2008, 'Collaborative Regional Security and Mutual Defence: SADC in Comparative 
Perspective', Politikon, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 159-176 at pp. 171-2. 
42 Ibid. 
43 SADC, 2004, 'Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections', Grand Baie, Mauritius. This 
document can be viewed on the SADC website at www.sadc.intlindex/browse/page/117. 
44 Cawthra, 'Collaborative Regional Security'. op cit, pg. 172. 
45 International Crisis Group, 2008, 'Zimbabwe: Prospects from a Flawed Election', Africa Report, no. 138, 
20 March; and International Crisis Group, 2005, 'Post-Election Zimbabwe: What Next?', Africa Report, no. 
93,7 June 
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history, constitution and political culture. This is not to say that they are immutable. 
National values can change over time but they can change in various directions. Some 
Southern African countries might become more democratic in the future but others might 
become less so. Normative convergence over time is thus possible but hardly inevitable. 
In this Section I have compared SADC with the EU in order to highlight the importance 
of common values as the glue that binds the members of a regional organisation in their 
pursuit of national and communal interests. Comparisons are also instructive because of 
the African tendency to seek to reproduce European institutions. Broadly speaking, the 
AU was modelled on the EU; the AU Commission on the European Commission; SADC 
on the European Community; the SADC Mutual Defence Pact on the NATO Treaty; and 
the CSSDCA, which is part of the AU, on the CSCE. This tendency stems from a desire 
to emulate successful organisations and from the proclivity of European countries to 
promote and fund their models on the continent. The tendency is inappropriate given the 
different conditions in Africa, not least because it is too ambitious. Most of the European 
institutions evolved incrementally on the basis of progress achieved in earlier phases and 
an of them were constructed by strong states. Weak states, by contrast, inescapably 
establish weak multilateral bodies. The following two sections consider the ways in 
which the political, economic and administrative weakness of SADC states have hindered 
the creation of a viable security regime.46 
5.4 The problem of sovereignty 
Nowhere in the world do states surrender sovereign decision-making lightly. There are 
three additional factors that make Southern African countries especially cautious and 
sensitive. First, they guard their sovereignty jealously because many of them attained it 
46 On the problem of weak states in Africa, see R.H. Jackson and C.G. Rosberg, 1982, 'Why Africa's Weak 
States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood', World Politics, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 1-24; and 
C. Clapham, 1998, 'Discerning the New Africa', International Affairs, vol. 74, no. 2, pp. 263-269. On the 
poor fit between imported European models of regional integration and the conditions in which they are 
applied in the Third World, see J. Mayall, 1995, 'National Identity and the Revival of Regionalism', in L. 
Fawcett and A. Hurrell (eds), Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International 
Order, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 169-198 at pp. 180-185. 
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relatively recently and at great cost through liberation wars. Second, most of them do not 
enjoy full sovereignty in any event: they do not have a monopoly of violence within their 
territories; they do not have adequate control of movement across their borders; their 
administrative reach in rural areas is weak; and their ability to mobilise resources and 
collect taxes is limited. Their national authority is further undermined by ~he economic 
and financial dimensions of globalisation and by the structural adjustment programmes 
and other prescriptive policies of international financial organisations and foreign donors. 
States that have weak de facto sovereignty are naturally resistant to regional mechanisms 
that would dilute it further through binding rules and decision-making that limit their 
discretion and heighten the possibility of interference in their domestic affairs. 
Third, an absence of common values and commensurate lack of affinity and trust make it 
highly improbable that states will relinquish sovereignty on political and security matters. 
Given the substantial normative gaps between the militarist and pacific camps and 
between the democratic and authoritarian countries in Southern Africa, governments have 
not been prepared to subordinate their national decision-making to collective decision-
making and rules because they cannot be certain that the decisions and rules will be 
consistent with their national policies and interests. 
The drafters of the 1992 SADC Declaration understood that the success of integration 
depended on states being willing to surrender a measure of sovereignty to the regional 
body (Section 2.5). Anticipating the reluctance of states to do this, the Declaration 
claimed that empowering SADC as a collective decision-making forum was itself an 
exercise of sovereignty and that regional decision-making would entail not a loss of 
sovereignty but rather a change in the locus and context of exercising sovereignty.47 In 
general and especially in relation to peace and security, this argument fell on deaf ears. 
As noted earlier, the Zimbabwean defence ministry official involved in the drafting of the 
Organ Protocol maintained that the Organ's operational modalities did not deny member 
states their sovereign right to act independently or stand aloof if they disagreed with 
47 SADC, Towards the Southern African Development Community, op cit, pg. 10. 
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collective arrangements (Section 3.3).48 No member state has advanced a different 
position. 
The SADC countries have not discussed openly the challenge that regionalism poses to 
sovereignty. Their collective view can nevertheless be discerned from official documents 
and decisions. For example, in 1996 the SADC Secretariat proposed that the Organ 
should be mandated to monitor the performance of member states in the fields of human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law.49 The ministers responsible for preparing the 
Organ's terms of reference rejected this proposal but were willing to permit the Organ to 
monitor the ratification by states of UN, OAU and other international conventions and 
treaties on human rights.50 During the finalisation of the Organ Protocol in 2000, 
collective monitoring even in relation to state ratification of international treaties was 
deemed too intrusive and an references to human rights monitoring were excluded from 
the document. Instead, the Protocol merely provides that one of the Organ's objectives is 
to encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for by the UN and the 
OAU.51 The Summit has never discussed the formation of the independent human rights 
commission recommended by the Ministerial Workshop on Democracy, Peace and 
Security in Windhoek in 1994 (Section 2.6). 
By way of further example, the SADC Treaty, drawn up in an era of emerging pluralism 
and optimism, presents the principle of sovereignty simply as "sovereign equality of 
states".52 The Orga  Protocol, prepared in a period of intra-state conflict and inter-state 
tension, is more elaborate and includes in the Preamble a commitment to "strict respect 
for sovereignty", sovereign equality, political independence and non-interference in 
48 A.W. Tapfumaneyi, 1999, 'The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: Interpreting the 
Decision ofthe Maputo 1997 SADC Summit', ACCORD Occasional Paper, no. 9, African Centre for the 
Constructive Resolution of Disputes, pg. 4. 
49 SADC Secretariat, 1996, 'Terms of Reference for the SADC Sector on Political Cooperation, 
Democracy, Peace and Security: Meeting of SADC Ministers Responsible for Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
SADC Affairs', unpublished document prepared for the ministerial meeting in Gaborone on 18 January 
1996, para 2.2.l(i). 
50 SADC Secretariat, 1996, 'The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: Meeting ofSADC 
Ministers Responsible for Foreign Affairs, Defence and SADC Affairs', unpublished minute of the meeting 
held in Gaborone on 18 January 1996, pg. 2. 
51 SADC, 2001, Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, Blantyre, article 2(g). 
52 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, op cit, article 4(a). 
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domestic affairs.53 The Mutual Defence Pact of 2003, concluded in the midst of the 
Zimbabwe crisis, contains two substantive provisions on non-interference in domestic 
affairs.54 Although the original aim in 1996 was that the Pact would address threats from 
outside the SADC region,55 the final version adds that the "State Parties undertake not to 
nurture, harbour or support any person or group of persons or institutions whose aim is to 
destabiHse the political, military, territorial and economic or social security ofa State 
Party".56 
The story of the SADC Tribunal is also instructive. The Summit was in no hurry to 
establish this supranational mechanism, which is provided for in the 1992 Treaty. The 
Tribunal is intended to adjudicate upon disputes between states and ensure adherence to 
the provisions of the Treaty. 57 With the potential thus to pose a significant challenge to 
sovereignty, it Janguished in the doldrums for many years. The Summit eventually 
approved the Protocol for the Tribunal in 2000 and the mechanism was set up in 2005. Its 
jurisdiction covers disputes between states, and between natural or legal persons and 
states, over the interpretation and application of the Treaty and the validity of acts 
undertaken by SADC institutions.58 Its rulings, according to the Protocol, are final and 
binding. 59 In 2008 this bold and intrusive provision was put to the test when a group of 
Zimbabwean farmers petitioned the Tribunal for relief over their government's seizure of 
their land. The Tribunal ruled in their favour, finding that the land seizures were 
unlawful, violated the SADC Treaty and should be halted immediately.6o President 
Mugabe dismissed the ruling as an "exercise in futility".61 When the farmers appealed to 
the Zimbabwe High Court to enforce the Tribunal's decision, the Court held that the 
53 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, op cit, preamble. 
54 SADC Mutual Defence Pact, 2003, Dar es Salaam, articles 7 and 8. 
55 SADC, 1996, 'Communique: Summit of Heads of State or Governments of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC)" Gaborone, 28 June, para 4.2.1 (I). 
56 Defence Pact, op cit, article 8. 
57 Treaty, op cit, article 16. 
S8 SADC, 2000, Protocol on Tribunal and Rules of Procedure, articles 14 and 15. The Protocol can be 
viewed at www.sadc.in1!tribunal/protocol.php. 
59 Protocol on Tribunal, op cit, article 24. 
60 L. Msipa, 2009, 'Demystifying the Zimbabwe SADC Tribunal Ruling', The Zimbabwe Telegraph, 9 
March, retrieved on 28 April 2009 from www.zimtelegraph.comlnews article.php?cat=23&id=257. 
61 R. Maingire, 2008, 'Mugabe Dismisses SADC Tribunal Ruling', The Zimbabwe Times, 4 December 
2008, retrieved on 28 April 2009 from www.thezimbabwetimes.coml?p=8330. 
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ruling had no legal effect as Parliament had not ratified the Tribunal Protocol.62 The 
SADC Summit made no public comment on the matter. 
Inevitably, the aversion of states to subordinating national decision-making to regional 
decisions and norms has stifled progress towards integration. It has also created an 
irresolvable tension between the SADC Treaty and state practice. The Treaty is supposed 
to be a legally binding document: member states must take all steps necessary to ensure 
the uniform application of the Treaty;63 they must take all necessary steps to accord the 
Treaty the force of national law;64 the protocols approved by the Summit are an integral 
part of the Treaty and must be ratified by the parties thereto;65 and the Summit may 
impose sanctions on a member that implements policies which undermine the 
organisation's principles and objectives.66 The integrity of the Treaty and the credibility 
of SADC have been sorely compromised by the failure of some states to adhere to 
democratic principles and by the failure of the collective forum to tackle this problem 
decisively. 
Furthermore, the idea that states retain their right to act independently or stand aloof if 
they are unhappy with collective security arrangements has greatly reduced the efficacy 
of these arrangements and sta es' confidence in them. In 1995 Joao Honwana and I 
highlighted the disadvantages of a non-binding and informal approach to conflict 
management and resolution: such approach would not regulate inter-state behaviour and 
the settlement of disputes in an agreed and predictable fashion, it would allow states to 
act in divergent and contradictory ways in crisis situations and it therefore militated 
against certainty and cohesion at the very times these elements were most needed.67 
These assertions were validated by SADC's divided response to the DRC rebellion in 
62 A. Chimora, 2009, 'SADC Tribunal's Ruling on Zimbabwe Overridden by Court', 4 March, retrieved on 
24 April 2009 from the website of Afrik.com at http://en.afrik.com/articieI5378.html. 
63 Treaty, op cit, article 6(4). 
64 Ibid, article 6(5). 
65 Ibid, article 22. 
66 Ibid, article 33(l)(b). 
67 L. Nathan and J. Honwana, 1995, 'After the Storm: Common Security and Conflict Resolution in 
Southern Africa', The Arusha Papers: A Working Series on Southern African Security, no. 3, Centre for 
Southern African Studies, University ofthe Western Cape and Centre for Foreign Relations, Dar es 
Salaam, February. 
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62 A. Chimora, 2009, 'SADC Tribunal's Ruling on Zimbabwe Overridden by Court', 4 March, retrieved on 
24 April 2009 from the website of Afrik.com at http://en.afrik.com/article15378.html. 
63 Treaty, op cit, article 6(4). 
64 Ibid, article 6(5). 
65 Ibid, article 22. 
66 Ibid, article 33(l)(b). 
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1998 (Section 4.4) and by the lack of clarity on the mandate with which South Africa and 
Botswana deployed troops in Lesotho that year (Section 4.3). In 1999 the Zimbabwean 
Defence Minister appeared to concede the point when he observed that the organisation's 
conflict resolution efforts had been conducted "on an ad hoc basis [that] is not good for 
the region".68 The Organ Protocol forrnalises SADC's approach to peacemaking but 
unified and consistent action has remained elusive because of the absence of common 
values. 
At the time of its inception, SADC noted that "many integration schemes [initiated by 
SADCC] in the past have failed because they were based on weak commitment by 
governments".69 This malaise has continued to plague the organisation because of the 
unwillingness of member states to cede sovereignty and, as discussed below, because of 
their limited economic and administrative capacity. 
5.5 Weak states 
Southern Africa is characterised by small economies with low productivity. In 2003 the 
combined Gross National Income (GNI) of the fourteen SADC states was $185.2 billion, 
of which South Africa accounted for $125.9 billion. The average GNI per capita was 
$1,711 and seven countries had a GNI per capita of less than $600. By way of 
comparison, in 2003 the GNI per capita was $2,250 in the Middle East and North Africa, 
$3,260 in Latin America and the Caribbean and $22,850 in the European Monetary 
Union.70 As a result of the low level of development, Southern African countries are 
heavily dependent on donor assistance. In 2004 SADC received approximately eighty per 
68 M. Mahachi, 1999, 'Remarks by the Zimbabwe Minister for Defence, Honourable M.E. Mahachi, During 
the Official Opening', presented at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the Inter-State Defence and 
Security Committee and SADC Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Mbabane, Swaziland, 26-27 October, pg. 2. 
69 SADC, Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy, op cit, pg. 27. 
70 All figures are in US dollars and were drawn from the World Bank's World Development Indicators 
database at www.worldbank.orgldatalguickreference/guickref.htmlon 14 November 2004. 
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cent of its project funding from the EU and other foreign sources, and it struggled to 
expend these funds.7 ! 
SADC's core mISSIon to promote integration assumes that the problem of small 
economies and underdevelopment can be addressed through the synergies generated by 
regional co-ordination and integration. Yet the weakness of states makes it extremely 
difficult for them to undertake co-ordination, let alone integration. The chronic lack of 
resources and expertise in the public sector undermines SADC in three ways: states that 
cannot effect proper co-ordination between their own departments struggle to fulfil the 
vastly more complicated task of co-ordination between countries; states that are unable to 
attend adequately to their domestic priorities devote scant attention and resources to 
regional projects; and the skills deficit cripples the implementation of multilateral 
programmes. 
Southern African leaders are acutely aware of these problems. In 1992 they noted that 
"the most binding constraint to development of the region is inadequate professionally 
and technically qualified and experienced personnel to plan and manage the development 
process efficiently and effectively".72 In 1995 the Council of Ministers described the 
region's capacity constraints as foHows: "shortages of skilled manpower; poor policy 
environment; low level of expertise; weak institutional capacity; inability for the retention 
of skills and expertise; [and] lack of incentives". 73 In these circumstances the potential to 
achieve synergy through regional projects is extremely low. 
The problems flowing from weak state capacity were exacerbated by the aversion to 
centralised structures at the regional level. Anxious to avoid the diminution of 
sovereignty that might· arise from having a strong Secretariat, SADC decided at its 
inception to allocate responsibility for co-ordinating multilateral programmes to 
individual states (Section 2.4). This approach was largely unsuccessfuL Ten years after its 
71 E. Tj0nneland, 2004, 'Foreign Aid and Regional Co-operation', SADC Barometer, no. 4, January, pp. 15-
16. 
72 SADC, Towards the Southern African Development Community, op cit, pg. 6. 
73 SADC, 1995, '1995 Annual Consultative Conference: Communique', Malawi, 4 February, para 5.2.1. 
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formation, SADC estimated that only twenty per cent of its 470 projects met the criteria 
for properly integrated regional projects, the rest being essentially national projects.74 
Following an extensive organisational review, in 2001 the Summit decided to centralise 
planning, co-ordination and implementation functions in the Secretariat (Section 3.6). 
The Secretariat's mandate remains administrative, however, and it has no political 
decision-making power. 
At the time of the restructuring in 2001, Jan Isaksen and Elling Tj0nneland pointed out 
that capacity constraints would continue to be a daunting challenge: 
The management of complex regional co-operation efforts requires the 
availability of a pool of political and technical experts. Such expertise is rare in 
the region. This is one reason why many sector co-ordinating units have 
performed so badly. The Secretariat is bound to experience difficulties in 
recruiting professionals. The technical capacity of most member countries to 
participate [in] and to implement [programmes] is also very limited.75 
By mid-2005, according to Garth Ie Pere and Elling Tj0nneland, an efficient Secretariat 
had not yet been established. Major capacity constraints were evident and there were 
unresolved issues relating to staffing and management. The Secretariat was gripped by 
bureaucratic inertia, the performance of governance structures was less than optimal and 
there were difficulties in defining priorities and finalising work programmes.76 Staff 
appointments had to conform to a quota system that had the positive aim of ensuring a 
balanced representation of member states but had the negative outcome of impairing 
efficiency since it prevented the organisation from hiring the best candidates.77 
74 J. Isaksen and E. Tj0nneland, 2001, Assessing the Restructuring o/SADe - Positions, Policies and 
Progress, Report ofthe Chr. Michelsen Institute, R 2001 :6, December, pg. 3. 
75 Ibid, pg. 21. 
76 G. Ie Pere and E. Tj011neland, 2005, 'Which Way SADC? Advancing Co-operation and Integration in 
Southern Africa', Occasional Paper, no. 50, Institute for Global Dialogue, October, pg. 15. 
77 Ibid, pg. 19. 
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The opposition of member states to centralised structures was most intense with regard to 
regional security arrangements, with Zimbabwe and other countries wanting to retain the 
informality of the Frontline States and avoid the creation of a permanent bureaucracy 
(Section 3.3). In addition, government officials believed that the staff of the SADC 
Secretariat would disclose confidential information to the organisation's donors (Section 
3.3). Consequently, the ministers responsible for drafting the Organ Protocol in 
1999/2000 decided that the Organ would not have a permanent secretariat; instead, its 
administrative functions would rotate annually among member states along with the 
rotating Chair of the Organ (Section 3.5). In 2001 the Summit rejected this position in 
favour of the Secretariat providing administrative support to the Organ. 
Since its establishment, the Organ Directorate in the Secretariat has experienced a 
number of problems arising from the political dynamics of the security body. Because the 
Organ is chaired by a head of state and because the members of SADC treat security and 
defence issues with a great deal of sensitivity, the Directorate staff are unsure whether 
they are accountable to, and should take their instructions from, the Executive Secretary 
or the Organ Chair and ministers. The staff are also uncertain whether their political 
principals want them to play a purely administrative role or take initiative on policy 
development, peacemaking and regional security projects. The uncertainty is heightened 
by the fact that the Chair of the Organ and the ministers who head the Organ's 
committees rotate annually. Different presidents and ministers have different expectations 
of the Directorate because their governments have different political orientations and 
different organisational and policy capacities. Adding to these complications are the deep 
political and strategic divisions within SADC (Chapter 3). In the absence of a strong 
consensus on regional security policy, and in the wake of the Organ imbroglio of the 
1990s, the staff of the Directorate are reluctant to take initiative and be assertive. Indeed, 
this is also true of the countries that chair the Organ. As a result of all these problems, the 
Directorate suffers from lethargy and low morale and is unlikely to attract dynamic 
staff.78 
78 These observations are based on the author's work with the Organ Directorate in a project aimed at 
building SADC's mediation capacity, 2007-2009. 
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The problem of weak and limited administrative capacity has not been of the same order 
as the political disputes between states but it has contributed to the lack of cohesion, 
consistency and co-ordination, prevented the development of sound systems and 
procedures and inhibited institutional capacity-building and learning. 
5.6 The role of South Africa 
South Africa accounted for 65 per cent of SADC's imports in 2001, 66 per cent of 
SADC's world-wide exports in 2002 and 79 per cent of SADC's exports within the 
SADC region in 2002.79 In 2007 South Africa's GDP of $277 billion was 66 per cent of 
the combined GDP of SADC countries; the next highest proportions of the combined 
GDP were those of Angola with 14 per cent, Tanzania with 3.9 per cent and Botswana 
with 2.8 per cent.80 The size of South Africa's economy, coupled with its democratic 
dispensation and comparatively substantial military capabilities, have given rise to 
expectations that it will playa hegemonic role or at least an active leadership role in the 
regIOn. 
In the period under review, Pretoria did not play these roles and did little to drive the 
integration project. Although some Southern African officials and scholars accused it of 
dominating its neighbours and behaving like a bully,81 this was true mainly with respect 
to the sheer weight of its economy and to the conduct of South African private sector 
companies that were expanding into the region. In the realm of regional politics and 
security, the main dynamic was one of neglect rather than domination.82 Officials from 
SADC states complained that Pretoria devoted less attention to its relations in Southern 
Africa than elsewhere, citing as evidence the absence of South African leaders from 
79 G. Oosthuizen, 2006, The Southern African Development Community: The Organisation, Its Policies and 
Prospects, Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue, pp. 255-6. 
80 These figures are drawn from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database, retrieved on 16 
November 2008 from http://siteresources. worldbank.orgIDATASTA TISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdt: 
81 Moyo, 'The African Renaissance', op cit; and A.W. Tapfumaneyi, 'Regional Security Cooperation', op 
cit. 
82 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, op cit, pp. 235-238. 
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important regional meetings because they were travelling abroad.83 For example, in 1995 
the Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, missed the annual meeting of the ISDSC in order to 
attend an arms exhibition in Saudi Arabia; the non-attendance was particularly striking 
because Modise was due to chair the ISDSC meeting.84 According to Mwesiga Baregu, 
the SADC countries "wonder whether South Africa is a SADC team player or is driven 
purely by self-interest". 85 
While Pretoria developed a coherent vision of common security In Southern Africa 
(Section 3.4), it did not have a comprehensive strategy and plan of action. Its defence, 
foreign affairs and intelligence officials often arrived at regional meetings on security co-
operation without a co-ordinated position, without ministerial directives and uncertain of 
the executive's stance on controversial issues;86 some of the officials complained 
privately of their difficulty in getting ministerial attention on regional security 
arrangements.87 Local analysts noted wryly that Deputy President Mbeki presented his 
vision of an African Renaissance at a greater number of non-African forums than African 
ones.
88 After Mbeki became President in 1999, he championed political, security and 
economic institution-building at the continental level through the AU and Nepad but 
devoted virtually no attention to these processes in Southern Africa. 
South Africa's failure to playa leadership role in the SADC region was due to a number 
of factors. First, under the Mandela presidency between 1994 and 1999 the ANC was 
confronted by the formidable challenge of becoming a government and the government 
was preoccupied with the daunting challenges of national reconciliation, transforming 
83 For example, 'African Tensions against SA on the Rise', Southern African Report, vol. 15, no. 33, 15 
August 1997, pp. 3-4; and 'Key Countries and Regions Neglected in Foreign Affairs', SouthScan, vol. 13, 
no. 20, 2 October 1998, pg. 157. 
84 The author attended this meeting as an advisor to the South African Deputy Minister of Defence, Ronnie 
Kasrils. 
85 M. Baregu, 2003, 'Economic and Military Security', in M. Baregu and C. Landsberg (eds), From Cape to 
Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 19-30 at 
pg.21. 
86 This observation is based on the author's participation in official meetings on regional security and on 
communication with South African government personnel between 1994 and 2001 (Section 1.7). 
87 Ibid. 
88 P. Vale and S. Maseko, 1998, 'South Africa and the African Renaissance', International Affairs, vol. 74, 
no. 2, pp. 271-285. 
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state departments and addressing the socio-economic legacy of apartheid. These 
challenges detracted from a sustained focus on the region and posed practical obstacles to 
regional engagement. For example, the ability of the armed forces to participate in 
multinational peace operations was constrained by the political and organisational 
complications arising from the merger of government and guerrilla armies in 1994. 
Second, during the Mbeki presidency Pretoria pursued an assertive foreign policy but, as 
noted above, the President largely ignored SADC as he devoted considerable energy to 
constructing the structures and policies of the AU. The reasons for this are a matter of 
speculation and probably reflect Mbeki's personal aspirations, strategic calculations and 
frustration with the limitations of his fellow heads of state in SADC. To assume 
leadership at the continental rather than the regional level was more in keeping with his 
ambition and fervent commitment to an African renaissance and was bound to do more 
to advance South Africa's profile and interests internationally. At the UN and in other 
global fora, the champion of Southern Africa would have been peripheral figure while the 
champion of Africa had stature, authority and influence. 
Third, South Africa is strong only by African standards. Viewed objectively, it is a 
developing country with a relatively weak state, a small economy, substantial poverty and 
unemployment and limited capacity to contribute to regional development.89 Given the 
combination of objective weakness and regional strength, Pretoria might believe that in 
many respects it has more to gain from economic and development co-operation with 
industrialised countries and strong developing states like Brazil and India than from co-
operation with its neighbours. The 2004 Strategic Plan of the South African Department 
of Foreign Affairs stated that "within the [Southern African] region the SADC remains 
the primary vehicle for South African policy and action to achieve regional development 
89 On weak administrative capacity in South Africa in this period see, for example, J. Bardill, 1998, 'The 
Presidential Review Commission and the Dilemmas of Administrative Reform in South Africa', 
Governance in Southern Africa: An Occasional Paper Series, no. 8, School of Government, University of 
the Western Cape. 
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in all development sectors".90 The unanswered question was whether the Southern 
African region was considered a high priority, if a priority at all. 
Fourth, the government has been wary of adopting a prominent political posture in 
Southern Africa because of its sensitivity to regional fears of domination, which are due 
both to the comparative strength of the country and to its ugly history of destabilisation in 
the 1980s. I have argued elsewhere that this cautiousness is excessive, falsely conflating 
leadership with domination, becoming a substitute for strategy and resulting in inertia.91 
Still, it is relevant that the legacy of apartheid and liberation politics has created a 
regional balance of power based more on history than on formal power, preventing 
Pretoria from playing the role of a local hegemon and enabling Zimbabwe to pose a rival 
source of influence.92 In the context of the debates around collective security 
arrangements, the contest between South Africa and Zimbabwe and their respective allies 
led to a prolonged stalemate in the 1990s and has still not been resolved. 
90 South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 2004, Strategic Plan, 2003-2005, March, pg. 20, retrieved 
on 25 January 2005 from www.dfa.gov.za. 
91 L. Nathan, 2005, 'Consistencies and Inconsistencies in South Africa's Foreign Policy in Africa', 
International Affairs, vol. 81, no. 2, pp. 361-372. 
92 P.H. Bischoff, 2003, 'External and Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy Ambiguity: South African 
Foreign Policy and the Projection of Pluralist Middle Power", Politikon, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 183-201; and M. 
Schoeman and C. Alden, 2003, 'The Hegemon That Wasn't: South Africa's Foreign Policy towards 
Zimbabwe', Strategic Review for Southern Africa, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 1-28. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE FICTION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA AS AN EMERGING 
SECURITY COMMUNITY 
6.1 Introduction 
The concept of a security community was developed by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues 
in a seminal study published in 1957. 1 In the International Relations literature the concept 
refers to a group of states whose ties are so close and whose affinity is so strong that they 
enjoy dependable expectations of peaceful change and thus regard the prospect of a war 
between them as inconceivable. A number of writers have claimed that Southern Africa is 
an 'emerging', 'embryonic' or 'nascent' security community (Section 1.6.2)? In this 
Chapter I refute that claim on empirical and theoretical grounds. 
The Chapter advances the thesis that domestic stability, defined as the absence of large-
scale violence in a country, is a necessary condition of a security community. Large-scale 
domestic violence precludes the existence of security communities for three reasons: it 
renders people and states insecure; it creates the risk of cross-border destabilisation and 
violence; and it generates uncertainty, tension and mistrust among states, inhibiting 
mutual confidence and a sense of collective identity. I conclude that the benchmark of a 
security community - dependable expectations of peaceful change - should apply as 
much within states as between them. In order to illustrate and validate this thesis, I 
consider not only SADC but also ASEAN and the Great Lakes region of central Africa. 
Both SADC and ASEAN aspire to become security communities but they will not 
succeed while they are plagued by domestic instability. 
The theoretical argument is an original contribution to the International Relations 
literature, which neglects the relationship between security communities and political 
1 K.W. Deutsch, S.A. Burrell, R.A. Kann, M. Lee Jr., M. Lichterman, R.E. Lindgren, F.L. Loewenheirn and 
R.W. Van Wagenen, 1957, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization 
in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
2 For references, see note 48 in Chapter 1. 
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stability and misinterprets Deutsch's concept as applying only to an absence of war 
between countries. For example, Alexander Wendt describes a security community as a 
social structure "composed of shared knowledge in which states trust one another to 
resolve disputes without war,,;3 Ole Waever depicts it as "a constellation where states 
don't expect to use war as a means in their quarrels,,;4 and John Mearsheimer portrays it 
as a group of states that renounce the use of military force and have a shared expectation 
of peaceful change.s In like manner, Mohammed Ayoob presents the essence ofa security 
community as foHows: 
The fact that regional security complexes are based on interactions of a 
conflictual as well as cooperative nature distinguishes them from the pluralistic 
security communities envisaged by Karl Deutsch. The latter are premised 
primarily on the existence and persistence of patterns of positive 
communication and interaction among a group of states that create shared 
identity and rule out the use of force in the settlement of disputes among them 
(Deutsch et al. 1957).6 
Many other International Relations scholars similarly define the Deutschian concept of a 
security community exclusively in terms of an absence of inter-state war.? Deutsch, in 
fact, also maintained that large-scale violence within countries was a fatal impediment to 
3 A. Wendt, 1995, 'Constructing International Politics', International Security, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 71-81 at 
pg.73. 
4 O. Waever, 1998, 'Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community', in E. 
Adler and M. Barnett (eds), Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 69-118 at 
pg.104. 
5 J. Mearsheimer, 1994/95, 'The False Promise oflnternational Institutions', International Security, vol. 19, 
no. 3, pp. 5-49 at pp. 38-39. 
6 M. Ayoob, 1999, 'From Regional System to Regional Society: Exploring Key Variables in the 
Construction of Regional Order', Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 53, no. 3, pp. 247-260 at 
pg.250. 
7 R. Jervis, 2002, 'Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace. Presidential Address, American 
Political Science Association, 2001', American Political Science Review, vol. 96, no. I, pp. 1-14 at pg. 1; 
M. Pugh, 2003, 'The World Order Politics of Reg iona liz at ion', in M. Pugh and W. Sidhu (eds), The United 
Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 31-46 at pp. 
39-40; and M. Mousseau, H. Hegre and J.R. Oneal, 2003, 'How the Wealth of Nations Conditions the 
Liberal Peace', European Journal of International Relations, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 277-314 at pg. 287. 
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the formation of a security community.s He stated his position very briefly, however, 
providing no theoretical or empirical elaboration. This Chapter aims to address that gap. 
The Chapter begins with a brief discussion on the concept of a security community and 
the claim that SADC is moving towards the formation of such a community. It then 
explores the reasons for viewing domestic stability as a necessary condition of security 
communities, focusing in tum on the security of people, the external impact of internal 
instability, and the volatility, uncertainty and risks that are associated with instability and 
militate against dependable expectations of peaceful change. The final Section presents 
Deutsch's position more fully and offers some explanations for the misreading of his 
position. 
6.2 The concept of a security community 
Deutsch and his colleagues defined a security community as "a group of people which 
has become integrated", where integration is understood as "the attainment, within a 
territory, of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and 
widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful 
change among its population".9 The 'sense of community' encompasses a "we feeling" 
and a dynamic process of mutual sympathy, consideration, loyalties, trust and 
responsiveness in decision-making. 1o In all the cases studied by Deutsch, "compatibility 
of main values" in the political domain was found to be an essential ingredient in the 
emergence of a security community. 11 Contemporary security communities include 
Western Europe; 12 the US and Canada;13 and the Nordic groUp.14 
8 K.W. Deutsch, 1961, 'Security Communities', in J. Rosenau (ed), International Politics and Foreign 
Policy, New York: Free Press, pp. 98-105 at pp. 99-103. 
9 Deutsch et ai, Political Community, op cit, pg. 5. 
10 Ibid, pg. 36. 
11 Ibid, pp. 46-9, 66 and 197. 
12 Waever, 'Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity', op cit. 
13 S.M. Shore, 1998, 'No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development ofthe Canadian-US Security 
Community, 1871-1940', in Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, op cit, pp. 333-367. 
14 H. Wiberg, 1993, 'Scandinavia', in R.D. Bums (ed), Encyclopaedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, 
vol. 1, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, pp. 209-226. 
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The benefits of establishing lasting pacific relations among a group of countries are 
substantial and self-evident. From a theoretical perspective, security communities pose a 
significant challenge to the core tenets of the realist school in International Relations. 
Realism holds that the anarchic structure of the international system necessarily and 
inescapably gives rise to fear of military confrontation and to relentless security 
competition among states; states are not involved in war at all times but they can never 
exclude the possibility that they might be attacked and they must therefore at all times be 
prepared for war. IS Contrary to these assertions, states that comprise a security 
community regard the use of force against each other to be unthinkable and eschew 
preparations for fighting one another. As Deutsch put it, "there is a real assurance that the 
members of that community will not fight each physically, but will settle their disputes in 
some other way".16 
Largely because of the onset of the Cold War and the dominance of the realist paradigm 
in the field of International Relations thereafter, Deutsch's pioneering work lay fallow for 
many years. In the 1990s his ideas were resuscitated, the most influential contribution 
being an edited volume by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, which develops the 
ideas, explores their application in different regional settings and offers a rich agenda for 
further research. 17 Adler and Barnett construct an analytical framework in which mutual 
trust and collective identity among a group of states are the necessary conditions of 
dependable expectations of peaceful change. Peaceful change is defined as "neither the 
expectation of nor the preparation for organised violence as a means to settle interstate 
disputes" .18 Evidence of a security community "should be sought in behaviour that 
suggests both the renunciation of military violence and the existence of deeply 
entrenched habits of peaceful resolution of conflict". 19 The emergence of the community 
is set in motion by any number of precipitating conditions that motivate the states to 
15 Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise', op cit. 
16 Deutsch et ai, Political Community, op cit, pg. 5. 
17 Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, op cit. 
18 E. Adler and M. Barnett, 1998, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities', in Adler and 
Barnett, Security Communities, op cit, pp. 29-65 at pg. 34. 
19 Ibid, pg. 35. 
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adopt similar orientations and engage in co-operation and policy co-ordination. Over time 
a positive interplay of interactions, institutions, social learning and other factors generates 
the requisite trust and transnational identity, which are themselves reciprocal and 
mutually reinforcing. 
The relationship between security communities and domestic stability has been neglected 
in the revival of Deutsch. Although several writers see instability as an obstacle to the 
formation of a security community in a particular case,20 others ignore the issue and there 
is no systematic treatment of the problem at a general level. As indicated above, Adler 
and Barnett define dependable expectations of peaceful change in terms of inter-state 
disputes. In their concluding chapter they note that some of the studies in their book 
hinted that political instability might be a barrier to the development of security 
communities but they do not discuss the matter further.21 
The Adler and Barnett volume inspired research on security communities in various parts 
of the world, including Southern Africa. The writers who argue that the SADC region is a 
nascent, emerging or embryonic security community do so principally on the basis of the 
construction of SADC's collective security arrangements through the establishment of the 
Organ in 1996, the Summit's ratification of the Organ Protocol in 2001 and the approval 
by heads of state of the Mutual Defence Pact in 2003.22 
20 M. Barnett and F.G. Gause III, 1998, 'Caravans in Opposite Directions: Society, State, and the 
Development of Community in the Gulf Cooperation Council', in Adler and Barnett, Security 
Communities, op cit, pp. 161-197; G. Gonzalez and S. Haggard, 1998, 'The United States and Mexico: A 
Pluralistic Security Community?', in Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, op cit, pp. 295-332 at pp. 
299-300; and A. Hurrell, 1998, 'An Emerging Security Community in South America?', in Adler and 
Barnett, Security Communities, pp. 228-264 at pg. 260. 
21 M. Barnett and E. Adler, 1998, 'Studying Security Communities in Theory, Comparison, and History', 
in Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, op cit, pp. 413-441 at pg. 425. 
22 N. Ngoma, 2003, 'SADC: Towards a Security Community?" African Security Review, vol. 12, no. 3, 
Institute for Security Studies, pp. 17-28; N. Ngoma, 2004, 'SADC's Mutual Defence Pact: A Final Move to 
a Security Community?" The Round Table, vol. 93, no. 375, pp. 411-423; N. Ngoma, 2005, Prospects/or 
a Security Community in Southern Africa: An Analysis of Regional Security in the Southern African 
Development Community, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies; M. van Aardt, 1997, 'The Emerging 
Security Framework in Southern Africa: Regime or Community?', Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 
vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 1-30; M.S. Lund and E. Roig, 1999, 'Southern Africa: An Emerging Security 
Community", in M. Mekenkamp, P. van Tongeren and H. van de Veen (eds), Searchingfor Peace in 
Africa: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities, pp. 391-5; F. SOderbaum, 1998, 
'The New Regionalism in Southern Africa', Politeia, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 75-94 at pp. 79-80; J. Selebi, 1999, 
'Building Collaborative Security in Southern Africa', African Security Review, vol. 8, no. 5; and A. 
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There are two major flaws with this argument: first, it focuses on formal structures and 
agreements rather than the actual state of affairs in Southern African countries, many of 
whose states and people are chronically insecure; and second, it ignores the fact that the 
agreements themselves are predicated not on expectations of peaceful change but on the 
possibility of violent conflict. The Organ's peacemaking mandate covers insurgencies, 
civil wars, coups and "large-scale violence between sections of the population or between 
a state and sections of the population, including genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross 
violation of human rights".23 The mandate also covers inter-state conflict in which an act 
of aggression or other form of military force has occurred or been threatened.24 These 
scenarIOS are not compatible with any convincing notion of an emerging security 
community. 
In 1996 SADC declared its intention of concluding a mutual defence pact in order to deal 
with external military threats to the region (Section 3.8). When the Pact was signed in 
2003, however, the organisation anticipated the possibility that the territorial integrity, 
political independence and security of a member state might be under threat from another 
SADC state.25 The Pact also stipulates that the signatories will not harbour or support any 
person or group whose aim is to destabilise the political, military, territorial, economic or 
social security of a signatory party (Section 3.8).26 Consequently, the Pact does not lend 
support to the notion of SADC as an emerging security community but points in the 
opposite direction. In the decade following SADC's formation in 1992, its members had 
not built mutual trust, collective identity and common values such that they were moving 
towards expectations of peaceful change. If anything, their confidence in this benign 
scenario had fallen. 
Hammerstad, 2005, 'Domestic Threats, Regional Solutions? The Challenge of Security Integration in 
Southern Africa', Review of International Studies, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 69-87. 
23 SADC, 2001, Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, Blantyre, article 11(2)(b). 
24 Ibid, article 1 1 (2)(a)(ii). 
25 SADC Mutual Defence Pact, 2003, Dar es Salaam, article 5(1). 
26 Ibid, article 8. 
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There are two major flaws with this argument: first, it focuses on formal structures and 
agreements rather than the actual state of affairs in Southern African countries, many of 
whose states and people are chronically insecure; and second, it ignores the fact that the 
agreements themselves are predicated not on expectations of peaceful change but on the 
possibility of violent conflict. The Organ's peacemaking mandate covers insurgencies, 
civil wars, coups and "large-scale violence between sections of the population or between 
a state and sections of the population, induding genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross 
violation of human rights".23 The mandate also covers inter-state conflict in which an act 
of aggression or other form of military force has occurred or been threatened.24 These 
scenarios are not compatible with any convincing notion of an emerging security 
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In 1996 SADC declared its intention of concluding a mutual defence pact in order to deal 
with external military threats to the region (Section 3.8). When the Pact was signed in 
2003, however, the organisation anticipated the possibility that the territorial integrity, 
political independence and security of a member state might be under threat from another 
SADC state?5 The Pact also stipulates that the signatories will not harbour or support any 
person or group whose aim is to destabilise the political, military, territorial, economic or 
social security of a signatory party (Section 3.8).26 Consequently, the Pact does not lend 
support to the notion of SADC as an emerging security community but points in the 
opposite direction. In the decade following SADC's formation in 1992, its members had 
not built mutual trust, collective identity and common values such that they were moving 
towards expectations of peaceful change. If anything, their confidence in this benign 
scenario had fallen. 
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6.3 The security of people 
The first reason for insisting that domestic stability is a necessary condition of a security 
community relates to the security of people and the question of credible terminology. If 
domestic stability were not a necessary condition, then it would be possible to classify as 
a security community a group of countries that enjoyed dependable expectations of 
peaceful change at the inter-state level but experienced large-scale violence at the intra-
state leveL The inhabitants of such countries would not be remotely secure, however, and 
substantial internal violence would threaten the security if not the survival of the state. It 
would strain credulity to claim that people and states in these circumstances are part of a 
'security community'. This term is admittedly a specialist one in the International 
Relations literature but its definition and usage ought to be convincing in their own right. 
By way of illustration, in 1998 Timothy Shaw described the Great Lakes region as an 
embryonic security community in light of a strategic alliance that had been forged 
between Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC in 1996.27 At that time Uganda was afflicted by 
fighting and terrorist activities in its northern and western provinces; Rwanda was 
confronted by the armed forces that had been responsible for the genocide in 1994 and 
were now conducting attacks on the country from bases in neighbouring DRC; Burundi 
was under military rule and beset by civil war; and the failed state of the DRC was 
shortly to be consumed by a rebellion and full-blown war in which the erstwhile allies 
fought each other. In August 1998 Uganda and Rwanda moved to overthrow the 
Congolese government and subsequently fought each other in pitched battles inside the 
DRC?8 The Great Lakes region was not an embryonic security community by any stretch 
of the imagination. 
The need for credible terminology and analytical clarity is not met by adopting a 
bifurcated approach that treats a group of unstable countries with co-operative relations 
27 T.M. Shaw, 1998, 'African Renaissance/African Alliance: Towards New Regionalisms and New 
Realism in the Great Lakes at the Start of the Twenty-First Century', Politeia, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 60-74. 
28 International Crisis Group, 2000, 'Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War', leG Africa 
Report, no. 26, 20 December. 
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as a security community at the inter-state level but not as a security community at the 
intra-state level. Frederick S()derbaum applies this approach to Southern Africa: "In so far 
as intergovernmental relations are concerned, Southern Africa has been transformed from 
an explosive security complex towards a security community with cooperative relations, 
that is, the level of regionness has increased"; on the other hand, "when moving beyond 
intergovernmental relations, Southern Africa is not of course a security community".29 
Beyond intergovernmental relations, according to Siiderbaum, lay civil wars in Angola 
and the DRC as well as "potentially explosive" situations in "Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Lesotho, Swaziland, etc [where] order is upheld mainly with power and by the armed 
forces".3o To suggest that these countries were part of a security community, however 
qualified, defies common sense. Elsewhere S(Sderbaum takes a different and preferable 
position, maintaining that a security community exists where "the level of regionness 
makes it inconceivable to solve conflicts by violent means, between as well as within 
states" [emphasis added].3l 
Whatever the nature of inter-state relations within a constellation of countries, a citizenry 
engulfed by internal violence cannot plausibly be said to inhabit a security community. 
Deutsch's work will be discussed more fully below but it can be noted at this stage that 
an emphasis on the security of people is consistent with his academic orientation as a 
sociologist. From that perspective, the members of a security community are not limited 
to states but include "individuals", "citizens", "groups" and "populations". 32 In Deutsch's 
much-cited summary defi ition, a security community comprises a group of people that 
has become integrated, and the subject of dependable expectations of peaceful change are 
not states but rather the population of the territory covered by the community.33 
This sociological orientation leads Andrew Hurrell, in an article contending that Brazil 
and Argentina have forged a loosely knit security community, to conclude that other 
29 Soderbaum, 'The New Regionalism in Southern Africa', op cit. 
30 Ibid, pg. 80. 
31 B. Hettne and F. SMerbaum, 1998, 'The New Regionalism Approach', Politeia, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 6-21 
at pg. 11. 
32 Deutsch, 'Security Communities', op cit. 
33 Deutsch et ai, Political Community, op cit, pg. 5. 
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South American and Central American countries are not part of that community or any 
other security community.34 Although civil wars and social violence in these countries 
have largely been contained within national borders, the levels of violence have been 
very high and include the killing of 165 000 people in Colombia in the 1980s. Hurrell 
insists that these phenomena are antithetical to the concept of a security community: 
If, as Deutsch originally argued, security communities have to do with groups 
of people, as well as collectivities, integrated to the point that they will not 
fight each other, then it becomes impossible to hide behind the distinction 
between international wars and other forms of social conflict [original 
emphasis].35 
Hurrell does not explore the point further, adding simply that "precisely how one deals 
with the relationship between social and international violence [in the context of security 
communities] is not clear".36 The solution advocated in this dissertation is to define a 
security community as excluding both types of violence. This has the analytical benefit of 
avoiding misleading terminology and the normative benefit of avoiding a state-centric 
model that neglects the security f people. 
6.4 The impact of domestic instability on inter-state relations 
The second reason for insisting that domestic stability is a necessary condition of a 
security community has to do with the linkages between intra- and inter-state conflict. 
Large-scale internal violence can lead to cross-border violence in various forms: 
hostilities between states; rebel attacks from neighbouring countries; military operations 
by governments against these forces; and collective enforcement action aimed at restoring 
domestic order. Even iflocal violence has not had any of these effects in a given case, the 
34 Hurrell, • An Emerging Security Community in South America?', op cit. 
35 Ibid, pg. 260. 
36 Ibid. 
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risk that they might arise in the future cannot reasonably be excluded. Dependable 
expectations of peaceful international interaction are therefore unattainable. 
Chapter 4 described some of the dramatic linkages between intra-and inter-state conflict 
in the SADC region. In 1998 the DRC was thrown into turmoil when rebels backed by 
Rwanda and Uganda moved to overthrow President Kabila. When Kabila called on 
SADC for support, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia responded positively and deployed 
troops in the Congo (Section 4.4). The DRC's neighbours in the north, Sudan and Chad, 
also came to Kabila's defence, while Burundi lined up with Rwanda and Uganda against 
him. The continent's biggest war began as an internal rebellion and soon involved as 
many as nine African countries.37 Hostilities raged until 2002, when most of the state 
belligerents withdrew from the Congo, and continued to simmer and flare thereafter. 
The state belligerents had several reasons for initiating and prolonging their military 
engagement, including access to the DRC's abundant natural resources. In addition, a 
primary motivation for the governments of Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and Burundi related 
to national security concerns arising from instability in their own countries. Each of them 
was subject to attacks by one of the rebel groups based in the DRC. These groups 
included the Interahamwe and other forces responsible for the Rwandan genocide; the 
Ugandan guerrilla movement known as the Allied Democratic Forces; the Angolan 
rebels, Unita; and the Burundi rebels, the Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie. 
Zimbabwe's motivation was also related to internal instability. As noted previously, a UN 
report on the DRC war asserted that Harare's military involvement was due partly to its 
need to build domestic support for the government in light of the country's declining 
standards of living and "gross mismanagement of the economy, unchecked public 
expenditure, corruption and one-party rule" (Section 4.4).38 
37 International Crisis Group, 1998, 'Congo at War: A Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the 
Central African Conflict', lCG Congo Report, no. 2, 17 November; International Crisis Group, 'Scramble 
for the Congo', op cit; and D. Shearer, 1999, 'Africa's Great War', Survival, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 89-106. 
38 United Nations, 2001, 'Addendum to the Report ofthe Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of 
National Resources and Other Forms of Wealth ofthe Democratic Republic of Congo', Security Council 
document S/200 111 072, 13 November, para 76. 
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There are many other examples from central and southern Africa of cross-border 
destabilisation and violence flowing from domestic instability.39 In the 1980s apartheid 
South Africa repeatedly launched military attacks on countries that provided rear bases to 
the liberation army of the ANC. In the post-apartheid era Angola was involved in an 
attempted coup against President Chiluba of Zambia in 1997 and threatened to invade 
Zambia the following year on the grounds that Unita was operating from Zambian 
territory and receiving assistance from its officials. In 2000 Zambia accused the Angolan 
army of conducting operations against Unita on its territory. In 1997 Angola provided 
military aid to General Sassou-Nguesso in his coup against President Pascal Lissouba of 
Congo-Brazzaville, the latter's government having had close ties to Unita.4o 
The DRC war illustrates how internal violence can thwart progress towards a security 
community by undermining trust and cohesion within a regional organisation. The war 
was not the original cause of the division between the militarist and pacific camps in 
SADC but it deepened the division and heightened the antagonism between member 
states (Section 4.4). The DRC war also showed the potential for collective enforcement 
action in response to domestic instability, although in this case the military action was 
taken not by the regional organisation but by a sub-set of its members. Similarly, in 1998 
South Africa and Botswana deployed troops in Lesotho with the aim of restoring 
domestic order in the face of a mutiny and incipient coup; the intervention led to protests 
and anarchy in Maseru and, more broadly, confounded expectations of a peaceful 
regional environment after the ending of apartheid and the Cold War (Section 4.3). 
In Southeast Asia, as in the SADC region, domestic instability has proven to be a major 
impediment to the emergence of a security community. The establishment of ASEAN in 
1967 institutionalised a reconciliation process among member states and has provided 
39 C. Clapham (ed), 1998, African Guerrillas, Oxford: James Currey; O. Furley and R. May (eds), 2001, 
African Interventionist States, Aldershot: Ashgate; and J.W. Harbeson and D. Rothchild (eds), 2000, Africa 
in World Politics: The African State System in Flux (3rd edition), Boulder: Westview. 
40 On Angola's military interventions as external projections of its internal conflict, see N. McQueen, 2001, 
'Angola', in Furley and May, African Interventionist States, op cit, pp. 93-117. 
169 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
them with a forum in which to address or ignore their disputes peacefully.41 The 
organisation's success in this regard is attributed to a set of inter-state norms and 
principles referred to as the' ASEAN way' .42 As noted in Section 5.3, these norms and 
principles include dialogue, consultation, decision-making by consensus and 'agreeing to 
disagree'; non-interference in domestic affairs; peaceful settlement of disputes; avoidance 
of the threat or use of force; and respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of states. In 2003 ASEAN declared its intention of building on this approach 
with the explicit goal of becoming a security community by 2020.43 
The 'ASEAN way' has had contradictory effects on prospects of achieving that goal. On 
the one hand, it has helped to manage bilateral disputes between states and prevent their 
escalation into violence and regional destabilisation.44 On the other hand, the non-
interference norm has prevented ASEAN from addressing gross human rights abuses and 
domestic violence that severely undermined the security of large numbers of people. The 
organisation was paralysed when separatist insurgencies and anarchy gripped Indonesia 
after the fall of President Suharto in 1998, it was ineffectual in relation to the East Timor 
catastrophe in 1999 and it has been stung by criticism of its soft approach to the military 
regime in Myanmar.45 These failures, the resulting damage to ASEAN's credibility and 
the persistent problem of domestic instability have provoked a contentious debate around 
softening the non-interference doctrine in favour of 'enhanced interaction' or 'flexible 
engagement' when internal problems have negative external implications.46 
41 M. Leifer, 1989, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia, London: Routledge; and D.R. Dillon, 
1997, 'Contemporary Security Challenges in Southeast Asia', Parameters, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 119-133. 
42 A. Acharya, 1998, 'Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia', in Adler and 
Barnett, Security Communities, op cit, pp. 198-227; and M. Caballero-Anthony, 2003, 'The 
RegionaJization of Peace in Asia', in Pugh and Sidhu, The United Nations and Regional Security, op cit, 
pp. 195-211. 
43 ASEAN, 2003, Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, Bali, 7 October, retrieved on 8 March 2005 from the 
ASEAN website at www.aseansec.org/15159.htm. 
44 Acharya, 'Collective Identity and Conflict Management', op cit; and Caballero-Anthony, 'The 
Regionalization of Peace in Asia', op cit. 
45 Caballero-Anthony, 'The Regionalization of Peace in Asia', op cit; and N. Khoo, 2004, 'Constructing 
Southeast Asian Security: The Pitfalls of Imagining a Security Community and the Temptations of 
Orthodoxy', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 17, no. I, pp. 137-153. 
46 A. Acharya, 2004, 'How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional 
Change in Asian Regionalism', International Organization, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 239-275 at pp. 260-264. 
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In the 1970s and 1980s ASEAN regionalism was driven by the vulnerability of states to 
internal political threats, especially those of communist insurgency. This led to close co-
operation against cross-border movement by guerrillas, promoting solidarity and 
mitigating tension around territorial disputes.47 Yet when the internal threat was posed by 
popular movements and resistance to authoritarianism in the 1990s, state solidarity 
bolstered regime security at the expense of human security. Amitav Acharya argues 
further that authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia have pursued co-operation and 
community-building mainly at the inter-governmental level. This type of regionalism, he 
maintains, does not translate into the kind of societal co-operation and sense of 
community envisaged by Deutsch. The emergence of a regional civil society opposed to 
ASEAN's position on human rights, democracy and the environment indicates the 
dissatisfactions with, and incompleteness of, the community-building enterprise led by 
elites.48 Even at the inter-governmental level, domestic instability and the fragility of 
regimes have inhibited multilateralism in certain areas, most evidently in the defence 
sector where no multilateral co-operation had taken place by the late 1990s.49 
Significantly, Indonesia's plan of action for the creation of the ASEAN security 
community, tabled in February 2004, included a proposal to form a regional 
peacekeeping force for deployment in internal conflicts. According to the Indonesian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the force was needed because "most conflicts in the world 
today are not between states but within states, and internal strife has a way of spilling 
over from the embattled country to the rest of the region".5o Equally significant, the 
proposed peacekeeping force was the most controversial aspect of the plan.5l The 
proposal was rejected by Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand, and was shelved by ASEAN 
in June 2004.52 
47 Acharya, 'Collective Identity and Conflict Management', op cit, pp. 203-204. 
48 Ibid, pp. 215-216. 
49 Ibid, pp. 217-218. 
50 Quoted in A. Simamora, 2004, 'UN Welcomes ASEAN Peacekeeping Force, Promises Help', Jakarta 
Post, 27 February. 
51 A. Kuah, 2004, 'The ASEAN Security Community: Struggling with the Details', IDSS Commentaries 
2112004, retrieved on 2 March 2005 from the website of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in 
Singapore at www.idss.edu.sg. 
52 'ASEAN Drops Regional Peacekeepers Plan', Asian Political News, 21 June 2004. 
171 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
The spill-over effects of internal strife can be illustrated with reference to the tension 
between Thailand and neighbouring Myanmar in 2002. The tension stemmed largely 
from the activities of two ethnic rebel armies in Myanmar, the Wa and the Shan. In May 
the Thai military moved heavy artillery, infantry and special force units to the border area 
and launched an offensive against the Wa, which it blamed for the flow of drugs into 
Thailand. Simultaneously, the Shan engaged in hostilities with the Wa and the Myanmar 
army. Thai villagers were evacuated and Burmese civilians fled across the border. 
Rangoon claimed that the Thai army was supporting the Shan and rebel Karen militias 
and had violated its sovereignty and territorial integrity. In protest, it closed its major 
border checkpoints with Thailand, denied visas to Thai officials and launched a stream of 
anti-Thai invective. In June fighting between Myanmar soldiers and Shan guerrillas 
spilled over into Thailand, forcing more villagers to flee; unidentified gunmen attacked a 
school bus, killing and injuring Thai students; Myanmar officials welded shut the steel 
gate on the Thai-Burmese Friendship Bridge; and both countries stepped up naval patrols 
of border waters. 53 This is an incomplete picture of the external impact of the Myanmar 
conflict but it exemplifies the obstacle that instability poses to mutual trust, a sense of 
community and dependable expectations of peaceful change. 
In terms of both human security and relations between states, domestic instability 
precludes the attainment of a security community in Southeast Asia. A more detailed 
account of these dynamics would cover the effects ofIndonesia's political volatility on its 
de facto leadership of ASEAN and on strategic assessments of peaceful change in the 
region; Malaysia's harsh treatment of refugees fleeing violence and repression in 
Indonesia; and the extent to which Singapore's military posture derives from concerns 
about a recurrence of the violence directed at the Chinese minority communities in 
Indonesia and Malaysia in the 1960s. 
53 The infonnation in this paragraph is drawn from the website of the Thai newspaper, The Nation, retrieved 
on 8 March 2005 from www.nationmultimedia.com/specialslbunna. 
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6.5 The problem of volatility and uncertainty 
The third reason for arguing that domestic stability is a necessary condition of a security 
community relates to the volatility and uncertainty associated with instability. As noted 
above, a security community entails so strong a degree of mutual trust and sense of 
community among a group of states that they consider the use and threat of force against 
each other to be unthinkable. Each of these elements requires consistency and 
predictability in the international behaviour of states: trust is a social phenomenon that 
rests on "the assessment that another actor will behave in ways that are consistent with 
normative expectations,,;54 the requisite sense of community includes "mutually 
successful predictions of behaviour,,;55 and reliability in the conduct of states is a sine 
qua non of dependable expectations of peaceful change. 
Realist scholars of International Relations maintain that the problem of uncertainty can 
never be overcome sufficiently to eliminate mistrust and the fear of war: states cannot 
divine perfectly the intention of other states and therefore cannot be completely certain 
that other states will refrain from attacking them. 56 Established security communities 
refute this position. The Nordic states, the West European countries, and the US and 
Canada have achieved sufficient trust and sense of community to have made long-term 
security decisions of a pacific nature with a high level of confidence. As Sean Shore 
asserts with respect to the US and Canada: 
It is simply unimaginable to most observers ... that the two North American 
countries could fight a war over any issue that is likely to arise. As 5,000 miles 
(and 125 years) of undefended border attest, neither side regards the other as 
even a potential military threat, despite the fact that interstate anarchy 
supposedly makes war an ever-present possibility.57 
54 Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities', op cit, pg. 46. 
55 Deutsch et ai, Political Community, op cit, pg. 36. 
56 Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise', op cit, pg. 10. 
57 Shore, 'No Fences Make Good Neighbors', op cit, pg. 333. 
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When states are unstable, however, the problem of uncertainty is acute. The domestic 
outcomes and regional repercussions of large-scale internal violence are not controllable 
or predictable. Some negative effects might be foreseeable but the volatility associated 
with instability can also throw up nasty surprises. For example, the conflicts between 
Angola and its neighbours that supported Unita were inevitable but the scope of the DRC 
war, the impact of that war on SADC and the hostilities between Uganda and Rwanda 
were unexpected. In the early 1990s Uganda had supported the Rwandan Patriotic Front, 
which seized power and ended the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. In 1996 Uganda and 
Rwanda combined forces to help Laurent Kabila overthrow President Mobutu in the DRC 
and in 1998 they orchestrated a rebellion to oust President Kabila. Despite this military 
alliance and close political and familial relations, in 1999 and 2000 Rwanda and Uganda 
fought each other inside the DRC.s8 By 2001 their relationship had deteriorated to the 
point that they appeared to be supporting each other's armed opposition and preparing for 
war.59 
As illustrated by this conflict and the tension between Thailand and Myanmar, domestic 
instability can precipitate a sequence of retaliatory moves that are not easily contained. 
Moreover, instability can provoke sudden changes in political leadership, through 
rebellions, assassinations, coups or palace revolts, which give rise to radical shifts in 
political orientation. Even if the leaders of a group of unstable states are confident of a 
common commitment to pacific inter-state relations, they cannot be certain that this 
commitment will be shared by future leaders. 
Although domestic instability does not always lead to cross-border violence, the risk of 
such violence cannot be ruled out. The nature and level of the risk may be indeterminate 
but it would be imprudent of states in a volatile environment to base their security and 
defence plans on long-term expectations of peaceful change. They are more likely to err 
on the side of caution. This is precisely what SADC did when it gave the Organ a 
mandate to address a range of violent scenarios between and within member states; the 
58 International Crisis Group, 'Scramble for the Congo', op cit 
59 International Crisis Group, 2001, 'Rwanda/Uganda: A Dangerous War of Nerves', Africa Briefing, no. 7, 
21 December. 
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Organ Protocol also includes the option of collective enforcement action when peaceful 
forms of conflict resolution have failed. 60 In Southeast Asia, concerns about the spill-over 
effects of domestic strife motivated Indonesia to advocate the establishment of a regional 
peacekeeping force as part of the ASEAN security community. 
In light of the preceding discussion, some tentative observations can be made about the 
factors that heighten the risk of domestic instability leading to cross-border violence. The 
observations are tentative because the sample of regions drawn on here is small and the 
volatility of unstable countries militates against definitive generalisations. 
Scale, intensity and duration of domestic violence. The duration, scale and intensity of 
internal violence are among the most significant risk factors. In the African examples 
cited above, with the exception of the intervention by South Africa and Botswana in 
Lesotho, the domestic violence that led to cross-border use of force was large-scale, 
widespread and sustained. There have been many incidents of low level and short-term 
violence in SADC countries that did not spill over national boundaries. The most 
prominent of these incidents in the period under review include a failed secessionist bid 
in Namibia in 1998/9, election disputes in Malawi in 1999, a constitutional crisis in 
Zambia in 2001 and election disputes on the Zanzibar island of Tanzania in 2001. 
Proximity. The risk of cross-border violence emanating from domestic instability is 
naturally greatest among contiguous countries. Rebel movements are more likely to be 
based in neighbouring countries than further afield, and military operations undertaken by 
states are easier to mount and sustain across immediate borders than over longer 
distances. States that are separated from one another by other countries or a geographical 
buffer are generally less vulnerable to being affected by each other's instability. For 
example, the islands of Mauritius and Seychelles are members of SADC but have not 
been destabilised by conflict on the mainland. 
60 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, op cit, article 1 1 (3)(c). 
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Balance of power. States are likely to weigh up the military balance of power when 
contemplating whether to use force against other states and whether the objective of such 
force is to send a warning, hold territory or overthrow a government. Weak states are 
obviously less likely to attack strong states than the other way round. Balance of power 
considerations are also relevant in regional enforcement operations. It is improbable, for 
example, that South Africa and Botswana would have sent troops into Zimbabwe or 
Angola had the latter countries experienced the conditions that prevailed in the tiny 
kingdom of Lesotho in 1998. 
Strategic culture of states and regional organisations. The foreign policy and strategic 
culture of states are important factors. As discussed at length in this dissertation, in the 
period under review SADC was split into pacific and militarist camps with respect to 
regional conflict management and resolution. Other regional bodies might have a more 
unified posture. At one end of the spectrum, member states might generally view 
enforcement action as an appropriate strategy. ECOWAS, which has often resorted to 
peace enforcement, falls into this category.61 At the opposite end of the spectrum, 
ASEAN has studiously avoided such interventions. 
Defensive versus offensive motivations. States that are subject to cross-border violence 
have a strong incentive to defend themselves by employing force aimed at neutralising 
the threat. Yet the distinction between offensive and defensive motives in external 
military interventions is often blurred. In the African cases considered above, most of the 
intervening states were driven by a mixture of national security concerns, regional 
aspirations and economic interests. Moreover, all the belligerents in a given case 
invariably profess to have a defensive motivation and independent observers may be hard 
pressed to make a categorical judgement on the competing claims. 
Structural instability. The preceding discussion has focused on the proximate 
relationships between domestic instability and cross-border violence in Africa, such as 
61 A. Adebajo, 2002, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, Boulder 
and London: Lynne Rienner. 
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when the rebels of one country are based in another country. However, the proximate 
relationships and relevant causal factors can only be properly understood in the context of 
deep structural instability on the continent, which flows from state weakness, 
authoritarianism and repression, marginalisation of ethnic groups and underdevelopment 
and inequality. These problems are compounded by the legacy of the colonial powers' 
arbitrary demarcation of national boundaries that split ethnic communities. As a result of 
these structural and historical factors, many African states have a propensity to large-
scale internal violence.62 Their weakness prevents them from halting the flow of violence, 
weapons and armed groups into and out of their territories and contributes to the absence 
of a clear dividing line between domestic and regional instability. 
6.6 Deutsch revisited 
As noted in Section 6.1, Deutsch is widely understood by International Relations scholars 
to have defined security communities in terms of dependable expectations of peaceful 
change only at the inter-state leveL I show below that this is mistaken. 
It is helpful to begin by recalling Deutsch's distinction between pluralistic and 
amalgamated security communities. In the former, which are the subject of contemporary 
scholarship, the states that comprise the community retain their sovereignty. In the latter, 
now largely ignored in the literature and unlikely to occur in practice, there is a merger of 
political units such as when independent provinces or countries become a unitary state. 
Deutsch considered the following to be amalgamated security communities: the US since 
1877, Italy since 1859, Canada since 1867, the Netherlands since 1831 and Switzerland 
since 1848. The pluralistic security communities that he studied included, inter alia, 
Norway and Sweden since 1907, the US and Canada since the 1870s and France and 
Belgium from the nineteenth century.63 
62 L. Nathan, 2004, 'The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: The Structural Causes of Crisis and Violence 
in Africa', in P. Batchelor and K. Kingma (eds), Demilitarisation and Peace-Building in Southern Africa: 
Concepts and Processes, vol. 1, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 41-58. 
63 Deutsch et ai, Political Community, op cit, pp. 29-30. 
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Deutsch regarded actual and potential large-scale internal violence as an absolute 
impediment to the formation of amalgamated security communities. He maintained that 
amalgamation per se did not necessarily lead to a security community because the 
"subjects of a common government may feel acutely insecure and act accordingly. They 
may fear or expect the outbreak of large-scale violence in civil wars or wars of 
secession".64 They might even welcome such wars if they perceived existing institutions 
to be a threat to some of their major values or an intolerable frustration of some of their 
desires.65 Examples of political communities "which are not in fact security communities 
are certain types of dictatorships, and countries on the eve of civil war or revolution".66 
Deutsch's general remarks about security communities, whether pluralistic or 
amalgamated, similarly reflect a concern with internal violence. He argued that these 
communities, by definition, exclude "organised preparations for war or large-scale 
violence among their participants" and "imply stable expectations of peace among the 
participating units or groups, whether or not there has been a merger of their political 
institutions".67 It followed that the attainment of a security community "can be tested 
operationally in terms of the absence or presence of significant organized preparations for 
war or large-scale violence among its members".68 No security community existed where 
military action by one political unit against a "smaller political unit, whether a state, a 
people, or a territory... was considered a sufficiently practical possibility to warrant a 
significant allocation ofresources".69 Nor was a security community established where a 
political community ended in secession or civil war.70 According to Deutsch, judgements 
about the stability of amalgamated and non-amalgamated governments would thus reveal 
much about the likelihood of achieving or maintaining a security community in a given 
area.71 
64 Deutsch, 'Security Communities', op cit, pg. 99. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid, pg. 103. 
67 Ibid, pg. 98. 
68 Ibid, pg. 99. 
69 Deutsch et aI, Political Community. op cit, pg. 32. 
70 Ibid, pg. 6. 
71 Deutsch, 'Security Communities', op cit, pg. 103. 
178 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Given these emphatic assertions, how might the subsequent misreading of Deutsch and 
the neglect of internal stability in the literature on security communities be explained? 
There are three possible explanations. First, it may simply be the case that the importance 
of political stability has gone unnoticed, or been taken for granted, because all the 
established security communities, such as Western Europe, Scandinavia and the US and 
Canada, comprise stable countries. Second, Deutsch barely mentions the problem of 
instability in his famous co-authored book of 1957. He is more forthcoming in his 1961 
article cited above, which appears in the first edition of an International Relations reader 
edited by James Rosenau72 but does not appear in the more commonly found second 
edition of that reader.73 Third, security communities are a promising solution to what 
Deutsch described as the fundamental problem of international politics and organisation, 
namely "the creation of conditions under which stable, peaceful relations among nation 
states are possible and Hkely".74 Security communities are consequently a matter of 
scholarly interest mainly in the field of International Relations, which concentrates on the 
external conduct and relations of states rather than on their domestic politics.75 
If domestic instability characterised by large-scale violence is a necessary condition for 
the formation of a security community, then a number of further questions arise: Does 
instability obstruct the emergence of these communities even in the absence of large-
scale violence? What impact does structural instability have on security communities? 
What is the relationship between security communities and domestic political systems? 
And is it possible for non-democratic states to constitute a security community? These 
questions are addressed in the following Chapter. 
72 J. Rosenau (ed), 1961, International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York: Free Press. 
731. Rosenau (ed), 1969, International Politics and Foreign Policy (revised edition), New York: Free Press. 
74 Deutsch, 'Security Communities', op cit, pg. 98. 
75 A notable exception is the regional security complex theory developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, 
which systematically links the problem of security at the national, regional and global levels. See B. Buzan 
and o. Waever, 2003, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
The first Section of this Chapter consolidates the thesis regarding the internal and 
external logic of regional organisations and the argument that SADC's attempts to create 
a viable security regime foundered on an absence of common values rather than an 
absence of common interests. It concludes by underlining the political and structural 
limitations of SADC, which flow from the organisation's primary feature as a forum of 
states and preclude it from doing things that lie beyond the will and capacity of these 
states. 
The second Section summarises the errors in the claim that Southern Africa is a nascent, 
emerging or embryonic security community and casts doubt on the validity and utility of 
the concept of a nascent security community. It then discusses the relationship between 
security communities, structural instability and the character of political systems and 
concludes that democratic systems are a necessary feature of these communities. 
7.2 Regional security arrangements 
7.2.1 The internal and external logic o/regional organisations 
In the decade following SADC's formation in 1992, the organisation's efforts to establish 
collective security arrangements were constrained and undermined by the political, 
economic and administrative weakness of member states, by their reluctance to surrender 
a measure of sovereignty to a security regime comprising binding rules and procedures 
and, most importantly, by their lack of shared values. These deep-rooted and inter-linked 
political and structural dynamics also prevented effective peacemaking. 
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In order to explain SADC's difficulty in setting up a viable security regIme, 
distinguished in Chapter 5 between the internal and external logic of a regional 
organisation as necessary but separate requirements for effectiveness. This framework 
gives equal weight to interests and values. The external logic refers to the promotion of 
state interests, which is the motivation for forming the body. If the external logic is not 
met to the satisfaction of member states, there is no incentive for them to co-ordinate 
their activities, bear the costs entailed in maintaining the organisation and agree to be 
bound by principles, rules and procedures that restrict their sovereign decision-making. 
The internal logic refers to the necessity for member states to have common values, in the 
absence of which a regional organisation will struggle to achieve cohesion, adopt 
communal policies and pursue collective strategies. According to Stephen Krasner, the 
constituent elements of an international regime are rules, procedures, norms and 
principles, which are intended to facilitate co-operation towards the attainment of some 
objective. I The defining features of a regime are its principles and norms rather than its 
rules and procedures; the latter are but a technical expression of the former. 2 It follows 
that states will not be able to set up a viable regime if they cannot reach agreement on its 
core principles and norms. Common values are the glue that binds the regime. They 
contribute to building trust between states, facilitate the formulation of common policies, 
minimise the compromises that states might have to make in order to achieve consensus 
and reduce the risk that some of them will deviate from the communal policies. 
There is no universal set of common values applicable to regimes across time and space. 
The relevant values depend on the focus and purpose of the regime, the character of its 
member states and the circumstances pertaining to the regime. Deutsch suggested that the 
values that bind the members of a pluralistic security community are those that the 
members themselves deem cardinal (Section 5.3). This position is likely to apply equally 
to regional organisations and security regimes. The internal logic, in other words, is a 
subjective condition. It is the member states that decide which values are critical to 
i S.D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', in 
Krasner (ed), International Regimes, p. 3. 
2 Ibid. 
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progress, whether there is sufficient normative congruence among them and whether their 
normative differences are impediments to co-operation, co-ordination or integration. 
Unsurprisingly, the Southern African experience indicates that the threshold for 
normative congruence is higher in a formal organisation with binding rules than in an 
informal coalition, it is higher in the realm of security than in less politicised areas of 
functional co-operation, and a regional organisation might consequently make more 
progress in certain areas than others. 
In the case of SADC, the external logic of a common security regime was satisfied at the 
time at which the organisation was formed and this has not changed in the intervening 
years. The founding documents spelt out clearly the rationale for co-operation and co-
ordination on regional security and conflict resolution in order to maintain a peaceful and 
stable environment conducive to integration, development and economic growth (Chapter 
2). The evidence that this discourse genuinely reflected state interests, and was not 
simply rhetorical, lies in the effort that member states put into constructing regional 
security arrangements, the intensity of their disputes over the strategic orientation of the 
Organ and the Mutual Defence Pact and their persistence when the disputes escalated to 
the point that they were damaging state relations and SADC as a whole. 
Whereas the external logic of a security regime was met, the internal logic was not. The 
absence of common values considered cardinal by SADC states was the major obstacle to 
progress. States regarded the division between the militarist and pacific camps as 
fundamental and, for many years, as largely unbridgeable. This stifled the development of 
the Organ and the Pact, rendered unattainable the cohesion and unity of purpose needed 
for effective peacemaking and generated acute mistrust and animosity between states. 
The absence of shared democratic values made it impossible for SADC to playa useful 
role in relation to the violence and insecurity induced by authoritarianism and human 
rights abuses in member states. 
The principles of state solidarity and anti-imperialism constituted a weak exception to the 
general problem of an absence of common values. These principles were brought to the 
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fore during the Zimbabwe crisis, uniting the SADC members against Western criticism of 
Harare (sections 4.2 and 5.3). The principles were limited in scope, however, and strictly 
defensive and reactive. They were relevant when. foreign powers put pressure on a SADC 
state but they had no utility whatsoever when SADC countries were at loggerheads with 
each other in relation to the Organ imbroglio, the impasse around the Mutual Defence 
Pact, the DRC rebellion in 1998 and the tension between Angola and Zambia in 1998-
2000. In relation to policy development and institution-building, the principles of 
solidarity and anti-imperialism did not lay the basis for a forward-looking agenda, a 
programme of action or a common foreign policy; nor did they provide a foundation for 
regional security arrangements. Their net result was to promote regime security at the 
expense of human security and regional security. 
One of the striking features of SADC's travails in the sphere of security and peacemaking 
is the foresight of its founding documents, which recognised the limitations of historical 
solidarity, the significance of common values and the importance of democratic norms. 
The 1992 SADC Declaration put the case as follows: 
Southern Africa has also been an arena of conflict and militarisation, 
associated with the struggle for political liberation and the fight against 
apartheid and racism, aggression and destabilisation. A new Southern Africa, 
concerned with peace and development, must find a more abiding basis for 
continuing political solidarity and cooperation in order to guarantee mutual 
peace and security in the region and to free resources from military to 
productive development activities. 
The countries of Southern Africa will, therefore, work out and adopt a 
framework of cooperation which provides for .... common economic, political 
[and] social values and systems, enhancing enterprise and competitiveness, 
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democracy and good governance, respect for the rule of law and the guarantee 
of human rights, popular participation and alleviation ofpoverty.3 
The SADC Treaty of 1992 formalised this aspiration by making the evolution of common 
political values, systems and institutions one of the objectives of the organisation and by 
enshrining human rights, democracy and the rule of law as core principles (Section 2.4). 
SADC's official commitment to forging common values never wavered thereafter. The 
Common Agenda contained in the amended Treaty of 2001 states that SADC's policies 
include the promotion of "common political values, systems and other shared values 
which are transmitted through institutions which are democratic, legitimate, and 
effective".4 Similarly, the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan of 2003 
presents SADC's vision as follows: 
The SADC vision is one of a common future, a future in a regional community 
that will ensure economic well-being, improvement of the standards of living 
and quality of life, freedom and social justice and peace and security for the 
peoples of Southern Africa. This shared vision is anchored on the common 
values and principles and the historical and cultural affinities that exist 
amongst the peoples of Southern Africa.s 
The argument that SADC's failure to set up an effective security regime was due to 
normative divisions does not imply that interests were unimportant. As noted above, 
Southern African states believed that a security regime would serve their interests. Given 
the different size, location, political dynamics, economic strength and security 
circumstances of these states, there were undoubtedly different interests at play, as well 
as competing interests. Most prominently, South Africa and Zimbabwe were engaged in a 
struggle for regional leadership. Nevertheless, the members of the pacific grouping were 
united around common values rather than common interests, this was equally true of the 
3 SADC, 1992, Towards the Southern African Development Community: A Declaration by the Heads of 
State or Government of Southern African States, Windhoek, pg. 5. 
4 SADC, 2001, Amended Declaration and Treaty of SA DC, article SA. 
5 SADC, 2003, Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, Gaborone, section 1.2.1. 
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members O,f the militarist blO,c, and the disagreements between the two' grO,Ups stemmed 
net from different interests but frO,m a no'rmative dispute en the best way O,f pursuing the 
cO,mmunal interest in regio'nai security. 
The divergent reactio'ns to' the ORC crisis in 1998 prO,vide a specific example Qfthis po'int 
(SectiO,n 4.4). The different respO,nses O,f SO,uth Africa and Zimbabwe cannO,t be explained 
in terms Qf different interests. Beth cQuntries appear to' have been mQtivated by a similar 
cQmbinatiQn Qf eCQnQmic interests and strategic and PQlitical CQncerns. This might 
explain their cQmpetitive relatiQnship but it dQes nQt aCCQunt fQr their o'pPQsing strategies. 
Instead, as with SADC's security disputes mQre broadly, their preferred strategy was 
shaped by CQre values embedded in their PQlitical and strategic culture. 
7.2.2 The limitations of regional organisations 
At the heart Qf all SAOC's difficulties lies a systemic tensiQn between regiQnal gQals and 
natiQnal cQnstraints. The Qverarching dilemma is that regiQnal integratiQn is an endeavQur 
intended to' strengthen states in variQus ways but SQuthern African cQuntries are in 
variQus ways tQo' weak to' undertake this endeavQur successfully. SADC's ability to' build 
strong states and cQntribute to' the transfQrmatio'n Qf authQritarian states is severely 
limited because its capacity, QrientatiQn and mandate derive frQm these states. SAOC 
cannQt drive their transfQrmatiQn, attend to' their dQmestic security prQblems Qr adQpt a 
structure that ensures the prQmQtiQn Qf demQcracy, as SQme writers recQmmend,6 because 
it is a fQrum Qf states that will nQt permit it to' do' this. NQr can SADC fQrge a genuine 
CO,nsensus en peacemaking and gQvernance, as Qther writers advQcate,7 since the majo'r 
6 A. Zacarias, 2003, 'Redefining Security', in M. Baregu and C. Landsberg (eds), From Cape to Congo: 
Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 31-51 at pp. 47-
48; M. Baregu and C. Landsberg, 2003, 'Southern Africa's Security Architecture: Challenges and 
Prospects', in Baregu and Landsberg, From Cape to Congo, op cit, pp. 345-354; C. de Coning, 1999, 
'Breaking the SADC Organ Impasse: Report of a Seminar on the Operationalisation ofthe SADC Organ', 
ACCORD Occasional Paper, no. 6, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes; and A. 
Hammerstad, 2005, 'Domestic Threats, Regional Solutions? The Challenge of Security Integration in 
Southern Africa', Review of International Studies, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 69-87 at pg. 87. 
7 R. Williams, 2001, 'From Collective Security to Peacebuilding? The Challenges of Managing Regional 
Security in Southern Africa', in Clapham, Mills, Morner and Sidiropoulos, Regional Integration in 
Southern Africa, op cit, pp. 10 1-113 at pp. 109-112. 
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disputes relate to the primary political features of member states and are not susceptible 
to compromise. Paradoxically, the challenge of common security in Southern Africa is 
thus more of a national than a regional challenge. 
It cannot be assumed that Southern Africa will follow the trajectory of Europe, with 
common values gradually emerging over time and giving rise inexorably to effective 
political and security institutions. The communal values that are needed to generate 
affinity and trust derive from national policies, which can change over time in the 
direction of either convergence or divergence. Progress is therefore uncertain. It seems 
clear, though, that without greater normative convergence, the Organ is unlikely to 
become more effective. If, at some point in the future, the regional security project were 
driven with enthusiasm and a common strategic outlook by South Africa and a 
democratic Zimbabwe, most of the other SADC countries would follow suit. It would 
probably then be possible for SADC to make a meaningful contribution to security in 
Southern Africa. 
7.3 Security communities 
7.3.1 Nascent security communities 
For a security community to exist, it is not sufficient that states have a formal 
commitment to pacific relations, that they perceive the risk of war among them as low or 
even that they have avoided hostilities for a lengthy period. Formal commitments can be 
breached and the low probability or absence of war might be due to the balance of power, 
limited military capabilities or other dynamics unrelated to a security community. 
Instead, in the International Relations literature a security community is understood to 
arise where states have achieved a level of integration, trust, collective identity, common 
values and sense of community sufficiently strong for them to have dependable 
expectations of peaceful change. They regard the use and threat of force against each 
other as unthinkable and hence avoid preparations for fighting one another. 
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The writers who argue that Southern Africa is a nascent, emerging or embryonic security 
community base this assertion on the development of SADC's security agreements and 
mechanisms (Section 6.2). The argument is mistaken because it ignores the content of the 
agreements, which anticipate the possibility of large-scale violence and thus do not 
reflect expectations of peaceful change. Nor does the argument take proper account of the 
failure of the security mechanisms to prevent and resolve violent conflict, the absence of 
common values among member states and the pervasive insecurity, high level of mistrust 
and low level of integration in the region. 
The idea of a 'nascent' security community derives from the temporal model constructed 
by Adler and Barnett, who distinguish between 'nascent', 'ascendant' and 'mature' 
phases in the evolution of these communities.8 Adler and Barnett define the nascent phase 
as one in which states begin to co-ordinate their relations, increase their communication 
and interaction and set up international organisations in order to build mutual trust, 
enhance security and pursue other objectives.9 In the concluding chapter of their edited 
volume, however, Adler and Barnett note that nearly all the case studies in the book 
indicate significant deviations from the temporal model and they add that the 
classification is only intended to be a heuristic device to aid research. 10 
The notion of a nascent security community lacks precision if it is divorced from the 
defining characteristic of security communities, namely dependable expectations of 
peaceful change. For example, Anne Hammerstad, drawing on the framework of Adler 
and Barnett, describes Southern Africa as a nascent security community because of 
positive security developments, including growing security communication and co-
operation among the SADC states, but she also maintains that the region is not likely to 
become a fully fledged security community. 11 In this formulation, then, SADC is a 
8 E. Adler and M. Barnett, 1998, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities', in E. Adler and 
M. Barnett (eds), Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 29-65 at pp. 49-57. 
9 Ibid, pp. 50-53. 
10 M. Barnett and E. Adler, 1998, 'Studying Security Communities in Theory, Comparison, and History', in 
Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, op cit, pp. 413-441 at pp. 431-5. 
11 Hammerstad, 'Domestic Threats, Regional Solutions?', op cit. 
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nascent security community even though the benchmark of dependable expectations of 
peaceful change is neither present nor foreseeable. This is an unsatisfactory formulation. 
The term 'nascent security community' surely implies that the states in question are 
progressing towards dependable expectations of peaceful change but do not yet discount 
the risk that some of them might use force against others of them. Definite movement of 
this kind - from uncertainty and insecurity to an absence thereof at some unknown point 
in the future - is very hard to ascertain and prove as a contemporary claim about a group 
of countries. The identification of a nascent security community is far easier and more 
plausible when reviewing retrospectively the historical trajectory of a well established 
security community. 
7.3.2 Domestic instability and security communities 
The International Relations literature pays no attention to the relationship between 
security communities and domestic instability. Yet instability, in the form of large-scale 
violence, appears to preclude the emergence or existence of these communities. It 
generates tension and suspicion between states, preventing the forging of trust and 
common identity. It can also lead to cross-border violence through inter-state hostilities, 
enforcement action by regional organisations, rebel attacks on neighbouring states and 
government operations against rebels based in other countries. Even if domestic 
instability in a given state has not had any of these effects, it rules out dependable 
expectations of peaceful international change because other states cannot exclude the 
possibility of spill-over violence and cannot be certain about the reliability of unstable 
regimes. In the national context, instability undermines the security of both citizens and 
the state. The inhabitants of a country wracked by violence cannot plausibly be said to 
live in a security community. Dependable expectations of peaceful change at the 
domestic level should therefore be considered to be a necessary condition of security 
communities. 
This formulation is consistent with the approach adopted by Deutsch. In the International 
Relations literature he is portrayed as having focused exclusively on the absence of inter-
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state violence but in fact he also insisted that security communities could not be attained 
in a context of large-scale domestic violence (Chapter 6). Moreover, Deutsch, who was a 
sociologist rather than an International Relations scholar, placed people and not states at 
the heart of his theory. According to Deutsch, a security community consists of a group 
of people that has become integrated and the holder of dependable expectations of 
peaceful change is the population of the territory covered by the community. 12 
In the case of SADC, domestic instability has generated acute mistrust among member 
states, weakened the sense of regional community, in several instances led to cross-
border violence and in all cases rendered citizens profoundly insecure. Instability in 
Southeast Asia has similarly impeded the development of trust and certainty required by 
a security community. By contrast, the Nordic, West European and US-Canadian security 
communities are comprised solely of stable countries. Broadening the necessary 
conditions of a security community to encompass political stability would therefore not 
alter their classification as such. It would be most relevant when considering whether 
groups that include unstable countries have attained or could attain that status. In all 
likelihood, security communities lie beyond their reach. 
The argument presented here gives rise to a number of questions about the relationship 
between domestic stability and security communities. The first set of questions flows 
from Deutsch's observation that these communities exclude large-scale violence and 
preparations therefor. 13 Does the term 'large-scale' require a more precise specification 
according to the intensity, duration and scope of the violence or would such specification 
inevitably be arbitrary? In any event, is the emphasis on large-scale violence entirely 
necessary? As described briefly below, domestic instability without substantial violence 
has prevented the formation of a security community between the US and Mexico and 
between the members of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCq.14 What kind or level of 
12 K.W. Deutsch, S.A. Burrell, R.A. Kann, M. Lee Jr., M. Lichterman, R.E. Lindgren, F.L. Loewenheim 
and R.W. Van Wagenen, 1957, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International 
Organization in the Light of Historical Expen'ence, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pg. 5. 
13 K.W. Deutsch, 1961, 'Security Communities', in 1. Rosenau (ed), International Politics and Foreign 
Policy, New York: Free Press, pp. 98-105 at pg. 99. 
14 The GCC states are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
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instability short of violence obstructs the emergence of a security community? 
Conversely, what kind or level of instability can be sustained by a security community? 
Guadalupe Gonzalez and Stephan Haggard contend that US concerns about Mexico's 
lack of political stability and democracy contributed to the absence of a tightly coupled 
security community between the two countries in the 1990s; the concerns inhibited the 
development of trust, institutionalised co-operation, common identity and US confidence 
in Mexico's capacity to make credible international commitments. IS In the case of the 
GCC, domestic instability without large-scale internal violence has likewise stifled 
progress towards achieving relations of trust and a sense of common identity. All the 
GCC countries are monarchies, they are situated in a broader, turbulent region with 
competing religious and nationalist pressures from more powerful states and, with the 
exception of Bahrain, they have Sunni majorities and substantial Shi'i minorities. The 
ruling elites' fear of instability has led to some internal security co-operation among the 
GCC members but it has also generated mutual suspicion. The elites are apprehensive 
that their neighbours might support their domestic opponents and undermine their 
regimes. Accusations of domestic interference in the 1990s were partly responsible for 
reversing the progress towards security co-operation that had been achieved by the GCC 
in the 1980s and during the Gulf crisis of 1990. 16 
A second, related set of questions arises from the fact that the problem of violence in 
connection with security communities is not limited to extant manifestations of physical 
force. The perceptions of relevant actors about the future are also germane because a 
security community rests on the subjective notion of dependable expectations of peaceful 
change. Notwithstanding the absence of violence in a given country, its citizens and 
neighbouring states might believe that there is a strong possibility of domestic or cross-
border violence occurring in the future. These perceptions are likely to be based on 
assessments of the country's structural stability. Should this phenomenon feature more 
15 G. Gonzalez and S. Haggard, 1998, 'The United States and Mexico: A Pluralistic Security Community?" 
in Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, op cit, pp. 295-332. 
16 M. Barnett and F.G. Gause III, 1998, 'Caravans in Opposite Directions: Society, State, and the 
Development of Community in the Gulf Cooperation Council', in Adler and Barnett, Security 
Communities, op cit, pp. 161-197. 
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prominently in the equation? How might the relationship between structural instability 
and security communities be defined in a general fashion? 
Structural instability is typically associated with weak states. Most African states are 
weak in the sense that they have limited economic, political and military resources and 
also in the sense that they have low levels of socio-political cohesion. I? Both aspects of 
weakness inhibit the emergence of security communities. The lack of social cohesion, 
political legitimacy, consensual decision-making, control over borders and monopoly of 
force combine to make states vulnerable to internal violence, external interference in their 
domestic affairs and destabilisation as a result of strife in neighbouring countries. As 
noted in Section 6.5, there is consequently no clear dividing line between domestic and 
regional instability. In the post-Cold War period, state weakness, military interventions 
by states and state system frailty have been mutually reinforcing. 18 As Christopher 
Clapham expounds, in the 1990s "the OAU consensus on respect for existing boundaries 
and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states crumbled under the strain [of 
state decline and collapse], as smugglers, guerrillas and refugees moved back and forth 
across frontiers that were quite impossible to police". 19 
Structural instability and domestic violence in Africa and Southeast Asia are frequently 
linked to authoritarian rule, raising a third set of questions concerning the relationship 
between security communities and the character of domestic political systems. Although 
Deutsch found that "compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making" 
was a pre-requisite for the birth of these communities, his historical survey did not reveal 
which values were most conducive to their attainment; instead, the relevant values 
differed from one security community to another across time and space (Section 5.3). 
Adler and Barnett were similarly unable to reach a definitive conclusion on the basis of 
the case studies in their edited volume. They note that the prevailing view among 
17 B. Buzan and O.Waever, 2003, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pg. 219. 
18 D. Rothchild and J.W. Harbeson, 2000, 'The African State and State System in Flux', in J.W. Harbeson 
and D. Rothchild (eds), 2000, Africa in World Politics: The African State System in Flux (3rd edition), 
Boulder: Westview, op cit, pp. 3-20. 
19 C. Clapham, 1998, 'Discerning the New Africa', International Affairs, vol. 74, no. 2, pp. 263-269 at pg. 
264. 
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scholars is that security communities are associated with liberalism and democracy.2o 
However, they believe there is insufficient evidence to say that liberalism is the cognitive 
structure best suited to building trust between states and they caution against the 
presumption that security communities cannot exist in non-Western regions, such as 
Southeast Asia.21 
If domestic stability and human security are indeed essential components of a security 
community, then it is hard to imagine that a security community could encompass 
authoritarian states. Unlike democracy, authoritarian rule does not provide citizens with 
the means to effect political change freely and peacefully. In most instances the state 
must rely on coercion to ensure compliance, there is an inherent potential for violent 
resistance, and rebellions can unleash massive violence, topple governments and 
destabilise adjacent countries. Deutsch maintained that security communities exclude 
"certain types of dictatorships".22 It is unclear why any type of dictatorship would make 
the cut. In response to the concern of Adler and Barnett regarding Southeast Asia, it is 
worth noting that ASEAN's 2003 vision for its envisaged security community includes 
the promotion and achievement of democracy.23 
In light of the above, an analytical framework for understanding the relationship between 
domestic stability and security communities would entail a matrix whose variables 
include actual and potential violence; structural instability; the security of states and 
people; the linkages between intra- and inter-state conflict; subjective perceptions of 
these dynamics held by citizens and neighbouring states; and the nature of the constituent 
domestic political systems. A comprehensive general description of the relationship 
might thus be elusive or overly complicated because of the large number of interacting 
variables. A parsimonious theoretical solution would be to define a security community 
in terms of dependable expectations of peaceful change at both domestic and 
20 Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities', op cit, pg. 40. 
21 Ibid, pp. 40-41; and Barnett and Adler, 'Studying Security Communities', op cit, pp. 425-426. 
22 Deutsch, 'Security Communities', op cit, pg.l03. 
23 ASEAN, 2003, Declaration of ASEAN Concord fl, Bali, 7 October, retrieved on 8 March 2005 from the 
ASEAN website at www.aseansec.orglI5159.htm. See also ASEAN, 2004, 'ASEAN Security Community 
Plan of Action', retrieved on 18 March 2005 from the ASEAN website at \vww.aseansec.orgl16826.htm. 
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international levels. The complexities and contingencies would then be treated as 
empirical and analytical problems that require investigation in each set of circumstances. 
In conclusion, SADC, ASEAN and other regional organisations that include unstable 
countries will not succeed in their quest to become security communities if they focus 
exclusively on inter-state relations and adhere rigidly to the principle of non-interference 
in domestic affairs. Large-scale internal violence cannot be quarantined and invariably 
begets regional instability. Yet regional bodies are ill-equipped to deal with this problem. 
They might engage in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding from time to time 
with varying degrees of success but their ability to strengthen weak states and transform 
authoritarian ones is severely limited. Weak states unavoidably establish weak 
organisations, authoritarian regimes set up multilateral forums that tolerate 
authoritarianism, and insecure governments are loath to create regional bodies with 
supranational authority. These constraints are compounded by the fact that regional 
forums are themselves destabilised when domestic instability generates tension between 
states. For the foreseeable future, Southern Africa will remain a community of insecurity. 
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